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ABSTRACT 
AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF PAIN 
MAY 2004 
DENNIS MICHAEL GRUBER 
B.S. YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY 
M.S. OHIO UNIVERSITY 
Ed.D. GEORGIA SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY 
Directed by: Professor William M. Reynolds 
Pain is a discursive construct of science and medicine. Through the 
discourses of biopower and technoscience pain is used to construct and maintain 
the social body. Biopower and technoscience are discursive practices that are 
enveloped within the disciplines of Western society. Specifically, the disciplines 
of education, science, and medicine use biopower and technoscience to normalize 
the body and construct binaries which create the abnormal. The cyborg is a 
discursive practice used to implode the binaries of the disciplines which maintain 
the social body. Through the implosion of binaries, the binary of mind/body is no 
longer plausible in the explanation of pain. Neuropathic chronic pain and 
phantom limb pain become cyborg discourses which operate to deconstruct the 
pedagogies of science and medicine. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The production of a discourse, "... is at once controlled, selected, 
organized and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures ..." 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 216) which look to exclude, prohibit, complement, etc. within 
a complex web of knowledge and power. The production of the discourse of pain 
is interwoven within a complex web of discourses which entangles patients, their 
friends and families, and care givers. The patient's discourse of pain is 
determined by specific knowledge making practices of disciplines within 
western society of which he/she is a member. By disciplines (Foucault, 
1975/1995), I am referring to those structures which through, "... meticulous 
control of the operations of the body, ... assured the constant subjection of its 
forces ..." (p. 137) upon the body. These disciplines operate through discursive 
practices. Foucault believes (as cited in Cherryholmes, 1987, p. 300) discursive 
practices are produced, "... by specific social, political, and economic 
arrangements." Further, "discursive practices cannot be extricated from their 
historical setting" (1987, pp. 300-301). History, society, school, etc. produce the 
discourse we use as part of everyday life. When someone is in pain, the 
sensations that he/she feels, the emotions that appear, the cultural responses that 
are displayed are drawn from his/her personal discourses and histories: 
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While we are immersed in our personal histories, our practices are not 
simply the products of our intent and will. We take part in the routines of 
daily life, we use language that is socially constructed to make 
camaraderie with others possible, and we develop affiliations with the 
roles and institutions that give form to our identities. We speak not only 
as ourselves but, as Foucault reminds us, as part of discourse of power as 
the social complexities and subtleties of intellectual life are inter-related 
with institutions. That which is seemingly normal and natural about our 
participation in the world are the very acts about which we need to 
become curious and critical. (Popkewitz as cited in Blades, 1997, p. 116) 
As individuals with personal histories and experiences, we are integrated and 
assimilated within the disciplines of a postmodern society. Our memberships 
within these disciplines are often a matter of our daily routines, work, school, 
religion, etc. These choices are often an outcome of our personal historv, culture, 
and health. The discourse of pain within these practices is, "... an intimate 
feature of lived experience of individuals in the context of their local social world 
and historical epoch" (Kleinman, Brodwin, Good, & DelVecchio Good, 1992, p. 
2). Our personal meanings and understandings of pain are bound bv our 
individual histories and our memberships within society. Our discourse mav 
change with time, however, the discourse of pain cannot be separated from the 
cultural and the social world by which we are constructed (Greenhalgh, 2001; 
Kleinman et al, 1992; Morris, 1991; Zborowski, 1952). In order to comprehend 
the discourses of pain, understandings and meanings of how individual pain is 
constructed need to be located. We must find, "... where one enters into the 
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conversation and with what experiences one enters into the [discourse]" 
(Weaver, 2002, p. 3). 
The discursive practices of pain are understood by some in western 
culture through three paradigms: Christianity, secular humanism, and medicine. 
These paradigms are not exclusive of each other (Sawchuk, Busby & Burns, 
1999). All three paradigms operate to objectify the body within their specific 
discourses and to subject the individual to their techniques. The Christian 
paradigm explains pain through the commission of sin. Pain is for sinners to 
suffer with. Through their suffering, Christians spiritually move closer to God 
and His Kingdom (Sawchuk et al., 1999). The most exalted narrative of pain and 
suffering is that of The Crucifixion of Christ. The narrative of The Crucifixion is 
commemorated annually during the Holy Week with its culmination on Easter 
Sunday and the celebration of The Resurrection. The suffering of Christ is vividlv 
documented throughout the Christian world and is the most important narrative 
in Christian religious practices (Christensen, 1980; Morris, 1991; Scarry, 1985; 
Wall, 2000). The narrative of the Crucifixion is so powerful within Christianitv, 
that it serves its members as a constant reminder of suffering, pain, and sacrifice. 
Through their suffering they must prove their worthiness to God. Pope John Paul 
II writes: 
What we express with the word suffering seems to be particularly 
essential to the nature of Man. Sharing in the sufferings of Christ is, at the 
same time, suffering for the Kingdom of God. In the just eyes of God, 
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before this justice, those who share in Christ's sufferings become worthy 
of this Kingdom, (as cited in Wall, 2000, p. 62) 
The second paradigm, secular humanism, has its roots within Christianity. 
Secular humanism utilizes the practice of the confession and self-help as the 
cornerstone of its treatment for pain (Sawchuk et al., 1999). By confessing, the 
individual produces the Truth (Foucault, 1976/1990). The confession, "... 
exonerates, redeems, and purifies ... ; it unburdens him/[her], of his/[her] 
wrongs, liberates him/[her], and promises him/ [her] salvation" (p. 62). By 
confessing, the individual is unburdening him/herself of his/her pain. If the 
confession is difficult to divulge, it is often assisted through pharmaceutical 
intervention. As in the case of Prozac, psychopharmacology supports a," ... 
discourse of human pain and suffering ..." (Lewis, 2003, p. 56). Pain as 
understood by this paradigm is psychological and behavioral in origin. 
Interestingly, this paradigm of pain is becoming less oppositional to pathological 
pain. 
The final paradigm is practiced within western medicine. Clinico- 
pathological medicine is the foundational epistemology for present dav medicine 
in western society. Its belief lay in the foundation that the cause of pain is the 
direct result of an inflammatory response. Inflammation is the direct result of a 
pathological lesion such as an injury to soft tissue (muscles or ligaments). Pain 
occurs as the result of peripheral nociceptors being sensitized by chemical 
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mediators, mechanical deformity, and/or thermal nociception (Wright, 2002a). 
Nociceptors are afferent nerve fibers which carry noxious (painful) stimuli 
towards the dorsal horn of the spinal cord. The sensory information is 
interpreted at the dorsal horn and may or may not be relayed further up the 
spinal cord towards the higher brain centers. 
Inflammatory pain does not constitute direct injury to the peripheral 
nerves. It is associated with injury outside of the nervous system (Wright, 
Benson, & O'Callaghan, 2002). The inflammatory process operates in a manner 
similar to the following example. An individual injures his/her ankle during an 
activity of daily living (ADL) like walking or running. The individual lands on 
his/her ankle incorrectly and the inflammatory process begins immediately. The 
mechanism of injury, such as inversion at the subtalar joint, causes tearing of the 
soft tissue surrounding the joint. A cascade of biochemical and hormonal events 
begins to take place. Pain in this situation is categorized as acute and coincides 
with acute inflammation. Acute pain, which is the fourth cardinal sign of 
inflammation, is caused by a multitude of responses. One of which is the 
distension of tissue spaces resulting from the ankle injury. Swelling which results 
from vascular disruption and pressure mechanically deform the nerve endings 
causing a noxious (painful) stimulus. Pain is also caused by biochemical irritation 
of the nociceptors (Kloth & Miller, 1990). These processes all sensitize the 
nociceptor receptors. This basic understanding of inflammation and acute pain 
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does not coincide with clinico-pathological medicine out of chance. These two 
medical enigmas, inflammation and the clinico-pathological have conjugated and 
evolved for over three hundred years (Foucault, 1963/1994). 
Pain within the Christian and clinico-pathological paradigms are signified 
as corporeal experience. Pain is somatic affirmation (Olalquiaga, 1999) for the 
patient, society, medicine, curriculum, care giver, etc. Through somatic 
affirmation, the postmodern body becomes the, "... precious bibelot, the 
foundation and last bastion of all that is dear to humanity" (Olalquiaga, 1999, p. 
257). As humanity clings to all that is flesh, bodies become sites where discourse 
is applied (Bailey, 2003; Olalquiaga, 1999; Pinar, 2002). Bodies become sites of 
hybridization (Haraway, 2000a). They become sites of identity politics 
(Kincheloe, 1998; Livingston, 2002). They become objects of surveillance 
(Foucault, 1995; Frank & Jones, 2003). All bodies become subject to the 
micropractices of power within specific discursive practices. The flesh (subject) is 
subjected to the technologies of the disciplines in order to be defined as self 
(Frank & Jones, 2003). 
At the intersection of curriculum and medical discourses, the body- 
becomes objectified as part of their respective discursive practices. Curriculum as 
a discipline subjects the body to its operative control through objectification of 
relationships between school subjects, culture, the world, and knowledge (Pinar, 
Reynolds, Slattery, & Taubman, 1996). Medicine like curriculum, subjects the 
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body to its disciplinary practices through its discursive practices of pain's reason 
for being. Medicine plays a significant role in establishing and maintaining 
beliefs that pain is largely a sensory and genetic outcome that can be cured with 
the appropriate technoscientific intervention to modify that particular sensation 
(Morris, 1991; Wall, 2000). The accepted definition of pain adopted by the 
International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) is, "... an unpleasant 
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue 
damage or described in terms of such damage" (IASP Task Force on Taxonomy, 
1994, pp. 2-3). This definition is formed through pathological and physiological 
explanations as its primary source of being. Within the framework of this 
definition, the cause of pain is correlated with tissue damage. Clinico- 
pathological pain is the offspring of anatomo-clinical medicine. With the onset of 
anatomical tissue damage, inflammation begins, and a pathological state is 
created. Pain is uncovered during the objective portion of the presentation of the 
case history of the patient to the care giver. Diagnosis is based upon anatomical 
location. Presentation of pain is assumed to be the result of an inflammatory 
response from disease/injury (cause/effect). This discursive practice encourages 
the physician (care giver) to correlate the location of pain with a specific 
underlying pathology. Clinico-pathological pain becomes a diagnostic 
technology for the physician. What is omitted from the examination is the 
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cultural, social, and historical experiences which are a significant portion of the 
corporeal: 
Psychological and anthropological studies have shown that, in higher 
species at least, pain is not simply a function of the amount of bodily 
damage alone. Rather, the amount and quality of pain we feel are also 
determined by our previous experiences and how well we remember 
them, by our ability to understand the cause of the pain and to grasp its 
consequences. Even the culture in which we have been brought up plays 
an essential role in how we feel and respond to pain. (Melzack and Wall, 
1983, p. 27) 
The genealogy of clinico-pathological pain, similar to curriculum and public 
schooling, moves from suffering and subjectivity to that of symptom, location, 
and objectivity. Curriculum and medicine objectify the body. Albeit for different 
outcomes but with similar purposes, "normalization of the body." 
Normal is created through the construction and exclusion of the abnormal 
(Foucault, 1988b). In order for normal to be understood within the realms of the 
disciplines what is not normal must be defined and categorized. Within 
education and curriculum, the category of normal encompasses behavior, 
attitude, and knowledge (Gore, 1998). The individual,//... is made into a subject 
through particular rules and standards in particular institutional patterns ..." 
(Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998, p. 12). Through the formation of the individual, 
naming becomes exclusory and hegemonic and is applied from multiple 
disciplines. The construction of normal, or in the case of medicine healthful, is an 
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end result of discursive practices of respective disciplines such as curriculum and 
medicine. Discursive practice: 
... represents a closed constellation of meaning, a subjective reality of 
normative structures, codifications, and hierarchies of truth produced in 
conjunction with and articulated through the asymmetrical power 
arrangements circulating within and between discursive forms and 
practices. (Deever, 1992, p. 67) 
These discursive practices are part of the web of disciplinary power (Foucault, 
1995). Power cannot function without the production and circulation of a 
discourse (Foucault, 1980). A normalized/healthful body indicates, "... 
membership of a homogenous social body but also playing a part in 
classification, hierarchization and the distribution of rank" (Foucault, 1995, p. 
184). The intent of normalization is to, "... strengthen the social forces - to 
increase production, to develop the economy, spread education, raise the level of 
public morality; to increase and multiply" (p. 208). The applications of the 
disciplines is in effect power over the individual in order to normalize the body 
to encourage the prosperity of the social. This power is Foucault's (1976/1990) 
biopower. Biopower is the ability of disciplines to control life and the body 
through regulatory practices such as birth control, abstinence, level of health 
care, etc. (1990). It is, "... the numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the 
subjugation of bodies and the control of populations" (Rabinow, 1984, p. 262). 
These disciplines include the church, state and local governments, hospitals, 
schools, medicine, etc. Through the application of discursive practices on bodies. 
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they are regulated and controlled. These practices allow "... politics (to) place 
his/ (her) existence as a living being in question" (Foucault, 1990, p. 143). 
Normalization within this framework can be productive. However, often in 
practices such as schooling and medicine, it becomes hegemonic and patriarchal. 
Biopower used within curriculum: 
... clearly define, categorize, examine, evaluate, distinguish, and 
standardize appropriate and inappropriate behavior, have enabled 
pedagogical practices, including those found in sexuality education, to 
participate in the multiple ways in which lives of school students are 
governed. (Wagener, 1998, p. 145) 
Biopower regulates the disciplines of society in the power over life and death. 
Medicine's continued, albeit limited, success over life deserves continued capital 
investment. In return, medicine grants the lure of power over life. McLaren (as 
cited in Pinar et al., 1996) reifies how this happens through the cultural 
inscription of the flesh within curriculum (and medicine) when he states that the: 
concept of the body as a site of cultural inscription ... enfleshment, that is 
a site wrhere epistemic codes freeze desire into social norms. ... We cannot 
separate the body from the social formation, since the material density of 
all forms of subjectivity is achieved through the "micropractices" of power 
that are socially inscribed into our flesh. (1996, p. 61) 
McLaren's (as cited in Pinar et al., 1996) position on cultural inscription helps 
uncover the operative discourses of the paradigms of pain. The body cannot be 
separated from the social and cultural enfleshment of its history. Individuals that 
suffer, do so within the confines of their consciousness, within the spaces and 
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regions of a social and cultural context that has been created by modern 
disciplinary practices (Frank & Jones, 2003). 
Since the 18th century, western medicine has gained an expanding 
foothold on the social and cultural landscapes of American society. The impetus 
behind the expansion has been the successful technological advancements in 
managing debilitating ailments (Greenhalgh, 2001) such as hypertension, 
coronary artery disease (CAD), myocardial infarction (Ml), etc. Bodily organs 
have become interchangeable at the human to human level and across species 
(Williams, 1997). The success attributed to technology and this new age of 
medicine has ingrained a new attitude within the American landscape since the 
end of World War II. Individuals, communities, and corporations are now 
willing to spend exorbitant amounts of money for opportunities of extending 
their lifespans through medical intervention. John Pickstone, in his book entitled. 
Ways of knowing: A new history of science, technology, and medicine describes the 
mindset of a society such as ours that tolerates exorbitantly high health care 
costs. "We may specify the useful qualities we want from a heating system or an 
office carpet, but for fine wines or cheese, stylish clothes or racehorses, 'we' 
demand a quality brand or a prestige breed" (Pickstone as cited in Pickstone, 
2001, p. 72). Health care presents itself as the illusionary fine wine. It is 
illusionarv because it is not accessible to everyone. Boone's Farm® does not 
satiate the senses when one is attempting to extend one's lifespan, but it 
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quenches one's thirst. Health care as a fine wine is an indicator of socioeconomic 
and cultural status rather than a guaranteed right of citizenship. Care provided 
by a prestigious doctor is as much a political statement as an issue of personal 
health and longevity. 
The negative effect to this mindset is the astronomical cost to maintain the 
current health care system. For example, in 1995 the United States spends $3,000 
for everv individual citizen and alien. No other industrialized nation spends 
more than $2,000. At the same time, approximately 45 million Americans are 
without a regular health insurance plan (Hall 2000; PEW Health Professions 
Commission). Of those 45 million uninsured Americans, 11 million are children. 
In 2002, health care spending surges to $1.6 trillion. The leading expense within 
health care are prescription drugs (Sherman, 2004). Health care becomes a 
discursive space from which issues of socioeconomic and racial hegemony 
pervade. The PEW Health Professions Commission is part of the PEW Charitable 
Trusts. It is administered through the Center for the Health Professions at the 
University of California, San Francisco and convenes to address several kev areas 
of health care within the United States (Cancer Network, 1996). The 
Commission's reports are important because several allied health professions use 
this information to outline curriculum changes for their respective professions. 
One of the allied health professions that utilizes this report is Athletic Training. 
The third report of the PEW Commission (1995) entitled. Critical Challenges: 
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Revitalizing the Health Professions for the Twenty - First Century, explains the 
justification behind skyrocketing health care costs within American society: 
For most of this century [20th], changes in medicine went unquestioned by 
a public that saw itself benefiting from these developments. Abundant 
resources went into research and education. Physicians were paid 
increasingly higher fees for working these miracles. Communities 
indebted themselves to buy bigger and newer facilities in which health 
professionals could practice, bidding up the cost of the technology to 
furnish these institutions, even when neighboring facilities duplicated 
these services and resources. Participation in insurance plans to ensure 
affordable access to these health care blessings became one of the principal 
objectives of employees, retirees, and the public at large. Anyone who 
scrutinized these advances was thought to be shortsighted, if not 
malevolent. The system that emerged was rationalized by the health 
professions as they understood and experienced the world and for some 
time corresponded with what served the public's interest, (p. 11) 
Continued emphasis on cost inefficient health care empowers medicine to 
continue its current discursive practices. Pain, within the current clinico- 
pathological discourse, is held hostage to the domains of hegemonic 
technoscientific knowledge making practices. 
Technoscience is the infusion of natural - cultural - technological (Menser 
& Aronowitz, 1996). In medicine, technoscience plays a large role in returning a 
patient back to health. In medical practice, it is difficult to discuss technology, 
like diagnostic ultrasound, and not incorporate the science that validates its 
usage. Technoscience is a concept that Bruno La tour (1987) uses to discuss the 
processes and tools that go into the creation of the discipline of science and the 
technology of science making. His writing attempts to demonstrate the cultural 
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origins of technology (as cited in Doll, Feng, & Petrina, 2001). La tour reminds us 
that personal histories, money, ethics, morality, politics, etc. are enmeshed within 
the matrix of technoscience. There is a history behind technological existence. 
"Technoscience ... is central to our world - to our artifacts and to our 'nature' 
(Pickstone, 2000, p. 3). Technoscience encompasses the discourses of knowledge 
and power within its web. Latour sees technoscience as a process. Whereas 
Pickstone describes it as, "... ways of making knowledge that are also ways of 
making commodities ..." (2001, pp. 13-14). Donna Haraway (1997) examines 
technoscience as a discursive practice. Regardless of one's position, 
technoscience: 
... is about worldly, materialized, signifying and significant power. That 
power is more, less, and other than reduction, commodification, 
resourcing, determinism, or any of the other scolding words that much 
critical theory would force on the practitioners of science studies ... . (p. 
51) 
However one finds meaning within technoscience, it is an integral part of 
schooling and health care. Technoscience envelopes the discourse of pain and the 
objectification of the body. 
As I continue, I will use technoscience within the context of a discourse 
(Haraway, 1997). This is not to place a hierarchical value to Haraway's meaning 
but rather her explanation fits the needs of my discussion better. Within 
Haraway's discursive technoscience the mutation of a historical narrative takes 
place (1997). Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), CT Scan, Mammograms, 
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massage, pharmaceuticals, etc. are all apparatuses of technoscience. These 
apparatuses are used to diagnose, treat, and rehabilitate patients in pain. 
Haraway (1997) sees the mutation of the narrative and its effect on the many 
aspects of our social lives as the shaping of our material, social, and literary 
technologies that bind people together (1997). Technology and science are 
intertwined and their epistemologies inter-related. Technoscience encompasses 
the social, political, and medical bodies of humans. In order for pain to be 
understood as something more than a neurologic anomaly, we must understand 
the discursive meaning of the apparatuses we are utilizing to relieve it. Pickstone 
(2000) writes that the: 
... production may be technical beyond the understanding of most 
humankind, but the appeal, manifestly, is a matter of 'human meanings.' 
We can only fully grasp these technologies if we understand the values; 
our appreciation of artifacts and of their invention and production must 
involve the study of meanings, (pp. 3-4). 
Since the end of World War II, science and technology are at incredible 
levels of creativity and ingenuity. In areas such as communication, medicine, 
chemistry, and molecular biology, science and technology have contributed 
greatly in enhancing the regulation of bodies. Technoscientific advances have led 
to decreases in recovery time and improved clinical outcomes. However, 
technoscience has also hindered patient care and economic growth (Sherman, 
2004). The costs in both human and capital terms is enormous. Insurance 
premiums are skyrocketing and the number of insured individuals is decreasing. 
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Haraway (1997) sheds light on the discourse of technoscience and the many 
problems that go with it when she discusses the role of OncoMouse™ in breast 
cancer research. Briefly, the OncoMouse™ is a genetically engineered mouse 
used in genetic research. The mouse's DNA is altered to study its affect on genes. 
Knowing the hosts DNA structure, allows researchers to study proteins and 
amino acids as they interact with the host. While verifying the claim that the 
mouse is a technoscientific tool in the war against disease, Haraway examines 
the mortality rates for African American women with breast cancer. Their 
mortality rises over fifteen years, while those of White women decline (p. 113). 
Interactions of government, religion, and the population have the power to set a 
course of action for the next several generations regarding research on stem cells. 
Ultimately, within the discursive practices of technoscience and biopower it is a 
decision about who lives and dies and ultimately who gets to make that decision. 
Technoscience as a discourse of curriculum has a strong correlation with 
that of medicine. Technoscience is under constant attack from techno-phobes 
who warn of Foucauldian surveillance gone awry (Weaver & Grindall, 1998) 
within both disciplines. As Tanner writes about the evils of using technology to, 
" ... restrict our notions of human behavior" (as cited in Pinar et al., 1996). 
McLaren sees technology as a point of resistance (as cited in Weaver & Grindall, 
1998) to hegemonic and patriarchal technoscientific discursive practices. Through 
the critical implementation of technology, hybrid discourses are formed that 
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resist (1998) categorizations and the processes of normalization and healthy. 
Hybridizations (Haraway, 2000a) that penetrate the pores of the skin of 
curriculum, medicine, and pain. Skin serves as the boundary and limit of our 
biological body within the Cartesian story (Shapiro & Shapiro, 1995/2002). It is 
seen, "... as a barrier between interiority of the subject and the exteriority of the 
social world" (Sawchuk, Busby, & Burns, 1999, p. xx). The skin is the boundary 
that, "... produces the more and the less 'human,' the inhuman, the humanly 
unthinkable" (Butler, 1993, p. 8). The skin serves to exclude within discursive 
binaries. Separation of mind/body within social and cultural practices such as 
education and medicine conveniently allow these disciplines the opportunity to 
exclude through their respective practices and discourses. Pain as a human 
construct, operates within these bodily sites. Pain, has its own skin with which to 
contend. Hybridizations mutate the body's boundaries. Hybrids exist as part of 
and within the skin of culture/nature, acute/chronic, normal/abnormal, 
truth/illusion, etc. Cyborgs are my hybrids (Haraway, 2000a, 1997). The cyborg 
as a political and social hybrid which defies boundaries. It refuses restraint, 
categorization, and naming. It resists exclusion. It is a mutation of boundaries 
between human, animal, machine, nature, and culture. The cyborg is created by 
the same hegemonic discursive practices that are used to deny it/him/her 
(1991/2000,1997). The cyborg permeates the skin of the discursive practices of 
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biopower and technoscience in the struggle to construct an alternate discourse of 
pain. 
Cyborgs have always existed. Through advances in technoscience, 
however, they are becoming more prevalent. For example, "... about 10 percent 
of the current U.S. population are estimated to be cyborgs in the technical sense, 
including people with pacemakers, artificial joints, drug implant systems, 
implanted corneal lenses, and artificial skin" (Hayles, 1993, p. 153). The problem 
is that mainstream society overlooks cyborg existence. They are camouflaged by 
virtue of binary thinking and practices. They resemble "normal." Few would 
view Aunt Martha or Uncle Dale as a cyborg because of his/her pacemaker or 
artificial hip. In binary thinking, they are still human, unchanged by biomedical 
intervention. Within binary thinking, you're either this or that, but in-between is 
out of the question. This tendency is a deep rooted prejudice of the mind as a 
special entity overshadowing that of the body (Clark, 2003). Cyborgs disrupt this 
mind/body binary. They disrupt the ongoing construction of body and subject as 
the question of what is human is redefined (Kull, 2002). My interpretative cyborg 
discourse with its contested meanings, disrupts traditional boundaries of science, 
technology, medicine, and curriculum. The cyborg stands in opposition to facts, 
the concept of human, race, etc. The cyborg questions the legitimacy of scientific 
discourse by standing in spite of scientific binaries. The existence of the cyborg 
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forces the recognition of something other than pure (Haraway, 1997; Lewis, 
2003). 
Spaces and regions are discursively constructed across disciplines. Both 
space and region are formulated by social rules and standards of multiple 
disciplines but are not reducible to one single institution (Popkewitz & Brennan, 
1998). "Curriculum [and medicine] becomes, from this point of view, part of a 
discursive field through which the subjects of schooling [and medicine] are 
constructed as individuals to self-regulate ..." (p. 13). Curriculum and medicine 
provide pivotal spaces from which to explore and form a different hybrid of the 
human condition of pain. Curriculum, medicine, and the discourses of biopower, 
technoscience, and pain are about everyday lives of people. As Weaver and 
Daspit (1999) suggest in their work, I am attempting through this narrative to 
promote border crossings and interdisciplinarity between athletic training and 
curriculum theory in an effort to construct an alternate discourse of pain through 
existing discourses of the cyborg. I am integrating some of the theoretical works 
of curriculum theory and athletic training to accomplish this goal. Within the 
binaries of the disciplines, space exists to allow permeation and change. Like 
biologic skin, the skin surrounding binaries is capable of exclusion and inclusion. 
My desire is not to expose a grand conspiracy. Rather, it is to utilize and 
hybridize the discourses of biopower, technoscience, and the cyborg to refract 
and reconstruct the operative performances placed upon the body. My intent is 
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to integrate cyborg discourse, technoscience, and biopower into a cohesive 
formation whereby some of the paranoia surrounding these discourses is 
interrupted. I do not believe the complete suppression of paranoia is possible. In 
time, I present my case as to why I do not subscribe to a conspiracy theory. I do 
believe, however, that through this text an alternative discourse which provides 
hope and agency regarding the understanding of pain is possible. 
Spaces 
Hearing the song The Space Between, by the Dave Matthews Band 
(Matthews & Ballard, 2000, track 3), returns my thoughts to that of spaces. My 
reasons for thinking about spaces is to uncover the operative functions of these 
spaces as they exist between the binaries of biopower, technoscience, curriculum 
and medicine as they intertwine and interrelate with pain. Their connectedness 
occurs to me while I am reading Sawicki's (1996), Feminism, Foucault, and 
"Subjects" of Power and Freedom. The connection and operative function of spaces 
has been within my grasp for some time. Initially, I am not perceptive enough 
while reading other cyborg literature (Bailey, 2003; Haraway, 1997, 2000a; Lewis, 
2003; Livingston, 2002; Sawicki 1996; Voithofer, 2002) to clutch this connection. 
Sawicki (1996), however, presents the cyborg in terms that finally turn the light 
on. The cyborg is an identity, a discourse, opposed to domination, stripped of 
innocent origins, and responsible for all its actions (1996). The cyborg is the 
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interruption, point of resistance, space that I am looking for within all of these 
discourses and disciplines. Her interpretation of Haraway's cyborg's role in the 
opening up of spaces of resistance is through adherence to particular disciplines 
and identities through the genealogical analyses of these practices (1996). 
I return to the lyrics of the song. 1 think about the binaries that are used to 
describe, categorize, and legitimize pain. Binaries are integral parts of hegemonic 
discursive practices which name people, things, and practices within western 
society. Discursive practices are about, " groups of statements ... that limit what 
can be said" (Greenhalgh, 2001, pp. 27-28). Part of the analysis of these binaries is 
to study, "... statements at the limit that separates them from what is not said, in 
the occurrence that allows them to emerge to the exclusion of all others" 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 119). Across disciplines, binaries share a commonality in that 
typically the valued term is first (Cherryholmes, 1987), for example, 
acute/chronic, mind/body, normal/abnormal, pathological/psychological. The 
construction of these binaries creates instead of describes (Pinar, 2002) bodies to 
be disciplined. Through the naming of something bodies are created. Through 
creation, binaries, "... divide us,... force us to choose, to discriminate, ... set up 
the social architecture for categories of insider/outsider, that establish the 
conditions of conflict over race, class, gender, childhood, and so on ..." (Smith, 
pp. xv-xvi, 2003). Curriculum and medicine maintain a similar binary as part of 
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their exclusive discourses. The mind/body binary is the specific point of 
application to which I am referring. 
These spaces which are between the binaries that consciously exclude 
through naming (Haraway, 2000a) within the disciplines of curriculum and 
medicine are similar to skin (Sumara & Davis, 1998). Skin which surrounds, "... 
the culturally invented and reproduced boundaries that have been placed 
around and between knowledge, experience, identity, and curriculum" (p. 76). 
Skin as a metaphor for binary functions in a similar manner to biologic tissue. It 
surrounds knowledge, identity, pain, the body, medicine, science, etc., in order to 
protect from outside infestation. It protects from outside entities which 
contaminate binarv life forms. Skin is also permeable. It allows bacteria, viruses, 
and small particles to penetrate the dermal layers. These invaders transform and 
infect the inner tissues and organs creating an inflammatory environment. The 
skin also provides tactile and sensorimotor feedback to the central nervous 
system (CNS). This information is used in a feedforward sense to allow the body 
to adapt in a positive manner to its changing environment. Skin encompassing 
our binary bodies facilitates permeation as much as protection in order to allow 
the body to remain homeostatic. 
Spaces remain a fixture as I continue this narrative. It continues 
prompting emotions and reminds me that I am trying to locate them within 
everyday life. Questions about the creation of spaces race through my mind 
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when I hear the replay of the song. I attempt to focus on a few questions in order 
to provide structure to build this alternate discourse. The questions I ask myself 
entail, now that I've located spaces within the binaries of curriculum and 
medicine, how have they functioned historically within biopower, technoscience, 
and the cyborg? What role do I play within these discursive practices as an allied 
health care professional and athletic trainer in maintaining their current 
operation? Finally, how do I go about constructing this alternate discourse from 
these spaces in order to facilitate hope and agency? 
My History 
This dissertation examines the discursive practices of the three paradigms 
of pain that define, normalize, and categorize the body in pain. I focus primarilv 
on clinico-pathological practices as this is the paradigm that I am most familiar 
with and interested in as an athletic trainer. Athletic training is a health care 
profession that provides care primarily to the physically active patient (often the 
student-athlete). Pain is often the reason for the initiation of the relationship 
between me and the patient. Pain is often the outcome of athletic injuries. As a 
certified athletic trainer (ATC) and allied health care practitioner, the relationship 
is nurtured by my ability to treat and rehabilitate their injuries successfully. My 
charge is to prepare their bodies for competition in their respective sports. It is 
also to assist them with the continuation of their athletic endeavors, pain free, if 
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possible, upon the onset of injury. As a result of a daily exposure to 
musculoskeletal pain and immersion into curriculum theory, I chose to write 
about the discourse of pain. Patients want immediate relief from pain. They want 
to continue their normal activities of daily living (ADL) without the frustration of 
a pain that bears down on them. To achieve pain relief, I utilize multiple 
technoscientific modalities such as ice, moist heat, and electrical stimulation. 
These modalities are usually sensory interventions. Theoretically, the purpose of 
these modalities is to stimulate the afferent sensory receptors called nociceptors 
(pain or noxious receptors). Nociceptors send the signal transmission to the 
dorsal horn of the spinal cord where the message is interpreted by higher order 
neurons (Lundy-Ekman, 1998). A message is then returned to override the 
noxious stimuli. Another technoscientific modality is pharmaceutical 
intervention. Typically, the class of drugs that physically active individuals 
utilize or are prescribed for pain relief are non-steroidal anti-inflammatorv drugs 
(NSAIDs). Examples of drugs in this class are Advil®, Aleve®, aspirin, and more 
recently Celebrex® and Vioxx®. The use of this class of drugs is based upon the 
assumption that the pain is acute and/or the result of a musculoskeletal injurv. 
Acute pain is postulated to be a secondary reaction resulting from the 
inflammatory response to injury or illness. As a general rule, pain relief provided 
by NSAIDs is a secondary result of the resolution of the inflammatory process. 
NSAIDs work by reducing the amount of prostaglandins, bradykinins, and 
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histamines circulating throughout the body. Prostaglandins, bradykinins, and 
histamines affect different regulatory reactions within the body. These 
substances either directly or indirectly cause the sensitization of the nociceptors 
that innervate the inflamed tissue. The gradual reduction of these substances 
cause the gradual reduction of pain. The inflammatory process is a natural 
process and a continual process that eliminates dead cells and other waste 
material. This simplified explanation introduces this class of drugs and their 
actions. An interesting note within the discursive practice of technoscientific 
pharmacology is that NSAIDs are regulated by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) as drugs to treat arthritic conditions. These conditions are 
classified as chronic illnesses. While NSAIDs are used for arthritic purposes, they 
are prescribed more often for acute musculoskeletal conditions. Conditions for 
which they are not legally intended. 
As a practitioner, my comprehension and understanding of the pain of the 
patient is much different than the patient's. Simply, I do not bear the pain. I 
cannot internalize nor sympathize with the sensory, psychological, and/or 
emotional stresses the patient is experiencing. His/her pain is his/her 
possession. It is a subjective experience which "... is never the sole creation of 
our anatomy and physiology. It emerges only at the intersection of bodies, 
minds, and cultures" (Morris, 1991, p. 3). It is much more than clinico- 
pathological. A problem for patients (subjects) of western medicine is the 
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continued reliance upon a clinico-pathological explanation for their pain. Our 
cultures, emotions, and life experiences rarely enter into the discourses during 
our patient-practitioner evaluations. I would be flabbergasted if a patient enters 
into a conversation about his/her cultural perceptions of pain on their initial visit 
to an orthopedic surgeon for low back pain. Herein lies part of the problem, the 
pedagogical practices of medicine. The pedagogy of medicine reinforces the 
pathological understanding of pain in clinical medicine in opposition to the 
psychosocial. "... medical education places too great an emphasis on the 
biological/technical aspects of medicine at the expense of the psychosocial; 
humanistic qualities ..." (Wear & Castellani, 2000, p. 602). Medical pedagogies 
define clinical pain in terms of the extent of injury and its etiology (Aronson, 
2002). The result is the medical student treating clinical pain as strictly an effect 
of the etiology, rather than the experience and history of the patient. Patrick 
Wall, a renowned researcher, responsible in part for authorship of the most 
widely discussed and taught theory of pain. Vie Gate Control Theory. The Gate has 
withstood over thirty-eight years of scientific criticism. Wall, like Delese Wear 
and many others, is frustrated at the lack of a complete understanding of pain. 
Wall emphasizes his frustration with clinico-pathological explanations in his last 
book (2000) prior to his untimely death. He sums up more than fifty years of 
disappointment at the refusal of medicine to accept pain as something "other" 
than pathological: 
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... I began to see patients in pain and realized that explanations given to 
them and to me by my teachers were overt rubbish. The fantasy 
explanations often depended on mechanical disorders for which there was 
no evidence, such as trapped nerves, extra ribs, strained muscles, or 
floating kidneys. If those failed to convince even the doctors, there was a 
leap to using as an explanation the supposed inadequate personalities of 
the patients: neurosis, hypochondria, hysteria, and malingering, (pp. vii- 
viii) 
As Wall notes, failure to identify a pathological cause of pain leads the physician 
to diagnose a psychological cause. The binaries of Cartesian thought always 
present themselves as an either/or scenario within the scientific process. The 
psychological cause of pain is the marginalized position of the binary. When the 
pathological does not exist or cannot be identified, only the psychological is left 
to diagnose. I believe that it is not, that there is a fear on the part of the 
practitioner of treating psychological pain or any other illness. Rather, it is the 
fear of not knowing or having the Answer to the patient's questions that drives 
the discursive formations of the "wounded as a passive victim" (Marion, 2002). 
This fear is part of the asymmetrical relationship between practitioner and 
patient (Wear, 1998). Wear (1998) believes the relationship between physician 
and patient to be unique from that of other health care providers. While I agree 
to a certain extent, I believe the asymmetrical relationship should include other 
health care providers. While her reasons for the asymmetry, such as economic, 
educational, technical, and social are valid there is still a discourse circulating of 
which the patient is the object of, rather than a participant in. Psychological 
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causes of pain are abnormal responses within the discipline of medicine. 
However, this repressive discourse is not intentionally created. This discourse 
circulates because it is the only one available to the physician. As Foucault states: 
This is an extremely complex system of relations which leads one finally 
to wonder how, given that no one person can have conceived it in its 
entirety, it can be so subtle in its distribution, its mechanisms, reciprocal 
controls and adjustments. (1980, p. 62) 
The patient is trapped within the web of discursive practices of the social, 
cultural, and medical. These discourses in turn disperse the subject into its 
subject position as patient (Reynolds, 2003). This web of discursive practices 
which encircles the patient and physician is part of the biopower of medicine. 
In her auto-ethnography, Under The Medical Gaze, Susan Greenhalgh (2001) 
writes about her struggles as a patient within the clinico-pathological discourse 
of Fibromyalgia. Like pain, Fibromyalgia is a difficult discourse circulating 
within the discipline of medicine. Fibromyalgia is a chronic pain syndrome of the 
musculoskeletal system. Fibromyalgia affects the muscles and other fibrous 
tissues of the body such as the fascia and ligaments. It is often accompanied by 
severe fatigue, disturbed sleep, morning stiffness, irritable bowel syndrome, and 
other symptoms. As Greenhalgh struggles to cope with the consequences of her 
disease she discovers that, "... fibromyalgia was a poorly understood, highly 
controversial, syndrome that lacked even a definitive diagnostic test" (p. 10). 
Fibromyalgia like: 
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... chronic fatigue syndrome, repetitive strain disorder, Gulf War 
syndrome, environmental hypersensitivity, ... All lack a known organic 
basis and are difficult to diagnose. All lack a recognized cause but are 
worsened by stress. ... All are chronic and treatable to a certain extent, but 
incurable. Most target women in larger numbers than men. (p. 3) 
Fibromyalgia is often confused with other diseases due to its vague and often 
overlapping symptamology. Patients of chronic diseases like Fibromyalgia are 
often delegitimated as mentally (psychological) unbalanced patients because 
their disorders lack a specific organic (pathological) lesion (Underwood, 2003). 
The lesion cannot be verified through technoscience, as in the case of cancer with 
its hyperactive cells, because there is no glaring pathological symptom which 
Fibromyalgia can call its own. 
Fibromyalgia was thought to be imaginary largely because there's no 
obvious source of pain - no injuries, worn joints or pinched nerves. 
Instead it's one of a number of poorly understood disorders, such as 
chronic fatigue and gulf-war syndromes, that are caused by 'central 
sensitization/ - or imbalances of chemicals and hormones in the nervous 
system. (Underwood, 2003, p. 53) 
Our immune, nervous, endocrine, and other systems are integrated and interact 
(Marion, 2002). Clinico-pathological medicine doesn't operate within this 
mindset, its discourse maintains a clear separation of the mind and bodv. Within 
the disciplines of western society there is a clear separation of mind/body. James 
Macdonald (1995) notes that this fundamental practice divorces us from our 
biological being as we are integrated and indoctrinated into the disciplines. 
Specifically, he speaks of the discipline education: 
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Although we rarely admit to a mind - body separation on a philosophical 
level, it is clear by the way we educate the young that we do not consider 
the biological aspects of the person to be relevant to the real business of 
education, (p. 93) 
This mind/body separation maintains the current practices of normalization 
within the disciplines of society. This separation of mind/body maintains 
multiple subjects as opposed to an individual. The individual may be labeled as 
being gifted, slow, malingerer, obsessive, or any of a number of tags in order to 
integrate surveillance within the subject (Frank & Jones, 2003). The individual 
becomes almost schizophrenic in the number of discourses derived from the 
multiple disciplines explaining the origins of chronic illness and/or non - 
pathological pain. Susan Greenhalgh (2001) spends nearly two years convinced 
she has Fibromyalgia. Only at the brink of a mental, financial, and physical 
breakdown is the truth uncovered. She is instead diagnosed with Rheumatoid 
Arthritis. This diagnosis is the result of a second opinion. She is informed by her 
second physician that the majority of her symptoms, thought to be from the 
Fibromyalgia, are instead caused by the pharmaceutical cocktail she is taking for 
the Fibromyalgia diagnosis (2001). She is one of the lucky individuals whose real 
malady is determined before a life controlled by chronic illness and/or pain, 
spins further out of control to a point of no return. While pain and chronic illness 
emanate from the patient (subject), they belong to the discourse of clinico- 
pathological medicine. A discourse that focuses on the symptoms in opposition 
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to the individual. Greenhalgh's experience is not uncommon within the clinico- 
pathological discourse. For individuals suffering from chronic illness and pain: 
Their world is experienced as different, as a realm that others cannot fully 
fathom. ... Pain resists the objectification of standard medical testing; 
there are no pain meters, no biochemical assays for pain. It resists 
localization; most efforts to identify the site of the origin of chronic pain 
fail, despite all advances in imaging techniques, and nearly all surgical 
attempts to remove pain pathways are quickly undone by the body's 
efficient generation of new pathways. (Good, 1992, pp. 39-40) 
As Greenhalgh (2001) discovers during the course of her illness, medicine 
does not focus on the patient but rather the symptoms (body). She asks 
rhetorically: 
... what happens to the patient, not only physically, but also 
philosophically and psychologically, when her worldview is disturbed, 
her body and life rearranged according to the rules of an esoteric svstem 
she neither understands nor influences, (p. 19) 
The focus upon the symptom as opposed to the patient is an outcome of the 
discourse of biopower. Biopower within the disciplines of societv desires to 
enforce, "(t)he 'right' to life, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the 
satisfaction of needs, and beyond all the oppressions or 'alienations' " (Foucault, 
1990, p. 145). At times however, the, "... techniques of power present at every 
level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions ..." act as, "... 
factors of segregation and social hierarchization ... guaranteeing relations of 
domination and effects of hegemony" (p. 141). Biopower also desires production 
and creation through, "... the development of the different fields of knowledge 
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concerned with life in general, ... a relative control over life averted some of the 
imminent risks of death" (Foucault, 1990, p. 142). Through the multiplicities of 
disciplines and their discursive interactions this desire is not always achieved. 
As one examines the techniques of power within clinico-pathological 
patient/doctor discourse it unveils the practices of the modest witness 
(Haraway, 1997). The modest witness is: 
... the legitimate and authorized ventriloquist for the object world, adding 
nothing from his mere opinions, from his biasing embodiment. And so he 
is endowed with the remarkable power to establish the facts. He bears 
witness: he is objective; he guarantees the clarity and purity of objects. ... 
His narratives have a magical power - they lose all trace of their history as 
stories, as products of partisan projects, as contestable representations, or 
as constructed documents in their potent capacitv to define the facts, (p. 
24) 
It is important to recognize that these exclusionary practices of the modest 
witness within the discipline of medicine descended from Boyle and Bacon 
(Weaver, 2001). The modest witness of clinico-pathological medicine examines 
the ills and injuries of the patient with the objectivity of Boyle and Bacon. 
His/her sociocultural status as authority and healer assures the operative 
function of biopower. Biopower, within this discourse, subjugates the body of 
the patient and reinforces the binaries of normal/abnormal, 
pathological/psychological, mind/body. Through modest witnessing the patient 
is: 
... constructed and used sometimes to justify certain policies, eliminate 
unwanted voices, and apologize for all its flaws and humanness in order 
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to shroud science behind a cloth of god-like importance and ability. 
(Weaver, 2001, p. 6) 
Delese Wear (1996) sees the practice of modest witnessing with the medical 
students with whom she teaches. As these students go through their clinical 
rotations, wanting very much to be the caregivers that they intended to be when 
thev entered medical school, they become numb to the hegemonic, patriarchal 
practices that surround them. "As the realities of power and authority become 
routinized in their education, their will to survive the moment often transcends 
their social conscience ..." (1996, p. 110). Students are a product of an educational 
system that in which they have long been indoctrinated. After years of schooling, 
one of the significant achievements of their educational life is their score on 
standardized tests. One can hardly place sole blame at their feet. They have 
successfully survived and mastered an educational system which emphasizes 
"truth games" (Frank & Jones, 2003). Truth games constitute the production of 
truth through the different disciplines of society. Truth games are, "... played in 
the three-dimensional space of knowledge, subjectivity, and power" (Simola, 
Heikkinen, & Silvonen, 1998, p. 65). Truth games are about the production, 
circulation, transformation, and application of truth (Frank & Jones, 2003; Simola, 
Heikkinen, & Silvonen, 1998). As Foucault writes, they (physicians in this 
instance, students in general) have been disciplined to the point that they now 
surveil themselves. Students are part of: 
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... a new pedagogical game where the master/teacher speaks and doesn't 
ask questions and the disciple doesn't answer but must listen and keep 
silent. A culture of silence becomes more and more important. (1988a, p. 
32) 
Within the truth game of medicine, there is little reward for breaking away from 
the discourse of clinico-pathological medicine. An example of another truth 
game is in Bill Reynolds' article, The Perpetual Pedagogy of Surveillance (2003). 
Reynolds discusses teachers and National Board Certified Teachers. The article 
examines the binary of professional/non-professional for teachers. Those 
teachers choosing not to become board certified through the National Board for 
Professional Teaching Standards become "other" (p. 80). 
A discourse of excellence and rigor is inscribed on the body by the 
creation of the bifurcation of excellence and mediocrity. Normalcy is 
established through the development of prohibitive and enabling 
conceptions, definitions, and descriptions within the pedagogical 
discourse, (p. 79) 
Teachers choosing not to become National Board Certified are measured against 
a national standard for professionalism and become marginalized for non- 
compliance. This repressive operative performance of biopower within the 
discipline of education no longer describes normal as a four year bachelor's 
degree and teaching certificate. A teacher must further invest in self-surveillance 
in order to be considered normal. Physicians must also practice the act of self - 
surveillance. They are pushed towards a modest witness approach to medicine 
and patient care. Objectivity and detachment become important concepts in the 
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pedagogy of doctors. The physician must be objective in order to determine the 
cause and comply with the Truth surrounding this cause. To attach oneself to the 
patient would break down the barrier of the truth game and present the 
individual as a person as opposed to an object. Physicians refusing to comply 
become "other." Critical consciousness comes into question with these 
pedagogical practices made within medicine and education. The modest practice 
is more technoscience than medicine. Hope in resisting modest witnessing is the 
concept of "witnessing" (Haraway, 2000b). Witnessing: 
... is about seeing; attesting; standing publicly accountable for, and 
psychically vulnerable to, one's visions and representations. Witnessing is 
a collective, limited practice that depends on the constructed and never 
finished credibility of those who do it, all of whom are mortal, fallible, and 
fraught with the consequences of unconscious and disowned desires and 
fears, (p. 158) 
Witnessing is the scientific and educational process as it should and could be in a 
truly democratic society. A human process that is vulnerable to error and willing 
to admit it. Accountable for its mistakes. Conscious of the ramifications that the 
technoscientific process brings to the world. Free from the pressure of corporate 
expectations and interventions. Witnessing needs to be done throughout 
healthcare. Witnessing is about the accountability and integritv of healthcare 
professionals whom care for patients. It is about their commitment to their 
patients' well being and not to their own entitlements. Within medicine: 
The clinical encounter must not be seen as a meeting of healthy and sick, 
agent and victim, subject and object. Rather, it should be a meeting of 
36 
selves, each of whom respects the other's unique life experiences, and who 
have come together to create a healthy between - a healing relationship. In 
this vital task, language plays a crucial role. (Marion, 2002, p. 157) 
I do not condemn healthcare professionals and physicians for I am as 
guilty as the others within the framework of the clinico-pathological. As an 
athletic trainer I am an accomplice in the clinico-pathological discourse. I am part 
of the web of biopower that spends $3,000 per individual on healthcare. My first 
instinct is always the gaze of the pathological. My clinical behavior is legitimated 
based upon my meanings and my understandings from my pedagogy. If the 
patient does not fit my culturally and scientifically pre-determined definition 
they become marginalized within my discourse. Rather than conform to the 
discourse of the disease, the patient (subject) is conformed to the clinico- 
pathological. The patient must rely upon the doctor to be his/her salvation in the 
struggle for health. Patients, "... desperate for someone to acknowledge and 
alleviate their suffering go to their doctors to name and ease their new pains" 
(Greenhalgh, 2001, p. 3). 
Pedagogy 
Pedagogy is a political act that is bastardized as it becomes commodified 
within the discourses of the modest witness. Modest witnesses dilute its meaning 
as they interchange this relationship with a process of skill instruction and rote 
memorization. Pedagogy to the modest witness is the deposition of knowledge 
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and the continuation of current normalization practices. On the other hand, 
pedagogy to the witness is the social construction of a critical consciousness that 
values both teacher and student (Freire, 1970/1990). 
Pedagogical thought must begin to acknowledge that receiving 
knowledge is a problem for the learner and the teacher, particularly when 
the knowledge one already possesses or is possessed by works as an 
entitlement to one's ignorance or when the knowledge encountered 
cannot be incorporated because it disrupts how the self might imagine 
itself and others. (Britzman, 1998, p. 220) 
Knowledge is not neutral. It operates within the web of biopower controlling, 
modifying, and surveilling the subject (Rabinow, 1984, p. 265). Curriculum and 
pedagogy7 are about knowledge making and therefore play a role within 
biopower. Understanding this allows one to recognize when knowledge is 
serving to perpetuate the subject in the procedures of normalization and creating 
"other." Freire (1998) writes about the importance of critical consciousness as we 
examine the everyday practices within a pedagogy of normalization. What 
transpires within this relationship of normalization is critical thinking instead of 
critical consciousness. Critical thinking is a skill that is prevalent throughout the 
disciplines of curriculum, medicine, and higher education. Critical thinking: 
... has been a focal point in higher education for the past 2 decades. The 
National Education Goals Panel advocated critical thinking and ... 
problem-solving abilities as indicators of success in higher education, and 
the United States Congress included significant improvement in the 
critical-thinking skills of all college graduated in the Goals 2000: National 
Goals for Education Act. (Leaver - Dunn, Harrelson, Martin, & Wyatt, 
2002). 
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Critical thinking is the buzzword encircling medical and athletic training 
pedagogies. It is part of the rampant discourse of standardization. Giroux (2000) 
makes the distinction between a critical pedagogy which incorporates critical 
consciousness and the process of critical thinking. He states that: 
Critical consciousness suggests learning how to theorize, think 
relationally, and draw judgments based on evidence and a thorough 
understanding of events. Critical thinking is of a lesser order and refers 
more to the mastery of specific skills, techniques, and methods. Critical 
consciousness provides the opportunity for students to engage the 
formative nature of their own learning and what it means to appropriate 
education as a critical function, (p. 151) 
The step by step process of applying a check sheet to your current dilemma 
hardly improves the educational outcome. Corporations and the public demand 
workers that will be equipped to deal with the needs of society for the next 
century. Critical thinking reduces learning to techniques to be mastered. Freire 
speaks of this process when he writes: 
... I must not reduce my instructional practice to the sole teaching of 
technique or content, leaving untouched the exercise of a critical 
understanding of reality. In speaking about hunger, I must not be satisfied 
with defining it as urgent need for food, big appetite, lack of nourishment, 
deprivation from, or scarcity of food. The critical intelligence of something 
implies the apprehension of its reason for being. Stopping at the 
description of the object or twisting its reasons for being are mind - 
narrowing processes. My comprehension of hunger is not dictionary: once 
recognizing the meaning of the word, I must recognize the reasons for the 
phenomenon, (pp. 44-45) 
Freire's words echo the need for a pedagogy that is critical of itself. Within 
education, medicine, and athletic training we are producing critically 
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unconscious students. In the foreword to, Pedagogy of the Heart (Freire, 1998), 
Martin Carnoy states that Paulo Freire's goal with education is to, "push against 
limits, create space, redefine the social agenda" (1998, p. 16). As I teach and 
watch undergraduate athletic training students, I see a naivete and numbness 
similar to that of which Delese Wear (1996) speaks. I don't see students wanting 
to push against the limits and create those spaces that Freire spoke of. They have 
accepted the hegemonic discourse of standardized education as a routine of their 
existence (Reynolds, 2003, p. 74). Athletic training education needs to follow the 
path of curriculum theory and work with students to define an alternative social 
discourse. A critical athletic training pedagogy is one which together the student 
and teacher can create these spaces in which equitable and humanitarian health 
care can be achieved within the discipline of medicine. David Blades puts my 
thoughts into perspective as he discusses challenges he faces with his own 
pedagogy: 
I thought of all the students I once taught, and all the students I was 
influencing by teaching their teachers. The world these children inherit 
desperately needs the skills, attitudes, and understanding these children 
could develop ... .In this great need, change is blocked by a tradition in 
the curriculum - discourse of technical thinking mediated bv truth, 
knowledge and power. I suddenly came to realize my research presented 
a great opportunity: through my re-search interpretations I had the opportunity 
to introduce into the on- going science education curriculum-discourse 
conversations of critique. (1997, p. 118) 
This mission is at the heart of a democracy. In this paper, I attempt to open up 
some of those spaces regarding the discourse of pain. I try to create hope for the 
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students that I teach, my colleagues, my patients, my children, and myself. By 
exposing the cracks, it opens up the possibilities for other explanations and 
discursive practices for those enveloped within these discourses. I question how I 
teach. I also question how that pedagogy operates. In Giroux's words the 
struggle within any pedagogy is: 
On the cultural front, teachers as public intellectuals can work to make the 
pedagogical more political by engaging in a permanent critique of their 
own scholasticism and promoting a critical awareness to end oppression 
and forms of social life that disfigure contemporary life and pose a threat 
to any viable notion of democracy. (2003, p. xxi) 
Table of Contents 
In Chapter II the Literature Review, I examine the discursive integration 
of biopower, technoscience, and the cyborg into the disciplines of education, 
science, and medicine. Initially, I discuss the emergence of the discursive practice 
of biopower as it relates to the disciplines and the creation of the social bodv and 
the concept of population. Through the implementation of the technology of the 
gaze, biopower constructs and maintains a normal social body for each 
discipline. I use examples from health and sex education to demonstrate how 
biopower can be both oppressive and proactive in its maintenance of the social 
body. Following the discussion of biopower, I examine the origins of 
technoscience as an interdisciplinary study during the late twentieth century. 
Technoscience is the dissolution of boundaries between science and technology^ 
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as separate entities and is the discursive practice of the effects of science and 
technology on the social body. The effects of technoscience are viewed through 
dystopian and Utopian lenses. Finally, 1 examine the cyborg and its use as a 
resistance pedagogy within the disciplines. Cyborg pedagogy through its 
discursive practices implodes the binaries of mind/body and functions to 
integrate these discourses as a means to create different meanings. 
In Chapter III Methodology, I discuss the construction of the discursive 
practice through a Foucauldian analysis. Through the construction of the 
discursive practice, biopower, technoscience, and the cyborg intertwine within 
the constructs of science and medicine to operate on the social body. Through the 
application of these discursive practices pain as understood through modern 
science and medicine is constructed. 
In Chapter IV Analysis, using the discursive practices of biopower and 
technoscience, I examine the historical constructions of pain through the 
discourses of the Western disciplines. Pain, through the discourses of clinical 
medicine, is explained as a response to injury or illness and becomes a 
technological tool for identifying cause. Two historical constructs of pain that are 
in opposition to this discourse are chronic pain and phantom limb pain, both of 
which lack direct causes. Chronic pain and phantom limb pain are cyborg 
discourses which refuse adherence to scientific and medical explanations of pain. 
Chronic pain and phantom limb pain require a different discourse of pain. 
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In Chapter V, I construct a cyborg pedagogy of pain. Through the 
discursive constructions of neuropathic chronic pain and phantom limb pain, 
cyborg pedagogy creates the spaces needed to disrupt the modernist binaries of 
mind/body. This disruption of mind/body re-integrates the mind and body and 
becomes a necessary discourse for a different understanding of pain. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Biopower 
"One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth 
century was the emergence of 'population' ..." (Foucault, 1990, p. 25). Population 
emerges as governments believe that they are no longer dealing with subjects or 
individuals (1990). Population is defined by phenomena such as birth rates, life 
expectancy, state of health, etc. (1990). Population becomes intertwined with the 
economic future of societies. "The biological traits of a population become 
relevant factors for economic management, and it becomes necessary to organize 
around them an apparatus which will ensure not only their subjection but the 
constant increase of their utility" (Rabinow, 1984, p. 279). Biopower emerges at 
the moment that population originates. Biopower emerges as the result of, "... an 
explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of 
bodies and the control of populations, ..." (Foucault, 1990, p. 140). Within the 
disciplines of western society, biopower is, "... centered on the body as a 
machine ..." (p. 139). One of the methods that biopower uses to subjugate the 
body is through the application of a mechanical discourse. Controlling the body 
in this manner allows for the continual modification and optimization of its 
functions for life within the social spheres. The optimization of the body's 
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capabilities are a primary concern for the discursive practices of the disciplines. 
Optimization of the body is a normalizing process. Normalization is executed to 
conform the body to the respective discursive practices of each discipline and to 
integrate that body into the population. 
A methodology of optimization, within each discipline, is the operative 
techniques of knowledge and truth production which places the body under its 
constant surveillance (Reynolds, 2003, p. 77). Surveillance of the body by the 
disciplines attempts a preventative and proactive operative function. 
Surveillance operates as a technique of biopower within each discipline of 
society. An example of the application of biopower, at a local level, is the 
implementation of an ethics hot-line in a small southern town in the state of 
Georgia (Reynolds, 2003, p. 80). The hot-line is implemented in response to the 
perceived lack of ethical behavior on the part of some local teachers (2003). The 
idea behind the hot-line is to report any unscrupulous teacher activity within the 
community and school (2003). At its point of application, the surveillance hot¬ 
line appears to operate in an oppressive form. Oppression is perceived by the 
teachers because they have become the target of community surveillance. 
Surveillance, within this particular application, requests that colleagues and 
individuals from the community report teachers that they believe are, "... 
engaging in illegal activities or simply 'wasting large amounts of time' " (2003, p. 
80). The initiation of an ethics hot-line is explained to the community as a moral 
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and ethical struggle against teacher torn foolery. This presentation of an ethical 
and moral struggle is a truth production on the part of the group running the 
hot-line. Truth promoted within this discourse perpetuates a knowledge that 
some teachers are unethical, as compared to the rest of the population, and in 
need of constant supervision in order to carry out their community mission of 
teaching. The intended outcome of this surveillance is the return of normal 
ethical behavior within the teacher population. An additional outcome of this 
surveillance is the self-surveillance by teachers at places other than school. "... 
teachers must police both themselves and others because you can't tell who 
might be unethical" (2003, pp. 80-81). Self-surveillance becomes a technology of 
the self (Foucault, 1988a). This technology: 
... permit(s) individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of 
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct, and way of being , so as to transform themselves in 
order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
immorality. (1988a, p. 18) 
The ethics hot-line sets up the perpetual observation of the individual teacher 
and others within the community. As individuals outside the teacher population 
begin the surveillance, they also begin self-surveillance. As an individual 
examines the behavior of others it becomes a natural act to begin the process of 
self-surveillance within the truth production of ethics and morals. 
The Gaze 
The birth of clinical medicine is traced to approximately the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries during the time of the French Revolution (Armstrong, 1998; 
Foucault, 1994; Morris, D. B., 1998; Peerson, 1995; Pickstone, 2000; Sullivan, 1986) 
A decree of the Revolution is the abolishment of guilds and Royal Societies and 
the closure of universities. The closure of guilds and universities results in the 
transfer of patients in the care of these doctors to community hospitals. Further 
reform calls for the establishment of clinics to assist the community hospitals in 
the care of the sick (Peerson, 1995). It is within the clinic that clinico-pathological 
medicine (clinical medicine) begins its evolutionary journey towards current 
medical practices. Clinical medicine is the first medical profession to utilize the 
methods of positivist science as its basis for knowledge making in practice and 
pedagogy. It employs pathological anatomy as a methodology for establishing 
the etiology of diseases (Duffin, 1999; Foucault, 1994; Morris, D. B., 1998; Rose, 
1998; Sullivan, 1986; Wall, 1999), hence the name clinico-pathological. "It was in 
pathological anatomy that tissues proved most fruitful for medicine, providing a 
framework for the view of diseases as lesions" (Pickstone, 2000, p. 110). 
Pathological anatomists, through the dissection of diseased corpses, uncover and 
catalogue tissue lesions. Anatomists correlate their tissue findings during 
autopsies with the cause of death of the corpse. The results of the autopsy- 
generate new medical knowledge in relation to the understanding of disease 
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progression. This knowledge of lesions allows a physician to diagnose based 
upon the patient's symptoms (case history) and the location of the tissue lesion 
(pathological anatomy) (Foucault 1994; Pickstone, 2000). The clinical presentation 
is then correlated with a catalog of diseases. The catalog having already been 
established through autopsies, case histories, and professional experiences of 
clinicians and pathologists. Pain, within the clinico-pathological discourse, 
becomes a technology in the history of clinical medicine. Pain becomes a tool for 
the physician to employ in order to correlate the location of the pain with the 
lesion. Pain as a tool becomes increasingly validated as clinical medicine 
progresses towards the twentieth century. (Foucault 1994; Morris, D. B., 1998). 
During the mid-eighteenth century, clinical medicine, applies a new 
technique within its practice. Foucault (1994) refers to this technique as the 
"gaze" (p. ix). The gaze is the English translation for the French word Te regard.' 
Le regard, in French, captures both perception and seeing in respect to disease 
recognition within the medicalized body (Armstrong, 1997). Space and location 
are integral to the function of the gaze. The gaze is the ability of the clinician to 
perceive the lesion of the patient through the uncovering of symptoms. The 
uncovering of symptoms aids in the recognition of diseases through the 
correlation of symptoms to this lesion. In lay terms, an individual with a fever, 
painful throat, swollen tonsils, and exudate (pus) on the tonsils is in all 
likelihood diagnosed with tonsillitis. This diagnosis is based upon the correlation 
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of symptoms with the location of the lesion. Pain is the diagnostic tool. Pain is 
present within the throat and believed to be the result of the lesion. Pain is acute, 
in this instance, due to the nature of its etiology. The clinical examination is 
initiated at the location of the pain. The gaze encourages the physician to 
uncover lesions within the spaces of the body. The gaze transforms the question 
in clinical medicine from "What is the matter with you?" to "Where does it 
hurt?" (Foucault, 1994, p. xviii). The gaze organizes and rationalizes the language 
of the clinical evaluation. The gaze transforms the body into the object of clinico- 
pathological discourse. "The object of discourse may equally well be a subject, 
without the figures of objectivity being in any way altered. ... one could at last 
hold a scientifically structured discourse about an individual" (1994, p. xiv). The 
employment of the gaze in clinico-pathological medicine ushers in the era of 
positivity (1994). The location of the lesion, rather than the patient, becomes the 
primary focus of the clinical evaluation and positivist medicine. The gaze is the 
technology of surveillance in clinical medicine. It orchestrates the objectification 
of the patient and his/her body as it focuses on returning the body to a normal 
pathological state. 
Within clinical medicine, the operative function of biopower becomes 
apparent as the body becomes the object of surveillance. Also, within this 
discourse, pain is no longer a private and personal experience of the patient. It 
instead becomes, objectified as a symptom of a disease. Pain belongs to the 
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discourse of clinical medicine as its diagnostic tool. "The lesion — illuminated, 
mapped, and verified — increasingly comes to represent pain as it is made newly 
visible to the gaze of the physician" (Morris, D. B., 1998, p. 192). Pain assists in 
the operative techniques of surveillance. Its location within the spaces of the 
body is a tool which alerts the clinician to any abnormalities. Locate the pain and 
the lesion follows. Treat (cure) the lesion and the pain will resolve (perhaps). 
Unfortunately, what is lost within the discourse of the gaze is the subjectivity of 
the patient. He/she is no longer an individual to be treated but rather a disease 
to be studied. He/she is irrelevant to the physician attempting to establish a 
cause. The physician is interested in only those symptoms as they relate to the 
eventual diagnosis and cure (Armstrong, 1998; Peerson, 1995). Clinical medicine 
is in opposition to the patient-defined agenda of the early eighteenth century. 
The deployment of a medicine based upon pathology reinforces a relationship 
between patient and doctor dominated by the doctor (Armstrong, 1998). "The 
doctor becomes the great advisor and expert, if not in the art of governing, at 
least in that of observing, correcting and improving the social 'bodv' and 
maintaining it in a permanent state of health" (Foucault, 1980, p. 177). The social 
body is a site of application of biopower within clinical medicine. The social 
body must remain healthy in order to contribute to the overall stability of the 
economic community. 
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Hygiene, Sex, & Lifestyle 
Surveillance, in the maintenance of the social body, is observed during the 
nineteenth century. Surveillance is applied within the apparatuses of health 
(hygiene). This installation is application across towns and urban spaces with the 
intention of fighting disease and securing health within the general population. 
The gaze, which is the tool of clinical medicine, no longer limits its use to the 
discipline of medicine. As Foucault (1995) discusses in Discipline & Punish, "The 
carceral texture of society assures both the real capture of the body and its 
perpetual observation; ..." (p. 304). The omnipotent gaze, whose object of 
affection is the body, finds application in other disciplines, such as education. 
"Within schools, ... as in other apparatuses of social regulation — the bodies of 
individuals are subjected to the 'panoptic' (all-seeing) gaze of authorities ..." (as 
cited in Middleton, 2002, p. 211). The gaze is implemented, "In order to govern 
the population ..." (Gastaldo, 1997, p. 114). Subsequently, "... knowledge is 
gathered on each individual body" (1997, p. 115), so that the governance may be 
effective in the management of the population. Through the accumulation of 
knowledge about the individual body, its functions, and its processes, disciplines 
such as education and medicine modify their surveillance in order to assert 
better control over the population. Govern in this sense refers to normalization 
rather than subjugation. Surveillance, "... in its compact or disseminated forms, 
with its systems of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the 
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greatest support, in modern society, of the normalizing power" (Foucault, 1995, 
p. 304). Surveillance in education is about instructing, supervising, and observing 
students during the school day. It is about keeping students on task, monitoring 
student's behaviors, learning names, etc. (Gore, 1998). The panoptic gaze of 
educators is applied in a variety of discourses within the curriculum. This gaze 
acquires a new role during the mid-nineteenth century, that of hygiene inspector. 
As the concern for public health increases, schools naturally become a primary 
place of observation of the body of children. The captive audience allows the 
educator to inspect and modify behavior in order to improve the qualitv of 
health for each body. "The school might have been established as a place for 
learning, but it also functioned as a laboratory in which the body of the child 
could be subjected to analysis, experimentation and transformation" (Armstrong, 
2002, p. 48). Two discourses of education which parallel that of medicine are 
health (hygiene) and sex education. These discourses enable a viewing into the 
operative techniques of biopower as it applies to the student's bodv. 
The implementation of health (hygiene) education as part of the 
curriculum begins during the mid-nineteenth century. The discourse of health 
education focuses on personal hygiene as a practical subject for students to learn 
in school. Knowledge of hygiene is seen as fundamental and useful in increasing 
the, "... ability to perform the arduous duties and to bear the inevitable burdens 
of life,..." (Willis, Schubert, Bullough, Jr., Kridel, & Holton, 1994, p. 47). In 1842, 
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as part of the Sixth Annual Report as Secretary of the Board of Education of 
Massachusetts, Horace Mann suggests the implementation of Human Physiology 
within the curriculum of the common schools of Massachusetts (Willis et al., 
1994). By Human Physiology, Mann refers to, "... the Laws of Life, and Hygiene 
or the rules and observances by which health can be preserved and promoted 
..." (1994, p. 48). One of Mann's reasons for recommending the addition of 
Human Physiology to the curriculum is the mortality rate within the general 
population of the State of Massachusetts. In his report, Mann states: 
... the rates of mortality have become a statistical science, it is found that 
more than one fifth, — almost a fourth, part of the human race die before 
attaining the age of one year. ... almost one quarter part of the race perish 
before attaining one seventieth part of their natural term of existence. And 
before the age of five years, more than a third part of all who are bom 
have died. (1994, p. 48) 
Mortality rates are a concern for the populations of not only Massachusetts, but 
the rest of the United States and Western Europe. Mortality is due in large part as 
a result of inadequate and unsanitary living conditions within the population, 
especially the lower socioeconomic classes: 
During the 1800s many European immigrants came to America to escape 
famine, poverty, and difficult living conditions. As these large numbers of 
people began to settle in seaport cities such as New York City, Boston, and 
Baltimore, many problems arose. Sanitation and housing problems 
became acute. The need for dealing with poorly ventilated, filthy 
tenement houses, inadequate sewage disposal and drainage, a poor water 
supply, and poor food distribution services put increasing pressure on 
communities to develop a public health program. (Miller & Price, 1998, p. 
5) 
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The desire within government agencies to educate the population and manage 
these public health concerns begins with the group most easily observed, school 
children. Mann's report and his general concern for the health of the population 
of Massachusetts, acknowledges concrete problems which need addressed if 
control over the population is going to take place. Through the common school, 
many of these issues can be integrated into the child at an early age. The 
operative function of biopower within this report is that with the knowledge of 
hygiene and physiology, the individual student may learn to care for 
him/herself as he/she matures. Self-surveillance then becomes a life long 
endeavor in the maintenance of hygiene. 
Mann is concerned not only with unfit living conditions but with 
epidemics throughout Western Europe and parts of the United States. These 
epidemics are wreaking havoc on populations: 
The epidemics that ravaged European cities in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century struck terror into the inhabitants of the towns and 
those who would exercise government over them — cholera, typhus, ... 
fever. ... (Rose, 1998, pp. 55-56), 
ran rampant through sections of towns and cities. These epidemics coincided 
with areas of, "... physical squalor and moral degradation" (1998, p. 56). 
Epidemics, infectious disease, and mortality are all attributed to poor hygiene, 
poor living conditions, economics, and morality. Mann's concern with infectious 
disease is also due in part to the economic burden placed upon the state of 
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Massachusetts. The financial and emotional burden of the chronically ill places a 
heavy burden upon the shoulders of society: 
The sick and valetudinary, instead of being here and there an individual, 
are a countless host; and it is rare to find any person entirely free from all 
ailments, organic and functional. Instead of contributing their share to 
those productions and improvements by which life is sustained, and the 
arts of life and the resources of well - being supplied, these classes are 
grievous burdens upon their friends or upon society. (1994, p. 48) 
Mann correlates hygiene with upbringing, morality, and socioeconomics. 
The discourse of biopower permeates his Puritan discourse. Mann implements 
the surveillance of school children within Massachusetts. This process of caring 
for oneself places the burden of surveillance upon the student. The student in 
turn operates in a normative and productive manner within the population of 
that particular discursive practice. As a result, he/she begins the process of self- 
surveillance. Biopower functions to: 
... regulate social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, 
absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Power can achieve an effective 
command over the entire life of the population only when it becomes an 
integral, vital function that every individual embraces and reactivates of 
his or her own accord. (Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 23-24) 
Once hygiene is accepted as an internal and integral discourse, normalization 
becomes a vital function in the longevity and growth of the population: 
Population, once it exists as a concept, can be measured, organized, 
statistically developed into categories, and dealt with in institutions, each 
with its own techniques of power/knowledge. (Popkewitz & Brennan, 
1998, p. 21) 
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Biopower subjugates bodies and controls populations. Biopower's goal is the 
eventual self-surveillance of the entire population within each discipline. 
In England and the United States, between 1859 and 1860, Herbert 
Spencer, one of the most influential educational reformers within English society, 
publishes. What Knowledge is of Most Worth? (as cited in Kliebard, 1992; Pinar et 
al., 1996). In his article. Spencer addresses the need for a school curriculum w'hich 
teaches knowledge about the practical needs of the student for a life beyond 
education. In his paper. Spencer mandates a,"... knowledge which subserves 
direct self-preservation ..." in the maintenance of health (1992, p. 32). His 
definition of self-preservation is the maintenance of the individual against 
diseases and "other" dangers which may lead the individual to an early demise. 
These "other" dangers are social and economic in nature. Spencer's concern for 
self-preservation is bound by the struggle for social elitism. Spencer, a Social 
Darwinist, believes that, "survival of the fittest," applies to nature as well as 
humans (Kliebard, 1995). Wealth and longevity come to the strongest and 
brightest. The efficacy of Social Darwinism, is legitimated through social 
hierarchy. Individuals with poor health and moral turpitude find it difficult to 
raise their social status within Social Darwinism. Poor health is proof of 
biological inferiority (Krieger & Fee, 2002). Spencer's concern for self- 
preservation is tainted by classism, racism, and sexism. Spencer's discourse of 
self-preservation exemplifies a common theme amongst many White Anglo- 
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Saxon Protestant men that thrives through the different historical periods of 
western society. Spencer's article is another example of the effect of the 
application of biopower at a micro political level. This particular application is 
hegemonic, patriarchal, and oppressive certain members of the population. 
Spencer's discourse is a similar discursive practice that is pervasive throughout 
sex education. 
The discourse of hygiene continues to be modified as public education 
evolves within the United States. In 1885, the State of Wisconsin passes a 
Hygiene Law which instructs schools to teach physiology and hygiene about the 
human body. Within the statutes of the law, instruction is to emphasize the 
detrimental effects of narcotics and stimulants (Patzer as cited in Wagener, 1998). 
"Hygiene, as is the case with the term 'health' today, meant more than the 
absence of pathogens. It contained socially negotiated directions that went 
beyond the bounds of a scientific study of pathogenic activity" (Wagener, 1998, 
p. 157). Spencer and the State of Wisconsin, in their separate but similar decrees 
for self-preservation, through the study of health unveil social agendas that are 
beyond living conditions and infectious disease. Self-preservation constitutes not 
only the physiological maintenance of the body but also the moral and social 
maintenance of the mind. The initiation of a drug education program applies 
surveillance to the individual within the multiple discourses of medicine, health, 
and morality. 
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During the twentieth century, schools become institutions of inspection. 
Through inspection, they provide health intervention and prevention to students 
(Rose, 1998). As the hygienic gaze moves into the twentieth century, it applies its 
surveillance to the lifestyle and behaviors of the student. This technique 
establishes a link from illness to health risks (Armstrong, 1995). Surveillance of 
illness serves to protect the individual body, as well as society, from the spread 
of epidemics and contagious disease. Surveillance becomes a new form of 
medicine. It evolves from the clinico-pathological model and promotes the 
continual observation of the body's lifestyle. Through the surveillance of 
lifestyle, behaviors are observed and categorized in order to establish abnormal 
ones which lead to increased risk for chronic disease or early morbiditv. A shift 
towards the "problematisation of the normal" proliferates within medical 
epistemology (Armstrong, 1995, p. 395). Normal becomes a continuum rather 
than a fixed location. The individual body is in a constant state of flux as 
innocent symptoms become risk factors and move the body from healthy to 
illness and back (1995). Surveillance medicine asserts that, "... no - one is trulv 
healthy" (1995, p. 397). It establishes that through the observation of a body's 
lifestyle, risks can be assessed and a relationship established by which future 
illness can be predicted with a degree of certainty (1995): 
The blurring of the distinction between health and illness, between the 
normal and the pathological, meant that health care intervention could no 
longer focus almost exclusively on the body of the patient in the hospital 
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bed. Medical surveillance would have to leave the hospital and penetrate 
into the wider population. (1995, p. 398) 
Surveillance medicine must now move out into the community at large and 
study risk factors. It must target the entire population in order to be effective 
(1995). The first target of this new form of medicine is the child's body.//... the 
child in the twentieth century who became the first target of the concerted 
attempt to conflate normality and abnormality and thereby create a scale of 
difference" (Armstrong, 2002, p. 99), between bodies, offers a myriad of 
opportunities for observation and inspection. Nutrition, social class, growth, 
development, sexuality, etc. all provide opportunities for study and 
problemitization of the normal child (2002). The child is part of: 
a population which is congregated and readily available for training in 
citizenship or for any health or other social improvement schemes of the 
local educational authority; a population which opens the door to contact 
with parents and gives a rough guide to home conditions; a population 
which is under a measure of discipline; a population which is 
impressionable, receptive, plastic, and pliable; a population which under 
sympathetic and proper guidance should be in the process of developing 
habits which would conduce to the welfare of the individual and the 
community. (Lloyd as cited in Armstrong, 2002, p. 100) 
As an easily observable member of the population the child allows surveillance 
medicine the opportunity to construct a web of relationships with education and 
the community at large. Surveillance medicine, hygiene, and education work 
together at times to construct the categories of normal. For instance, 
immunization programs instituted within public agencies to stop the spread of 
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disease, like polio, (Armstrong, 2002) are verified through the schools. Tetanus, 
Measles, Mumps, and Rubella provide other examples of a similar process. 
Children are not permitted to attend public schools until they are properly 
immunized. Education provides verification, tracking, and maintenance of future 
shots. Normal within this practice is the result of a combination of force relations, 
such as education, family, community, etc., working collectively to accomplish 
certain public goals related to health risks. This complex web of biopower is: 
... the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they 
operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process 
which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, 
strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations 
find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, .... (Foucault, 1990, 
p. 92) 
These entities do not continue to travel parallel paths. Often, their agendas 
appear common but their respective discursive practices diverge in principle. 
Within the sphere of force relations, biopower changes in its effect and 
application as the force relations change within the discursive practices. As a 
result, normal evolves through the modification of surveillance and its operative 
control. 
Through the collection and standardization of information regarding the 
population of children, the binary of normal/abnormal is established. The use of 
this information within the disciplines of education and medicine allows the, "... 
installation of a problem. Then, that problem must be constituted as pathological. 
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Finally, a cure must be offered to normalize the pathology" (Britzman, 1999, p. 
387). Currently, this binary is operating within the discourse of obesity and 
overweight. The concern surrounding increased fat and caloric intake in the 
American diet poses a serious threat to the long term stability of the population. 
This discourse as it evolves will set a precedent in health care, health insurance 
coverage, exercise, genetics, medicine, education, diet, etc. Surveillance, within 
these discursive practices, will observe every facet of every American's social 
body for generations. The storage of fat by the body, either through the intake of 
excessive sugar or animal fats is linked to numerous illnesses such as heart 
disease. Type II Diabetes, and hypertension (Miller & Price, 1998; Telljohann, 
Symons, & Pateman, 2004). The established link between obesity and risk of 
chronic disease is a concern for the discipline of medicine: 
Former Surgeon General David Satcher characterized the health 
consequences of overweight and obesity to be among the "most 
burdensome" public health issues faced by the nation. Associated 
difficulties are manifested in premature death and disability, increased 
health care costs, lost productivity, and the social stigma associated with 
overweight and/or obese. (Telljohann, Symons, & Pateman, 2004, p. 234) 
Medicine is attempting to reduce risks to current and future populations through 
the surveillance of obesity and overweight. The population which again provides 
the best opportunity for the application of surveillance is that of children: 
Overweight children often become overweight adults, and overweight in 
adulthood is a health risk. Although childhood overweight may not result 
in adult health risk, immediate consequences of overweight in childhood 
are often psychosocial and also include cardiovascular risk factors such as 
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hypertension, high cholesterol levels, and abnormal glucose tolerance. 
(Ogden, Flegal, Carroll, & Johnson, 2002, p. 1728) 
This discourse establishes overweight and obese bodies as risks. Obesity and 
overweight are categorized as degrees of abnormality. Obesity and overweight 
become pathologies for education, medicine, hygiene, government, and 
corporations to correct. Each discipline with its own discursive practice operates 
collectively to modify the individual body. Intervention on the part of education 
is through teaching proper nutrition, promoting exercise, and managing caloric 
intake. The difficulty in implementing this practice is multifaceted. Education 
relies on the other disciplines to assist with certain tasks. For example, nutrition 
within the school is dependent upon funding from the Federal, State, and Local 
governments. While the respective discursive practices present themselves as 
common, their divergence begins to rear its ugly head. Governments at all levels 
are promoting healthy lifestyles, while at the same time reducing funding for 
public education. It becomes difficult to achieve set goals without the resources 
available to accomplish them. The discourse of sex education traverses a similar 
path. 
Sex within education is constructed by the multiple discursive practices of 
government, religion, and medicine: 
The social context for sex instruction not only influenced the form of 
instruction, but created new ways in which the self and social body were 
defined. In later years, there were shifts in the ways in which bodies were 
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constituted, with new bodily constructions again becoming normalized. 
(Wagener, 1998, p. 151) 
In 1912, Milwaukee begins incorporating sex hygiene into the school curriculum 
(Wagener, 1998). One of the concerns on the part of the local board is that 
instruction in sex hygiene will increase promiscuity. The board hopes that during 
this instructional period parents will instruct their children in "self-denial" 
(Wagener, 1998, p. 157). The other concern is in defining normal sexual behavior: 
This scientific rationalization of human sexual behavior was embodied by 
notions of "normal" male and female sexual impulses and desires. The 
form of health instruction, and the public discourses about the dangers of 
sexual experimentation as espoused by Health Department leaders, give 
insight into the way in which male and female bodies were defined and 
conceptualized in early twentieth-century Milwaukee sex education, (p. 
158) 
This discursive practice normalizes sex and sexuality. It effectively modifies two 
binaries within sex hygiene, that of the normal male/female roles and the normal 
heterosexual/homosexual desires. These modified binaries, "... give sex 
meaning ..." and, "... allow modern knowledge to take hold of the body ..." 
(Britzman, 1999, p. 388). By taking hold of the body the force relations of these 
particular binaries become, "... the tactics of individualizing disciplines ..." and 
they, "... are imposed on the excluded; and, on the other hand, the universality 
of disciplinary controls makes it possible to brand (the abnormal) ... and to bring 
into play against him the dualistic mechanisms of exclusion" (Foucault, 1995, p. 
199). This process of exclusion renders, "... some sex intelligible and to relegate 
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other sex to the unthinkable and the morally reprehensible" (Britzman, 1999, p. 
381). Exclusion, "... within contexts of education ..." points, "... to normalcy as 
exorbitant production ..." and, "... allows one to consider simultaneously 'the 
unstable differential relations' between those who transgress the normal and 
those whose labor is to be recognized as normal" (Britzman, 1998, p. 218). These 
binaries construct normal identities and roles within sex. They provide a 
mechanism from which the population of students is under surveillance. "In our 
context of education (and medicine), the normal body must personify a stable 
meaning even as that meaning must be adjusted through developmental 
discourse" (Britzman, 1999, p. 379). The individual student under constant sexual 
surveillance must conform to these roles in order to be recognized as normal. 
Origins 
Origins are of considerable importance to modern history. From the 
genesis of a singular event, a flurry of effects unfold in linear paths. This 
recording of origins functions within certain truth games to produce a specific 
chronology of history. Madan Sarup (1993) in his book. Post - Structuralism and 
Postmodernism, outlines the construction of modern history through the operation 
of truth games. Sarup writes that, "... traditional or 'total' history inserts events 
into grand explanatory systems and linear processes, celebrates great moments 
and individuals and seeks to document a point of origin ..." (1993, p. 59). In 
64 
order to unfold an alternative history of origins, an alternative perspective must 
be employed. This perspective is a post-structural analysis of history. Origins 
within a post-structural analysis break, "... off the past from the present and, by 
demonstrating the foreignness of the past, relativizes and undercuts the 
legitimacy of the present" (p. 58). Origins become something that is beyond the 
individual's grasp and are, "... beyond any apparent beginning, there is always a 
secret origin - so secret and so fundamental that it can never be quite grasped in 
itself" (Foucault, 1972, p. 25). Post-structuralism situates origins within that 
particular framework of time, space, and events as opposed to a universal birth. 
Origins become obscure and devoid of linear progressions and lose the aura of 
the grand narrative. 
Obscurity of origin is the matrix which envelopes the discourse of 
technoscience. Technoscience's obscurity is not just within the genesis of its 
name, but also within the genesis of its meanings. Technoscience and pain, 
within modern history, appear to operate with common discursive practices. In 
reality, pain and technoscience conjure up very different and distinct meanings 
for each individual within that discourse. Although the word pain is common 
within the language of western culture, it carries with it much more than a 
sensory physiological event. Ronald Melzack and Patrick Wall (1983), two pain 
researchers whom I mentioned in the first chapter, are responsible for much of 
what science and medicine know about human pain. In their book. The Challenge 
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of Pain, they explain that, "The diversity of pain experiences explains why it has 
been impossible, so far, to achieve a satisfactory definition" (p. 71) of pain. Pain is 
enveloped by multiple cultural and social connotations and therefore does not 
carry the same significance for each individual. Certainly, the individual in pain 
and the individual treating the pain have different priorities about its meaning 
and its resolution. Zborowski's (1952) landmark ethnography at Kingsbridge 
Veterans Hospital exposes this cultural and social diversity of language and 
meaning within the pain discourse of patients, practitioners, and families. "In 
human society pain, like so many other physiological phenomena, acquires 
specific social and cultural significance, and, accordingly, certain reactions to 
pain can be understood in the light of this significance" (p. 17). The point, within 
this discussion, is that technoscience, like pain, must be understood within the 
cultural and social context of its discursive formation because underneath the 
obscure layers what is revealed is the abundant cultural and social meanings of a 
complex society. 
Within their respective texts, Don Ihde, Distinguished Professor of 
Philosophy and Director of the Technoscience Research Group at Stony Brook 
University (2000) and Scharff and Dusek (2003), credit the origin of the term 
technoscience to Gaston Bachelard. "Bachelard was a prolific writer with a legacy 
of over ninety publications, which includes twenty-three books, among them 
twelve on the philosophy of science" (Krugly-Smolska, 2001, p. 41). Bachelard 
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begins writing about the history and philosophy of science and technology prior 
to its establishment within the academy as a formal area of critique. His writing 
influences several French authors, including Foucault and Derrida (2001). 
Bachelard coins the term technoscience while writing about the philosophical 
relationships between contemporary science and its technologies (Ihde, 2000). 
The obscure layering that envelops the origin of technoscience becomes apparent 
while reading Donna Haraway (1997). She credits her use of the term to Martin 
Heidegger. Haraway asserts that technoscience in her context comes from 
Heidegger's term technicity (Rabinow as cited in Haraway, 1997). To complicate 
matters even more, Bruno Latour is credited with popularizing and 
mainstreaming the term in his book, Science in Action (Haraway, 1997; Harding, 
2003; Scharff & Dusek, 2003). It is apparent that technoscience is a discourse 
whose birth is certain but its conception a mystery. Through the culmination of 
these origin stories, it appears that technoscience is a Western European critique. 
Heidegger, Latour, and Bachelard are legends within the literary critique of 
technoscience. One of these three are usually cited within anv contemporary 
critique. Of the three, Bachelard is the least well-known because the bulk of his 
texts are not translated into English (Krugly-Smolska, 2001). However, because 
of his impact on other French writers, it will not be long, before his influence is 
seen. 
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In order to comprehend the particular meaning of technoscience within 
the context of a discourse, the author and reader must have a common 
understanding of its usage. The term technoscience, while insignificant in terms 
of its actual conception, is significant in terms of its impact upon academia and 
Western culture. The discourse of technoscience intersects at multiple layers 
within the social fabric and questions the legitimacy of certain science claims. It 
questions, "... what is science, ... where is it found? In the market square or in 
the classroom? And in what language is it spoken? By those who spout jargon or 
by those who speak coarsely" (Serres, 1995, p. 9)? Michel Serres, a critic of science 
but not an anti-scientist, asks, what is the nature of science? Is science and its 
technologies restricted to laboratories and white coats? Or, can thev also be about 
the relationships between people, pedagogy, students, nature, culture, and 
humanity? The discourse encompassing technoscience is too big and too 
powerful to be left unquestioned by the school teacher and taken too lightly by 
the elitist jargon of academicians. The origin of the computer is an example of a 
material technoscientific product also shrouded in ambiguity. Lew (1995) in, A 
History of Scientific Thought, discusses origins within computer science. As 
traditional history attempts to validate the individual founder, credit is often 
given to the undeserved. Von Neumann, who is given credit, contributes less to 
the project than what he actually accomplishes: 
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Here the supposed founder had brought about a brilliant synthesis of 
ideas, most of which were the work of others, but which he organized 
within the framework of a general theory of automata. It's not a question 
of denying the reality or the originality of von Neumann's contribution to 
the history of computer science, but of challenging the very idea of 
foundation or points of origin, ... (p. 643) 
Technoscience evolves because of the contribution of multiple authors to its 
discourse. No one individual should be credited for the significance of its critique 
of science and technology. Modern history, however, perpetuates a competitive 
nature by bestowing its accolades and awards upon specific origins. This practice 
results in individuals that are credited with contributions to their respective 
fields for which questions remain as to their legitimacy. On the other side, 
individuals who make significant contributions to science are silenced by the 
annals of modern history. Sandra Harding (1991) writes about one of those 
travesties within science. Harding unfolds the story of Rosalind Franklin in. 
Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Franklin's story is an example of a scientist's 
work intentionally omitted from science history because of its sexist practices. 
Rosalind Franklin is a co-contributor in the discovery of the DNA helix. Her 
contribution, however, is voided by the modest witnessing of Watson, Crick, and 
the hegemonic, patriarchal practices of Western science. This practice of modest 
witnessing (Haraway, 1997) provides sufficient evidence as to the necessity of the 
undertaking by critiques of technoscience in their respective observations of 
these practices. "... the male identity of science is no mere artifact of sexist 
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history; throughout most of its evolution, the culture of science has not simply 
excluded women, it has been defined in defiance of women and their absence ..." 
(as cited in Haraway, 1997, p. 29). Modest witnessing by Watson and Crick 
construct a culture which excludes Rosalind Franklin on the basis of sex. This 
exclusivity allows the construction of facts and truths which affect life outside 
the laboratory. Life outside the lab is lived through the facts and truths 
constructed by modest witnesses. These witnesses produce a privileged 
knowledge which only a select few have access to (Gough, 2001). Watson and 
Crick rely upon the practices of modest witnessing to validate their denigration 
of Rosalind Franklin. Watson and Crick are awarded the Nobel Prize and accept 
the accolades that go along with it. The origin story of the double helix is an 
intentional omission on the part of the Nobel Prize committee and other 
academic committees of science. These committees develop their origin story 
they so desperately desire, white males conquering the mysteries of mankind. 
Michel Serres (1995) examines how origins are created within the political 
practices of modern science. He points to the influence of the knowledge 
production on the part of academic committees. Serres writes that: 
These decisions plotted on the map are accepted or rejected by an 
authority which often acts as a tribunal. Only such a court decides. The 
Greek schools, the Church councils and university symposia function in a 
similar way and claim a monopoly of the definition of words, of 
knowledge and the truth. They are tribunals and they hold the crucial 
power of cardinal importance in the history of science. It is here that 
orientations are defined and set down. (p. 9) 
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These academic committees operate truth games within their respective 
disciplines (Foucault, 1997). The American Medical Association, The National 
Athletic Trainers Association, The American Cancer Society, etc. are examples of 
modern day committees. Truth, within these committees, is produced through 
sets of rules, procedures, and principles (1997). Truth, regarding Rosalind 
Franklin, is established upon the premise that within this particular game of the 
modest witness an individual must be male in order to participate. As a result, 
Rosalind Franklin becomes an omission in the annals of scientific history. 
However, Sandra Harding and other technoscience writers, attempt to carrv the 
message to new generations of readers, students, and practitioners that, "... the 
process of knowledge production means acknowledging the politics of the 
production processes and the political and cultural contexts in which thev are 
situated" (Gough, 2001, p. 278). John Weaver (2001) unfolds another origin story 
of modern science. This one involves Calculus and relates to the ongoing feud 
between Newton and Leibniz. They are embroiled in a professional struggle as to 
the creator of Calculus. Newton becomes the anointed winner. His victory is 
perhaps achieved through his position as the president of the Royal Society and 
author of the committee report which establishes the Truth. This omission of 
evidence is another example of the same process of exclusion which fails to 
recognize Rosalind Franklin. The rules of Newton's truth game are different from 
Franklin's. The rules of His game favor the individual making the rules. The 
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examination of these truth games is another reason individuals are drawn to the 
study of technoscience. 
Interdisciplinanty & Meanings 
Technoscience as a field of study is integrated within the disciplines of the 
academy. It is a unique field of study in that it encompasses a large 
interdisciplinary following (Ihde, 2003; Nelkin 1996). Researchers are from 
philosophy, sociology, anthropology, science, medicine, curriculum theory, 
cultural studies, etc. Technoscience is enmeshed within a matrix of meanings, 
applications, and understandings. Meanings, applications, and understandings 
differ depending upon the author's line of research, professional training, 
particular interests, and philosophical grounding. There is common agreement 
among the differing perspectives of technoscience that its general critique is 
about materiality. The materiality of technoscience is an integral part of Western 
human existence. In Western society, technoscience provides the creature 
comforts that are taken for granted during the course of daily life. The tendency 
to be blinded by technoscience materiality is a numbing process. Individual's 
fortunate enough to have access to material goods find technoscience to be 
natural as opposed to a cultural artifact. Pickstone (2001) explains the concept of 
natural within his framework of a modern Western technoscientific existence. He 
explains that: 
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The world which is 'natural' for us is not in fields, or the natural history 
museums, or in accounts of the changing seasons of the Hampshire 
villages, but in our product - packed homes and gardens, in the 
supermarkets and the guides to consumption that flood the television and 
the magazine racks - not to say the Internet.... (2001, p. 81) 
The individual rarely questions the existence or origin of these material things 
because they are integrated as an extension of the body. These material items 
define, at times, human existence. By examining this process through a cultural 
and social perspective we find that the concept of: 
... the technological is not so easily distinguished from the "human," since 
it is within (medical technologies, processed foods), beside (telephones), 
and outside (satellites). Sometimes we inhabit it (a climate-controlled 
office space), or it inhabits us (a pacemaker). (Menser & Aronowitz, 1996, 
p. 9) 
Technoscience from a cultural studies critique demonstrates the dissolution of 
the boundaries surrounding what is considered science, technology^, and human. 
Cultural studies critique of technoscience encompasses the social and cultural 
aspects of our practices as actors within the framework of the medical, scientific, 
and educational disciplines. Bradley Lewis (2003) observes the technoscientific 
infiltration of medical practice when he writes about the effects of 
biotechnologies and psychopharmaceuticals. In his article, Prozac and the Post- 
human Politics of Cyborgs, he is concerned by the lack of a resistive discourse 
against biotechnologies: 
... the technoscience invasion of medicine has happened so fast, and is 
controlled by such dominant interests, that the standard medical literature 
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has not caught up with the full complexities of technomedicine or even 
begun to develop a critical discourse of this phenomena, (p. 52) 
Without an organized and intelligent critique, the technoscience of 
biotechnologies and psychopharmaceuticals go unchecked as they make their 
way into the American marketplace. Lewis' discussion cuts through multiple 
layers of our capitalist society. Who decides the ethical, moral, and economic 
impact of biotech and psychopharmaceuticals on the American consumer? 
Lewis' concern about clinicians, "... in danger of becoming glorified distributors 
of the new technologies for the giant transnational biotech corporations — sort of 
like new car dealers with a medical certificate" (p. 52) is a genuine concern. This 
distribution, however, is already taking place. Instead of using clinicians, 
corporations are using mass media. It is a more effective campaign that reaches a 
broader audience, and the message delivered is not tainted. The message unfolds 
in several ways. An example of how this sequence begins is with a television ad 
for symptoms an individual may have, may believe he/she has, is not sure 
he/she has, but wants to try this new drug anyway. The individual then visits 
his/her family physician. During the visit, the individual communicates these 
symptoms from the ad to the physician. Since symptoms of pathologies overlap, 
as I discussed earlier regarding Fibromyalgia, the physician may agree and 
prescribe this new drug. The physician and patient then wait and see what 
happens to the symptoms. While this example oversimplifies the process. This is 
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a very real ethical and moral dilemma ongoing within medical practice. One 
need only read Lewis' article or ask a teacher about the number of students on 
drugs for ADD and ADHD within his/her school to come to grips with a 
national problem. Technomedicine is delivered to the doorstep of millions of 
Americans each and every day. Medicine, as curriculum theory is doing, must 
examine the cultural influences of technoscientific venues like television, the 
internet, mass media and begin to deal with these issues of biotechnologies and 
psychopharmaceuticals from a popular cultural position (Daspit and Weaver, 
1999). 
Commonality and cordiality of technoscience ends here. The split centers 
upon who has the authority to observe and critique science and technology. 
Some philosophers of science and some scientists are offended bv what thev 
believe to be the oversimplification and outdated conceptions of science (Scharff 
& Dusek, 2003). This is dubbed the anti-science movement. The anti-science 
members are collectively lumped as social constructivists, postmodernists, and 
cultural studies writers (Weaver, 2001). Bruno Latour (2003) considers himself a 
philosopher scientist and an integral part of the science establishment which he 
critiques. He believes his work has been a positive influence on the 
understanding of the practices of science. Now that his work is being challenged 
by his colleagues and friends from the science field he describes his anxietv: 
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What I would call "adding realism to science" was actually seen, by the 
scientists at this gathering, as a threat to the calling of science, as a way of 
decreasing its stake in truth and their claims to certainty, (p. 127) 
The significance of Latour's, other "science studies" (2003), and cultural science 
studies (Weaver, 2001) writers is their critique and observations of issues 
affecting life outside the laboratory. These authors abandon, "... the modern 
notion embedded in science that suggests the communicative process through 
language can be transmitted without any noise ..." (2001, p. 2). Society is dealing 
with issues of what Latour calls "hybrid articles" (as cited in Doll et al., 2001): 
They are hybrids because, neither pure science nor pure politics, they 
muddle and mix, in an ever-weaving network of social and technical 
relations, the cultural and technological, the social and the scientific. To 
know how to handle the issues raised by global warming, AIDS vaccines, 
frozen embryos, and contraception pills is virtually impossible, for we 
have no past history of dealing with such hybrids. (Doll et al., 2001, p. 25) 
Whatever feathers are ruffled by these authors, their respective works are 
important in writing about issues that affect more than science. As discussed 
earlier, with Bradley Lewis' concerns, serious moral and ethical issues like AIDS, 
psychopharmaceuticals, the genome project, and health care face the discourse of 
technoscience. These critical issues need to be addressed on local and national 
levels and by multiple actors. "Critical' means evaluative, public, multiactor, 
multiagenda, oriented to equality and heterogeneous well-being" (Haraway, 
1997, p. 95). Critical means more than modest witnessing, it means all witnesses. 
Decisions that affect all inhabitants of the earth should not be left in the hands of 
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transnational corporations or any other select group. As a species we are no 
longer at the "threshold of modernity" (Foucault, 1990, p. 143) we are through it 
and the authors of cultural sciences studies need to assist science and scientists in 
making our way down the pathway without further insult or catastrophic event. 
Michel Serres is another one of those individuals criticized for his 
oversimplification of science (Weaver, 2001). Maria Morris (2001) postulates that 
Serres is an outcast because of his writing style. An aspect, "... of Serres' texts 
that probably maddens positivistic scientists is the mystical element that 
pervades his writings. Conservative scientists might not like this because 
mysticism is often associated with irrationalism. And irrationalism is plain 
anathema for scientists" (p. 99). Serres (1995) speaks of the interaction of 
technoscientific boundaries and current pedagogical practices in, A History of 
Scientific Thought. He writes about the problems that western societv is 
encountering at the mutation of technoscience and pedagogy. Society is in peril 
unless significant changes are made to the way science teaches and conducts its 
business. "In short, our entire learning process is inappropriate to the real world 
in which we live, a world which is a confused mixture of technology7 and society, 
of insane or wise traditions and useful or disturbing innovations" (1995, p. 1). 
Science relies upon outdated traditions and problem solving techniques to cope 
with issues such as bioethics, corporate and academic mergers, and pedagogy7. 
Science must accept the notion of interdisciplinarity. "Being educated requires a 
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great deal of crossing-over into fuzzy terrain, into new and different regions of 
knowledge" (Morris, 2001, p. 107). 
Crossing over involves how and what we teach. David Blades (1997) 
discusses this in his dissertation on science reform in Alberta, Canada. He desires 
a resistance to the multiple positivistic forces at play in the reformation of science 
curriculum in Alberta. Blades is frustrated by the "back to the basics" voices of 
science reformers. He and others push for a science curriculum which is critical 
of the role of science in knowledge and truth making. Blades wants a 
technoscientific curriculum which accepts responsibility for its actions upon 
humans and nature, and realizes it can no longer hide behind the veil of 
objectivity. Unfortunately for Blades, mainstream science silences his reformation 
efforts as being anti-science and too humanistic (my emphasis). Change, within 
Blades' discourse, is not anti-science. It is, the contestation of,//... the notion that 
anyone, whether it is the 'good' scientist or the reality-denying cultural critic, can 
really know reality or its external truths without some form of mediation, 
whether it is language or a laboratory instrument" (Weaver, 2001, p. 5). Post- 
structural technoscience critique, "... realizes Being is defined, delimited, and 
determined by modernity and seeks to find, through text, ..." (Blades, 1997, p. 
126), the means to re-think these practices in a critical sense. Traditional science 
must realize that Truth making and its practices are pre-defined. Traditional 
science is about teaching science a certain way (Weaver, 2001). Within traditional 
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science pedagogy "... It is a matter of teaching practitioners how to construct 
nature, erase themselves, and to rationalize this pedagogy as an accurate 
representation" (2001, p. 18). In order to critically resist traditional science 
pedagogy, must re-examine these practices at the same instance as one re-thinks 
Being. These cultural practices of science are human constructions rather than 
absolutes (Weaver, 2001). 
Utopia & Dystopia 
Akin to biopower, technoscience is burdened by both positive and 
negative connotations. This examination of technoscience is from the perspective 
of what Don Ihde (1997) calls, "knowledge through technologies" (p.73). "This is 
a special kind of praxical or use knowledge which runs through a wide range of 
human actions" (p. 73). Instead of examining knowledge about technology or 
theoretical knowledge of technology (1997), this practice examines the cultural 
and social aspects of knowledge through technologies. Ihde comments that, 
"Knowledge through technology has historically often fallen prey to disparate 
Utopian or dystopian interpretations ..." (1997, p. 73). Individuals which critique in 
this manner are what Weaver and Grindall call, "techno-maniacs and techno- 
phobes" (1998, p. 232). 
The Utopian vision of technoscience examines the rational uses of 
technology. This vision champions the positive effects technology has on the 
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every day lives of individuals. A critic of cyborg discourse and Utopian 
visionary, Simon Williams (1997) reiterates a concern of those who believe 
cultural studies of science is an anti-science movement. He, amongst others, 
believes that the benefits of technoscience far out weigh those of the negative. 
Williams admits no shortcomings with medicine and believes that the discourse 
should be controlled by those with the Knowledge. He asserts that the ethical 
dilemmas are overshadowed by the lives saved: 
Rather, we should also acknowledge the significant contribution which 
medical technology has made to our lives, from improvements in the 
quality of life (e.g. organ transplants) of life itself. Indeed, even in 
controversial areas such as gene therapy, certain forms of treatment 
would seem to be a moral obligation rather than an option, (as cited in 
Williams, 1997, p. 1048) 
This type of technoscience visioning lacks a moral and ethical backdrop. 
Implementation of new technosciences is more beneficial (or less catastrophic) in 
the opinion of this visionary than no implementation at all. The origin story of 
the stethoscope is an example of a Utopian technoscience contribution that has 
benefited humankind. Technological discoveries often emerge out of a milieu 
rather than explode on the scene (Duffin, 1999). Laennec, around 1816, invents 
the stethoscope out of necessity and happenstance. Clinico-pathological medicine 
requires him to listen to the heart sounds of a well-endowed young female. 
Percussion is out of the question and decorum precludes placing his ear on her 
chest. Laennec rolls up his notebook and places one end on her chest and the 
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other to his ear. To his amazement he hears her heartbeat (Duffin, 1999; Postman, 
1992). Laennec later writes, 
From this moment... I imagined that the circumstance might furnish 
means for enabling us to ascertain the character, not only of the action of 
the heart, but of every species of sound produced by the motion of all the 
thoracic viscera." (Postman, 1992, p. 98) 
While it appears this 'discovery' is a flash of brilliance, additional evidence 
suggests otherwise (Duffin 1999; Postman 1992). First, clinico-pathological 
medicine demands the search for a lesion. The gaze requires verification through 
the spaces of anatomy. Without this methodology of medicine, there is no reason 
to listen to heart sounds. Second, accounts by Laennec's student tell a different 
tale. Laennec passes by children speaking through a log to one another. This 
catches his attention and he 'rediscovers' that sound travels through a medium 
(Duffin, 1999). The significance of this technology to medical practice is 
invaluable. This Utopian technoscientific production is critical to the future 
development of the practice of medicine. For Haraway (2000a): 
Technologies and scientific discourses can be partially understood as 
formalizations, i.e. as frozen moments, of the fluid social interactions 
constituting them, but they should also be viewed as instruments for 
enforcing meanings. The boundary is permeable between tool and myth, 
instrument and concept, historical systems of social relations and 
historical anatomies of possible bodies, including objects of knowledge, 
(p. 302) 
The stethoscope should be viewed as a tool and instrument that is neither our 
savior nor our destruction. It carries the meaning that we, as humans, give it and 
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in turn becomes an extension of us. Haraway, alerts us that these tools we use 
help and hinder the eventual diagnosis of pathology. Haraway provides both a 
dystopian and Utopian outlook on technoscience. She understands the efficacy of 
technoscience, but is terrified by the consequences of a discourse left unattended 
and taken for granted. As 1 referenced in chapter one (p. 13), technoscience as 
defined by Haraway (1997) is part of the web of power. She uses Foucault's 
concept of biopower (1997) to demonstrate the integration of technoscience into 
our human/cyborg relations. Knowledge through technology is the framework 
which I apply within this methodology and analysis. 
David Blades (2003) in his latest work, The Pedagogy of Technological 
Replacement, takes a dystopian and apocalyptic outlook to the future of 
humanity. He believes that: 
We are in danger as a species of inventing ourselves to death. We have at 
the most one or two generations to gain public control over the direction 
of technological change. The children about to start school next vear, our 
little ones — certainly their children — will face a radically different world 
than humanity has ever known. Indeed, these changes have alreadv 
begun and the time is short in beginning the public discussions and action 
needed to direct the evolution of our technology. (Blades as cited in 
Blades, p. 213) 
Blades is concerned that technoscience is permanently altering the essence of 
what it means to be human. His discussion is an extension of Heidegger's (1977) 
relationship of the essence between being human and technology. Ted Aoki 
(1999) in his article. Toward Understanding "Computer Application," is also 
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concerned with the lack of introspection on the part of teachers and 
administrators in their widespread application of computers within education. 
Blades and Aoki both examine technoscience from this perspective. Aoki and 
Blades share similar concerns across the generations of curriculum theory. Blades 
sees the technological progress ten plus years later from Aoki. Their collective 
alarm at the lack of understanding on the part of technology proponents 
concerning the implementation of technology is disheartening for them. Aoki 
concludes his piece with a story of one of his doctoral students on dialysis. The 
student relays to him her concern with being enslaved by technology: 
These understandings she has for she understands that the truth of 
technology is in the essence of technology, ... in the revealing of things 
and people as only resources, as standing-reserves that can be objectified, 
manipulated, and exploited. (1999, p. 175) 
This student feels the need to transcend the technology that sustains her life in 
order to regain her human essence. She wants to be more than a teaching tool 
within the hospital and an extension of a dialysis machine. The essence of 
technology, in Aoki's and Blades' perspective, is the subjectivity and utilitarian 
exploitation of the human essence. This visioning of human/technological 
interaction is narrow. While a critical examination of technology is in order bv 
the frustrated authors. I prefer to think along the lines of James Macdonald when 
he states that, "... technology is in effect an externalization of the hidden 
consciousness of human potential" (1995, p. 75). Technoscience as an extension of 
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human thought is along the lines of what some curricular theorists call for when 
they integrate pop culture with the technological. In Weaver and Grindall's 
(1998) article, Surfing and Getting Wired In A Fifth Grade Classroom, they attempt to 
build a, "... vision of a critical techno-mania classroom where a multiplicity of 
voices, multiple personalities, and critical insights are nurtured within our 
students and ourselves" (p. 232). This type of environment is neither dystopian 
or Utopian. It oscillates between the two and carries with it a critical critique of 
technoscience. 
Cyborg 
The term cyborg is coined by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline in 1960 
(Clark, 2003; Haraway, 1997, 2000a; Klugman, 2001). Clynes and Kline are two 
researchers working at Rockland State Hospital in New York. The two are 
outstanding researchers in the area of human physiology (Clark, 2003). The 
cyborg is their idea generated from the necessity to prepare humans for space 
travel. Clynes and Kline attempt to solve the problem of how to cope with the 
demands of space travel on the human body. They propose: 
Instead of trying to provide artificial, earth-like environments for the 
human exploration of space, why not alter the humans so as to better cope 
with the new and alien demands? ... Why not, in short, reengineer the 
humans to fit the stars? (Clark, 2003, p. 13) 
From its inception as a model, the cyborg is built as, "... a cybernetic organism, a 
hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature 
of fiction" (Haraway, 2000a, p. 291). The cyborg takes its theoretical shape from 
the Cartesian thought of man as machine. Conceptually, the cyborg is an 
integration of an "artifact-organism systems" (Clark, 2003, p. 14), in which 
electronic devices use biofeedback to regulate bodily functions. These functions 
include respiration rates, heart rates, metabolism, etc. (2003). These cybernetic 
functions adjust the human physiologic responses so as to prepare the cyborg for 
each specific environment in space travel (Clark, 2003; Klugman, 2001). 
Cybernetic and data-processing research that is done on behalf of the Defense 
Department (Clark, 2003) is the science that creates the cyborg. Cybernetics 
Studies observes the physiological and neurological systems of the human 
(Klugman, 2001) in order to eventually replace these systems with mechanical 
and electrical ones. It is a collection of post-World War II technoscientific projects 
from informatics and biologies that shapes the figurations of the cyborg 
(Markussen, Olesen, & Lykke, 2003). 
The cyborg as it is understood within contemporary technoscientific 
literature is the direct result of Donna Haraway's influence. Haraway's (2000a) 
writing does to the cyborg what Latour's does to technoscience. She mainstreams 
and acculturates the cyborg. Two of her major works, Cyborg Manifesto (2000a) 
and Modest Witness (1997) carry the thematic of the cyborg. It is difficult to read 
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cyborg academic literature and not see her referenced. Haraway's cyborg, "... 
brings together a string of events and dimensions which include technologies, 
social enactments, modified biological processes — everything from genes to the 
socialized military-industrial powers" (Ihde, 2003, pp. 4-5). Haraway, whose 
academic training is in biology, begins writing about technoscience and the 
cyborg from within the system she critiques (Ihde, 2003). Her academic training 
helps the permeation of her message and is not viewed by the establishment as 
an anti-scientist like Serres or Latour. The cyborg is significant in her writings 
because it opposes Cartesian thinking and examines technoscience from an anti- 
positivist perspective. She believes that Cartesian thinking is dangerous, 
especially when comparing humans to machines. "If you define something as a 
machine - like a chimpanzee - then one of the implications of the machine is that 
it can be reengineered" (Haraway, 2000b, p. 68). The reengineering of humans 
digs into the heart of the Genome project. Reengineering promotes a discourse of 
racism, sexism, and elitism through its belief that the negative genes or behaviors 
of humans can be eradicated or improved to the benefit of the positive ones. As 
Haraway asks in Modest Witness (1997), who or whom will be the beneficiary of 
such changes? While not all scholars agree with Haraway's position on the 
cyborg, it is within her discourse that the construction of the cyborg as we know 
it begins. 
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Unlike technoscience, the cyborg carries a common meaning. The cyborg 
for Haraway is a, "... general blurring in our age of the traditional boundary 
lines not only between persons and hardware but also, thanks to biotechnology, 
even between species" (Scharff & Dusek, 2003, p. 414). Perhaps, a reason for 
Haraway's cyborg as a common starting point for this discussion is her vivid 
description and explanation for what she is speaking about when she uses the 
term "cyborg." The cyborg is about the, "... fusion of the organic and the 
technical forged in particular, historical, cultural practices" (Haraway, 1997, p. 
51). The cyborg is materiality (Ihde, 2003). It originates from Western culture and 
society, particularly within transnational corporations, academic institutions, and 
the Department of the Defense (Haraway, 1997; Kull, 2002; Lewis, 2003). The 
cyborg refuses to deny its origin and its history (Sawicki, 1996). The cyborg takes 
responsibility for its actions by, "... refusing an anti-science metaphysics, a 
demonology of technology, and so means embracing the skillful task of 
reconstructing the boundaries of daily life, in partial connection with others, in 
communication with all of our parts" (Haraway, 2000a, p. 316). The cyborg by its 
very existence forces the disciplines of Western society to come to terms with the 
integration of technoscience and humanity. For example, electronic stimulators 
implanted onto the nerves of the spinal cord to reduce pain or implants within 
the Tympanic membrane to allow fluid to drain out of the ear. These are 
technologies which are minute and becoming minuter as nanotechnology 
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continues to develop (Livingston, 2002). These technologies allow humans to go 
through their daily lives with little reminder as to their reliance upon technology'. 
These technologies demonstrate the seamless fusion in creating a cyborg. As 
artificial hearts, joints, metal rods, etc. become commonplace extensions of 
human boundaries, our modern ways of thinking about what constitutes human 
needs adaptation. "We are cyborgs because we are the instruments of a powerful 
technological, medicinal, scientific, and military system that appropriates and 
reshapes the world at an ever - increasing rate" (Kull, 2002, p. 284). The 
collective We are the inhabitants of the planet Earth. We are all affected in one 
way or another by the discourses of technoscience and the cyborg. We are 
affected either directly through the use of these tools of technoscience or 
indirectly through the exploitation of resources utilized to develop them. These 
resources constitute labor, material, capital, or procreative means within the 
practice of technoscience. "In creating machines, humans are often said to take 
on the god-like role of 'creator.' Yet we often see the machine as the image of 
doom or evil" (Applebaum, 1999, p. 95). The message, which I borrow from Peter 
Applebaum, is that there exists a fine balance between dystopia and utopia 
visioning of technoscience. The cyborg is a material and figural way of keeping 
this visioning in perspective. 
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Mind/Body 
Humanity separates itself from other species through the construction of 
the mind at the exclusion of the body (Kull, 2002; Macrine, 2002). It is the 
separation of mind and body which positivist science uses to maintain the claim 
of what constitutes being human. This claim also enables positivist science to 
maintain male/female, normal/abnormal, heterosexual/homosexual binaries 
and to construct other binaries as the situation permits. The construction of the 
mind in exclusion of the body, however, sits in opposition to that of the cyborg 
discourse. The cyborg makes ambiguous the distinction between mind and body 
(Haraway, 2000a). The cyborg implodes binaries and boundaries, contradicts 
identities, and dissolves what socially and historically constitutes gender, race, 
and class (Haraway, 2000a). Posthuman cyborg discourses which discuss the 
posthuman condition (Livingston, 2002; Stelarc, 2000; Terranova, 2000) have a 
tendency to be undermined by the duality of mind/body. Within the discourse 
of the posthuman it situates itself upon the body and the mind is left to pasture. 
At the heart of these discourses is the eventual jettisoning of the biological body, 
like a snake that sheds its skin. By cyberjacking into the brain, hyper-identities 
and hyper-realities are created (Livingston, 2002). Or are they? In cyborg 
discourse, no distinction is made between mind/body, so whose realities and 
identities are posthumanists dislodging and whose are they accepting? With the 
Cartesian distinction, the cyborg becomes an identity as opposed to a hyper- 
89 
identity (2002) an object as opposed to subjects. What needs to be abandoned in 
posthuman discussion is the underlying duality of mind/body. Posthuman 
cyborg discourse walks a thin Cartesian line. 
Another dualism that should be cyberjettisoned along with the 
mind/body, is the methodology of clinical medicine. Cause/effect discourse 
forces the gaze of the physician upon the lesion, rather than the patient (Cassell 
as cited in Kahn & Steeves, 1986; Dubos as cited in Sullivan, 1986; Sawchuk, 
Busby, & Burns, 1999; Wall, 1999, 2000). Objectification of the body, at the 
exclusion of the mind, through the cause/effect binary allows the free movement 
of practitioners to define lesions and objects. Clinical medicine utilizes Cartesian 
duality to separate the visible from the invisible. That which is subjective 
(invisible) resides within the mind (psychological) and that which is objective 
(visible) or pathologically verifiable resides within the body (physiological). 
Unresolved clinical pain, without a clearly defined organic cause leads to a 
psychosomatic diagnosis. Psychosomatic pain is kin to hysteria, hypochondria, 
and malingering (Wall, 2000). These are pathologies which carry the stigma of 
neuroses and are also the spaces which are largely occupied by women (Morris, 
D. B., 1998). 
Fibromyalgia, other chronic, stress related illnesses, and chronic pain can 
be cyborgs within this paradigm. Taking this conversation a step further, Bradley 
Lewis' (2003) article, Prozac and the Post-human Politics of Cyborgs, provides a 
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pertinent example to what I am getting at. Metaphorically, Lewis asks is a human 
still a human if he/she is altered pharmacologically? Or in my terms, does the 
mind maintain separation from the body if it is altered pharmacologically? What 
do we do to the human (cyborg) condition if all that is changed is the perception 
through the addition of a few drugs: 
If we plug human suffering, misery, and sadness into the calculus of 
bioscience, there is no need to make changes in the social order, instead, 
we only need to jumpstart some neurotransmitters. There is no need to 
reduce social harassment and discrimination. Instead, let them have pills, 
(p. 56) 
What happens to pain in a posthuman condition? What becomes of suffering? 
Does the alteration of one's personality by Prozac become a cyborg mutation or 
is it technoscience gone bad? Does Prozac like the OncoMouse™, "... contribute 
to deeper equality, keener appreciation of heterogeneous multiplicity, and 
stronger accountability for livable worlds" (Haraway, 1997, p. 113)? If it does, 
then by all means a posthumanity on Prozac proves to be interesting. In a 
different context, if "normal" is achieved through Prozac intervention then in the 
context of Cartesian thinking, is that where we want to be? 
Thyrza Goodeve (1999) provides a similar quandary for me in her chapter. 
You Sober People: 
The discourse, both popular and scholarly, around Prozac since its 
development in the late 1980s takes such technological mind-body 
modification of cyberpunk fantasy into the realm of psychiatric practice 
and philosophy. Ingesting Prozac, the first designer drug for the treatment 
of mental illness, has become a kind of jacking in to the science-fiction 
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ontologies... But instead of the body, it is one's "personality" or 
"temperament" that is said to be technotuned, not severed, as in the case 
of midecentury lobotomy. (p. 237) 
Goodeve writes another cyborg story with a Cartesian epistemology. Her 
chapter, like other posthumanist writing, brings to light some interesting points 
for me. Goodeve, as do others in the scientific and medical communities, 
separates mind/body and searches for the pathological/psychological in her 
analysis of a cure for personality and pain disorders. First, she presents the 
binary of mind/body as if two separate entities exist. As if the mind/body travel 
separately. Earlier, in her chapter (p. 230), she references David Morris (1991) in 
his criticism of western medicine and the separation of physical and emotional 
pain. Goodeve, along with Morris, critique western medicine and its approach to 
patients in pain. Physical pain holds credibility while emotional and 
psychological pain fights for legitimacy. In one breath, Goodeve criticizes the 
separation of physical and emotional pain in medicine. While in the next, she 
separates mind and body in personality disorders. While her argument about 
Prozac and the cyborg are valid, and I agree with her, the separation of mind and 
body are what I disagree with. If, in the context of the text, we are going to speak 
of emotional and physical pain as one, then we must speak of mind and body as 
one as well. The human brain after all is responsible for the regulatory functions 
of our daily existence. The separation of mind and body throughout science and 
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medicine continues to present pain as a singular sensory event. Rather, focus 
should be on pain as a holistic human experience. 
Second, Goodeve is concerned about the pathological/psychological in 
the identification of diseases. By pharmacologically cyberjacking people with 
Prozac, we affect not just the mind but the body as well. If Prozac mutates 
personality, then it also mutates the mind. By mutating the mind, the body is 
next. Pathological and psychological changes take place within the brain as a 
result of this pharmacological jacking. The majority of these changes are minute 
and take place at cellular levels. By doing this, is there still a distinction? What if 
we instead, approach the Central Nervous system as an integrated unit as 
suggested by Riemann and Lephart (2002), and consider the pathological and 
psychological as we do the rest of the Sensorimotor system, an integrated unit? 
What if we reconsidered a feed forward and feed back system with pain? If we 
did these things Goodeve's argument would speak volumes for posthuman 
cyborgs. 
Identity Pedagogy 
Cyborgs resist binaries because they are the offspring of positivist 
technoscientific discourses (Karaway, 1997). As offspring of often morallv and 
ethically questionable discursive practices, cyborgs accept responsibility for their 
existence. They deny the legitimacy of binary categorical descriptions as accurate 
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representations of what they are and where they came from. Resistance to 
binaries, for cyborgs, comes from their ability to separate themselves from 
positivist discourses at points of responsibility. Positivist discourses, such as sex 
= gender, construct normal identities based upon assumptions that male is 
masculine and female is feminine (Morris, M., 1998). "A cyborg body is not 
innocent; it was not born in a garden; it does not seek unitary identity and so 
generate antagonistic dualisms without end ..." (Haraway, 2000a, p. 315). The 
cyborg operates in defiance of binary descriptions. Cyborgs as transgendered 
and transsexual entities refute either/or assumptions of binary thinking. By 
denying binary constructions and accepting the responsibility for what they are, 
cyborgs disrupt the construction of normal and discredit its operative function 
within discursive practices. 
Within a discursive practice, cyborg pedagogy also disrupts the positivist 
binaries. In the following section and subsequent chapters, I discuss cvborg 
pedagogy as a possibility for resisting binary constructions of the normal social 
body within the disciplines. The normal social body, within the discursive 
practices of the disciplines, creates an identity specific to that discourse. In 
positivist discursive practices, there is a, .. dominant insistence upon the 
stability of bodies, the body as fact and as transmitting obvious information" 
(Britzman, 1999, p. 379). The body transmits a meaning of normal /abnormal and 
the transmission of this information is used to construct identity. The 
94 
transmission of obvious information is the taken for granted assumptions of 
binary thinking. These assumptions operate by applying an identity to the body 
which is often not representative of the individual and his/her collective 
qualities. "The body is the human form seen from the outside, from a cultural 
perspective striving to make representations that can stand for bodies in general" 
(Hayles, 2002, p. 297). Within a positivist discourse, the normal body and its 
identity personify stable discursive meanings (Britzman, 1999). Stable discursive 
meanings such as, masculine and feminine, are intended to instill the same 
meaning for all of us. Instead, these meanings often instill uneasiness and 
discomfort, especially to those individuals categorized as abnormal. The outward 
appearance of the body is intended to communicate normal/abnormal along a 
continuum as a mobile position, or as a fixed position. The mobility or fixedness 
of normal/abnormal hinges upon the discursive practices of the discipline within 
which the body is constructed. Regardless of the position of the body within the 
construction of normal, the identity attached to it personifies stability in its 
positivist meaning through social representations. For example, when the bodv 
and its identity are defined by categories of gender within the discourses of 
education and medicine, normality is fixed. The body constructed through an 
illness category is defined along a continuum of normality. The accompanying 
identity and the meaning it portrays are fixed. 
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Identities and bodies are not stable and do not carry the same meaning for 
everyone. Continuing with Deborah Britzman's (1999) thoughts about stable 
meanings, the current public debate about same sex marriages brings into 
question what marriage as a social practice means to each individual. 
Conservative patriarchal social groups identify marriage as a sanctimonious 
religious practice reserved for man and woman. These groups see marriage as a 
stable meaning that all Americans identify and agree with. These groups believe 
their meaning of marriage transcends race, sex, religion, and culture. Clearly, for 
those that do not see stable meanings in marriage this is not the case. Marriage 
can be defined as more than a social bonding of strictly man and woman. It can 
also be defined as two individuals sharing a spiritual, communal bond that is 
beyond that of friendship. Marriage is a complex social practice that's discourse 
permeates multiple sectors beyond religion. Marriage is essential to the 
privileges of medical and survivorship benefits for spouses, male or female. A 
social practice with health and financial securities attached to it carries serious 
consequences for individuals which have shared a significant portion of their 
lives together. Marriage transcends a religious bond and provides financial, 
emotional, physical, and psychological security. Marriage is a discourse of 
biopower which serves to control and regulate social bodies. This discourse 
should not be left to a select sanctimonious few willing to further define the 
stability of our meanings. 
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Identity, within normative discourses, is constructed by something as 
simple as hair. Hair loss, in cancer patients, demonstrates a degree of normative 
health within oncological discourse. This identity is a cultural signifier which 
represents a stable meaning of cancer (illness) to others. "Our cultural obsession 
with hair — as sexual signifier, as sign of youth, as style and especially with its 
'bigness' — can be explained by the excess of meaning that attaches to it" (Orner, 
2002, p. 267). Hair loss signifies illness, cancer, and creates an identity for the 
abnormal body. Unfortunately, medical discourse is so dominant in its operative 
techniques within Western society that the medical identity of cancer overpowers 
all other identities. The normative body and its identity, within oncological 
discourse, are perpetuated by self-help literature distributed to female cancer 
patients. The American Cancer Society prints and distributes literature that 
encourages women without hair to, "... improve their attitudes — 'Look Good, 
Feel Good'— when undergoing chemo and radiation" (2002, p. 266) bv wearing 
wigs and makeup. This sexist identity discourse reinforces women's bodies as 
sites for sex = gender (Morris, M, 1998) by perpetuating a feminine discourse of 
outside beauty as identifier of health. Women should look and feel the role of 
normative feminine sexuality, even during torturous radiation and 
chemotherapy. Looking and acting feminine is essential in displaying a normal 
healthy identity. 
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The universal body is constructed by cultural and societal discourses. The 
thin, fit, and muscled bodies are all constructions of normal healthy bodily 
discourses. The body assumes the identity of the particular discursive formation 
in which it is currently operating. "The body gains meaning within discourse 
only in the context of power relations" (Butler, 1990, p. 92). These power 
relations are those which Foucault (1990) speaks of when he discusses biopower. 
Biopower is, "... what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit 
calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human 
life" (Foucault, 1990, p. 143). Biopower establishes the normality of the social 
body through knowledge of the social body. Identity exists as part of the 
positivist desire to normalize within the discourses of biopower. The appearance, 
especially of a chronically ill body without hair, transmits an identitv of 
abnormal. "... the body is figured as a mere instrument or medium for wTdch a set 
of cultural meanings are only externally related" (Butler, 1990, p. 8). Figuration of 
the body through surgical intervention is another example of the normalization 
process of the abnormal body. Cosmetic surgery re-creates a discourse of 
outward bodily beauty as identity construction. Cosmetic surgery in a normative 
sense is another way of re-stating the sex=gender discourse (Morris, M., 1998). 
Women must normalize their bodies to fit within the roles defined by discourses 
of health and beauty. "Cosmetic surgery enacts a form of cultural signification 
where we can examine the literal and material reproduction of ideals of beauty" 
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(Balsamo as cited in Lewis, 1998, p. 17). Cosmetic reproduction reifies the 
Cartesian discourse that perpetuates the body as a machine. The body can be 
enhanced and upgraded just like a machine. Cosmetic surgery is a form of 
cultural sculpting (Marion, 2002) that permeates the social body and forces it to 
concede to notions of outward beauty as the one true identity. "'Sculpting' is an 
example of the language contemporary culture uses to speak about mutilation" 
(2002, p. 153). Cultural mutilation reinforces the medical model that the body is 
normalized through modification and upgrading. Abnormal bodies must modify 
themselves or risk becoming obsolete. 
A cyborg pedagogy implodes the construction of normal as defined by 
binary thinking. It undermines positivist biopower and technoscientific 
discourses that construct the normal body. A cyborg pedagogical discourse built 
on Deborah Britzman's (1998) call for, "... an ethical project that begins to engage 
difference as the grounds of politicality and community" (p. 213) refutes all 
claims to normality. Britzman's project examines the boundaries of 
exclusion/inclusion within normative discourses. It disturbs how the normal 
body is defined in identity construction (Britzman, 1998). A cyborg pedagogy7, 
"... is resistant to uni-forms, uniformity, conformity, comfort, domestication, 
uniform knowings, standardized curricula, standardized testings, standardized 
knowings" (Morris, 1999, p. 422). Deborah Britzman (1998) promotes in, Is There a 
Queer Pedagogy?, a discussion about categories of identity. Specifically, she 
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examines gay and lesbian identities and queers how these and all binaries can be 
constructed differently. Queering, as I use it within this discussion, is defined 
within Maria Morris' (1998) context. She sets three ingredients that together or in 
combination define queering. These ingredients are: 
(a) Queerness as a subject position digresses from normalized, rigid 
identities that adhere to the sex = gender paradigm; (b) Queerness as a 
politic challenges the status quo, does not simply tolerate it, and does not 
stand for assimilation into the mainstream; (c) Queerness as an aesthetic 
or sensibility reads and interprets texts (art, music, literature) as 
potentially politically radical. A radical politic moves to the left, 
challenging norms, (p. 277) 
Queering the body challenges normative discourses which employ binaries of 
exclusion in order to establish identity. Queering establishes differences as 
normal rather than abnormal. It promotes respect as opposed to tolerance. 
Britzman uses a discussion of identities as a means to launch her discourse of 
differences, "... in unsettling the sediments of what one imagines when one 
imagines normalcy, what one imagines when one imagines difference" (p. 227). 
A cyborg pedagogy engages differences in social relations in order to queer the 
claims of normality. This discursive practice allows an individual to define 
his/her personal identity within the spaces of life and the examination of, "... 
societal pivotal point(s) to explore..." oneself, "... and the broader human 
condition in a meaningful context" (as cited in Macdonald, 1995, p. 2). This 
discourse allows an individual to explore differences in the way binaries are 
constructed and implemented in a normative society. Instead of the body and its 
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identity conforming to positivist identity discourses, a cyborg pedagogy 
provides alternative meanings from which to form one's own identity. 
As I continue with this discussion of normalization, an example of a 
discursive practice which constructs the normal identity is that of family 
planning. Within this discourse, the cyborg pedagogy opens up alternative 
spaces and queers the discursive practice of normal family planning. The Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) release their report. Ten Great Public 
Health Achievements in the United States: 1900-1999, which lauds public health 
efforts of the United States during the previous one hundred years (as cited in 
Telljohann, Symons, & Pateman, 2004). The public health achievements listed are 
notable. They also demonstrate a standard of success on the part of the public 
health movement in raising public awareness of hygiene issues within the United 
States. The efforts to achieve an improving quality of life and increasing 
longevity within the population are remarkable. One achievement listed in the 
report is family planning (2004). Family planning as outlined by The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention encompasses: 
Improved and better access to contraception, resulting in changing 
economics and roles for women, smaller families, and longer intervals 
between births; some methods related to reduced transmission of human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and other sexually transmitted diseases, 
(as cited in Telljohann, Symons, & Pateman, 2004, p. 5) 
Family planning within the public health discourse constructs a social 
identity of a normal family. The normal family is established within the United 
101 
States within the discursive practices of the heterosexual woman that practices 
"safe," procreative, and planned sex. Safe is defined as abstinence within a 
conservative discourse and protected (contraceptive) in a more liberal (closer to 
center) one. These normative identities are the result of, "... social hygiene 
movements variously termed as pedagogy, criminal justice, psychology, 
anthropology, medicine, and sociology ..." (Britzman, 1999, p. 387) operating 
within the realm of biopower. Family planning is constructed within the 
conservative framework of male/female within the social hygiene movements. 
Queering (Morris, M, 1998) this report, normative identities establish that in 
order to be a "responsible" woman, abstinence is the first choice. If this is 
unrealistic, sex should be planned and protected. Planning should be understood 
as contraception and a limited number of partners. It goes without saying that it 
should be heterosexual, after all procreation is a desired outcome in the familv. 
This discourse applies only to women because the CDC report fails to mention 
the responsibility or contribution on the part of men within family planning 
discourse. What is even more interesting within this discourse is that while 
contraception is a volatile topic in society, it maintains a consistent population 
within the United States. "The development of contraceptives was a 
technological solution to what was defined by Western elites as the problem of 
overpopulation among ethnic and racial minorities in the First world and 
indigenous Third World peoples" (Harding, 1991, p. 91). This in turn helps the 
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capitalist discourse as overpopulation, food production, housing, and future job 
markets can be better managed. What is also happening is the struggle for 
dominant discourse between the religious discourses and that of capitalism. 
Normative identity structures construct the family as a product of the 
heterosexual man and woman. Family is a discourse established through the 
disciplines. This stable meaning of family is what Britzman is trying to unsettle 
in her discussion of exclusion/inclusion. Cyborg pedagogy unsettles the 
legitimacy of normative structures and their meanings as heterosexual familv 
products. Cyborg pedagogy disrupts the normative idea of how a familv is 
defined and how it operates. Cyborg families are mixed breeds. They come from 
all walks of technoscientific life. Cyborgs understand that compassion, love, and 
caring are qualities that transgendered and transsexual beings possess as well as 
normative humans. Cyborg pedagogy accepts partiality and allows individuals 
to construct their own identities within the curriculum and classroom (Weaver & 
Grindall, 1998). A cyborg pedagogy queers the stability of family meanings 
within these binary discourses. It allows identities to become unstable and 
flexible. It creates spaces from which individuals may create and critically 
analyze the world around them. Cyborg pedagogy focuses on processes of 
inclusion as opposed to exclusion. Cyborg pedagogy looks for ways to 
implement technoscience as a discursive practice for developing alternatives to 
the construction of the world. Cyborg pedagogy is concerned with the integrity 
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of our discursive interactions. The process of becoming, within a cyborg 
pedagogy, creates spaces where thoughts from all categories find places from 
which to speak (Livingston, 2002) with legitimacy and respect. I continue this 
discussion of a cyborg pedagogy in Chapter V. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
In Chapter IV, I examine the human condition of pain as a discursive 
practice. I examine both contemporary and historical constructs of pain through 
the discursive formations of biopower, technoscience, and the cyborg. I examine 
their operative functions within the disciplines of science and medicine. 
Biopower, technoscience, and the cyborg, as I discussed in chapter two, are 
contemporary discursive practices originating out of critiques of Western 
disciplines (Foucault, 1990; Haraway, 1997, 2000a; Latour, 1987; Lewis, 2003; 
Weaver, 2001). I intend to weave these discursive practices as Maria Morris 
(2001) suggests in Serres Bugs the Curriculum. Morris (2001) uses weaving as a 
metaphor for interdisciplinarity and the merging of boundaries of specialty 
knowledges within academia. Through the weaving of knowledges, individuals 
create spaces in which a greater appreciation for differences in thinking and 
being are developed. These spaces are important to create in medicine and 
science as a need for deconstruction of the universal, the generalizable, and the 
practice of closure are warranted (Weaver, 2001) in order to understand the 
patient as something more than objective knowledge. As an athletic trainer, 
allied health care professional, and curriculum studies graduate, I am obliged to 
continue weaving these discursive practices. I intend to add a critical voice to the 
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discursive practices of athletic training and begin to bring this profession into a 
discursive critique of the cultural studies of medicine. 
My weaving is with a post-structural thread. The aim of chapter five in 
this text is to move the discourse towards a cyborg pedagogical practice that is 
critical of the manner in which pain is defined, treated, and experienced within 
Western medicine. This cyborg pedagogy is not anti-science or anti-medicine, it 
is anti-positivism. This pedagogy, "... focuses on the process of knowledge 
production and acknowledges, "... the politics of the production processes 
and the political and cultural contexts in which they are situated" (Gough, 2001, 
p. 278). This pedagogy uses queering and difference within the contexts of Maria 
Morris (1998) and Deborah Britzman (1998) to disrupt modest witnessing and its 
current understanding and explanation for pain. Through the weaving of a 
discourse of difference, I integrate the fabrics of curriculum theorv into those of 
athletic training in order to queer a different meaning of pain (Morris, 2001) and 
look for ways of inclusion as opposed to exclusion for patients and practitioners 
that deal with pain as part of their everyday lives. Inclusion in a cyborg 
pedagogy, "... allow students to develop relationships with individuals ... 
whose 'differences' — nondominant ethnic identities, poverty, disability, 
language difficulties — put them at disadvantage for health-related services and 
at risk for illness" (Wear, 2003, p. 553). 
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Foucault & the Discursive Practice 
Foucault is the discursive force behind the methodology of this text. 
Archaeological analysis is a discursive methodology for Foucault. Through the 
analysis of discourse, Foucault believes the purpose: 
... is not to give voice to the silence that surrounds them, nor to rediscover 
all that, in them and beside them, had remained silent or had been 
reduced to silence. ... but to define a limited system of presences. The 
discursive formation is not therefore a developing totality... it is a 
distribution of gaps, voids, absences, limits, divisions. (Foucault, 1972, p. 
119). 
Through the archaeological analysis of discursive formations, there is no goal of 
totality or grand narrative to develop. This type of analysis is in contrast to 
positive history. Foucault downplays the, "... role of cause or explanation ..." 
(Sarup, 1993, p. 59) within his archaeologies. What he attempts to uncover is the 
truth game that defines the operative function of the discursive practice. Truth 
games regulate discursive practices and determine the rules and procedures for 
what can be said within that particular discourse (Foucault, 1997). Truth defines 
the discourse. In all discursive practices: 
... we are also subjected to truth in the sense in which it is truth that 
makes the laws, that produces the true discourse which, at least partially, 
decides, transmits and itself extends upon the effects of power. (Foucault, 
1980, p. 94) 
In order to understand what can and cannot be said within the discourse an 
individual must understand the regulatory function of its supporting truth game: 
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If what can be stated is regulated by discursive rules and practices, what 
can be true or false is so regulated. The existence of constraints on what 
can be uttered and, thus, on what can be true is one mechanism by which 
power and truth interweave. (Cherryholmes as cited in Blades, 1997, p. 
117) 
Through understanding the discourses which allow the truth game to continue 
in present structure one can reconstruct, "... who is speaking, his/her position of 
power, the institutional context in which he/she happens to be situated ..." 
(Foucault, 1990, p. 100). Through this reconstruction of the discourse, it can be 
modified at local levels. Power, for Foucault, is relational rather than possessive. 
It is entered into, rather than something in material form. Truth games and 
power are entities which collectively regulate discursive practices. As a result of 
their discursive relationship, truth and power produce knowledge about the 
social body. Knowledge about the body is produced through the collection of 
information about the population through the panoptic gaze of the disciplines 
(Foucault, 1980). 
To better understand medicine's current discursive practice of pain and its 
connection to biopower, this discursive analysis begins with The Birth of the Clinic 
(Foucault, 1994). In this book, Foucault studies the birth of clinical medicine 
towards the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. 
Foucault asserts that within this historical period positivity inserts itself as an 
epistemology into the practice of medicine: 
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Medicine, as a general technique of health even more than as a service to 
the sick or an art of cures, assumes an increasingly important place in the 
administrative system and the machinery of power, .... The doctor wins a 
footing within the different instances of social power. (Foucault, 1980, p. 
176) 
As the doctor creates a stronger foothold on the disciplines, he creates new 
knowledge as he studies men and women as both subject and object (Eribon, 
1991). "Medicine was perhaps the first positive knowledge to take the form of 
expertise, in which the human being was not only to be known but to be the 
subject of calculated regimes of reform and transformation, legitimated by codes 
of reason ..." (Rose, 1998, p. 49). The Birth of the Clinic (1994) examines the 
discursive codes of reason within medicine with the adoption of positivitv and 
pathological anatomy as its epistemology. Pathological anatomy changes the 
entire discursive practice of the patient-doctor relationship: 
... the whole relationship of signifier to signified, at every level of medical 
experience, is redistributed: between the symptoms that signify and the 
disease that is signified, between the description and what is described, 
between the event and what it prognosticates, between the lesion and the 
pain that it indicates .... (Foucault, 1994, p. xix) 
As discussed in chapter two, the history taking by the doctor changes from, what 
is wrong with you?, to where does it hurt (Foucault, 1994)? The discourse is 
modified from subjectivity of the patient to one of objective location and space 
within the body. This modification in discourse is a product of the gaze 
(Armstrong, 1983,1997; Foucault, 1994; Macey, 1993; Morris, 1998; Sullivan, 
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1986). The gaze is not a grand event in the evolution of medical history but rather 
a subtle change in the manner in which physicians and patients communicate. 
An undercurrent of The Birth of the Clinic (1994) is the presence of 
Foucault's discursive attention towards the operative techniques of power. 
Although never mentioned in the book by name, power quite literally is felt as a 
ghostly aura as the story of clinical medicine unfolds. Years later, Foucault 
admits that, "When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was 
talking about, in Madness and Civilisation or The Birth of the Clinic, but power?" 
(1980, p. 115). The gaze is a thematic to The Birth of the Clinic (1994) and this 
thematic carries over to Foucault's subsequent book, Discipline and Punish (1995). 
In Discipline and Punish (1995), the reader discovers how the panoptic gaze 
becomes a technological apparatus of disciplinary power. Joanne Rendell (2004) 
also recognizes this progression of Foucault's gaze within these two 
archaeologies. In her article, A Testimony to Muzil: Herve Guibert, Poucault, and the 
Medical Gaze, Rendell (2004) writes about the friendship between Guibert and 
Foucault. The publications of Guibert and Foucault coincide in thematics and 
topics so as to suggest that Guibert writes resistance discourses that parallel 
Foucault's writings about the medical gaze and power. Rendell (2004) articulates 
through Guibert that resistance within the medical gaze is not only possible but 
empowering to the individual patient. Resistance is local and temporary as 
discourse and power are bound to adapt and reapply themselves through a 
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different mechanism. However, resistance through this application provides the 
individual patient dignity and agency as he/she is subjected to the oppressive 
medical gaze. 
In two of Foucault's archaeologies (1990,1995), he develops two different 
constructs of power, disciplinary power and biopower. Foucault's discussion of 
disciplinary power is seductive in its critique of the panoptic gaze of the 
disciplines. Power is a common theme that authors draw from when they 
reference Foucault's works (Armstrong, 1983,1997; Blacker, 1998; Blades, 1997; 
Gastaldo, 1997; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Lewis, 2003; Peerson, 1995). The gaze is 
often used by authors and critics of Foucault to construct a repressive and 
dominating discourse. At the beginning of his work on power, Foucault is careful 
to suggest that power is not entirely repressive. Power is productive; otherwise 
there would be a constant struggle to overthrow its force. Power produces 
discursive practices, forms social networks, and has an effect of pleasure on the 
social body (Foucault, 1980). At some point in his/her discursive argument, an 
author that refers to disciplinary or biopower must concede that the application 
of these discursive practices is also productive in the management and 
maintenance of the population. The disciplines would not be the far reaching and 
bureaucratic institutions that they are without the productive influences of 
power. 
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As Foucault (1995) continues to develop the thematic of power, 
knowledge production becomes vital to its operative functions (Rendell, 2004). 
Knowledge production is essential to the growth and spread of power within 
discursive relationships. Knowledge about the body, its processes, the social 
functions that surround and control it, all work in a discursive relation to 
construct the population. Foucault moves from an analysis of knowledge, truth, 
and power practices to the construction of the technologies of the self as his 
writing progresses (Foucault, 1997). 
The difficulty in achieving success with a Foucauldian analysis is grasping 
the progression of his thoughts as they lead up to his death in 1984. To define 
Foucault's methodologies is not only in opposition of Foucault, but a task that is 
extremely difficult. For example, Foucault is criticized for not explaining what he 
means when he describes resistance alongside biopower. It is unclear how 
resistance operates within the individual subject within the discourse of 
biopower. Also, Foucault moves from biopower to technologies of the self and 
the ethical discourse of the subject and does not return to address his notion of 
resistance except in select interviews (1997). This technology of the self is an 
entirely new line of research that departs from the discourses of power. As 
Foucault (1972) writes, the concern of what should count when interpreting the 
oeuvre of an author during the course of an archaeological analysis is always a 
sticking point: 
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Yet, at first sight, what could be more simple? A collection of texts that can 
be designated by the sign of a proper name (author). But this designation 
(even leaving to one side problems of attribution) is not a homogenous 
function: does the name of an author designate in the same way a text that 
he has published under his name, a text that he has presented under a 
pseudonym, another found after his death in the form of an unfinished 
draft, and another that is merely a collection of jottings, a notebook? (pp. 
23-24) 
David Armstrong's (1997) response to this dilemma is enlightening in reference 
to his own problems with his thesis and Foucault's methodologies. He believes 
that there are "(m)any different readings and many different Foucaults. Mine can 
only be one such reading ..." (p. 15). This reading of Foucault's works is an 
understanding of his oeuvre at a particular moment, in a particular setting. The 
responsibility of the methodology is not to repeat Foucault, nor follow his outline 
step by step (as if one existed), but rather link his thematics to the systems and 
technologies which act upon the social body (Armstrong, 1997). 
Deleuze in a tribute to his friend Foucault writes a fitting epitaph. Deleuze 
believes Foucault to be one of the greatest thinkers of the 20th centurv. In his 
epitaph, Deleuze discusses Foucault's thoughts and the turmoil surrounding 
those thoughts: 
Because once one steps outside what's been thought before, once one 
ventures outside what's familiar and reassuring, once one has to invent 
new concepts for unknown lands, then methods and moral systems break 
down and thinking becomes, as Foucault puts it, a "perilous act," a 
violence whose first victim is oneself. (1995, p. 103) 
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Deleuze relays his profound respect for Foucault as a thinker and person that 
ventures out beyond any safety net. Foucault reaches beyond contemporary 
epistemologies and establishes new ones in his search for differences. Foucault's 
critical analysis of discursive practices paves the way for post-structural 
thinking. 
Biopoiver 
The panoptic gaze is the surveillance technology that power uses to 
observe and regulate the social functions of the body (Foucault, 1995). The gaze 
is omnipotent within the discursive practices of medicine. Power is present 
simply through the application of social and cultural apparatuses already in 
place. This, "... power, ... is concerned not with repressing but with creating. It is 
disciplinary power, through the surveillance and subsequent objectification of 
the body, which actually serves to fabricate the body ..." (Armstrong, 1998, p. 
23). The gaze observes the body as an object of discovery. Through the discoverv 
process, the body is described and categorized similar to a machine. The human 
machine is then studied utilizing the experimental methods of science (Melzack, 
1993): 
Descartes opened a new era in medical science simply by asserting with 
logical force and literary skill that all the structures and operations of the 
human body are reducible to mechanical models, while the soul is a direct 
gift of God and is, therefore out of the range of scientific understanding ... 
Removing the mind from scientific concern greatly simplified the study of 
life and particularly of man. (Dubos as cited in Sullivan, 1986, p. 332) 
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Descartes' model is part of the origin of the "technico-political register," which 
begins a whole set of regulations, methods of controlling, and correcting the 
operations of the body (Foucault, 1995, p. 136). This technico-political register is 
constituted by the discourse of medicine and operates to regulate the population 
of patients. Biopower is the evolution of the technico-political registrar and it in 
turn creates social apparatuses to regulate the body within two relationships, the 
anatomo-politics of the human body and a bio-politics of the population 
(Foucault, 1990). These two poles of biopower, the anatomic and bio-political, 
are, "... directed toward the performances of the body, with attention to the 
processes of life — characterized a power whose highest function was perhaps 
no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through" (1990, p. 139). Biopower 
invests itself in the mechanisms of population control to create an even greater 
investment in the production of life and all its mechanisms (Foucault, 1990). 
Biopower should be observed as a mixture of Utopian and dystopian 
discourses. Power is defined by organic and non-organic relationships within 
systems of government, religion, education, and medicine and is maintained bv 
these entities. The poles of biopower: 
... operated in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and 
the forces working to sustain them. They also acted as factors of 
segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence on the 
respective forces of both these movements, guaranteeing relations of 
domination and effects of hegemony. (Foucault, 1990, p. 141) 
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Power in a medical discourse is often seen as the relationship between the patient 
and the physician. A common occurrence of the dominating effects of biopower 
is when a female patient walks into a male doctor's office. Susan Greenhalgh 
notes from her experiences with Fibromyalgia, "... the hierarchies of science and 
gender overlap in the examining room, leaving women patients in position of 
little power." (2001, p. 38). Greenhalgh defines this medical power within a 
relational discourse in her encounter with her doctor. Her medical discourse is 
enveloped by patriarchal norms of the subjective position of women. As in 
Greenhalgh's own life of Fibromyalgia and the treatment of chronic pain, the 
goal of resolution and cure are life draining. She describes her journey through 
the medical discourse as: 
This longing for help, along with the sadness and inner turmoil that are 
always part of chronic illness, leave the chronic patient emotionally 
vulnerable to the rhetorical appeals of a doctor who claims to be more 
scientific, more infallible than his peers. The social isolation of the chronic 
patient, a result of needing more support than most friends and familv 
members can bear to give, increases the susceptibility to the judgments of 
the doctor, who may be the only person in the patient's social world who 
can always be counted on to care about her problems. (2001, pp. 33-34) 
Chronic pain and illness become discouraging identities for the patient. Its 
continued presence and the constant search for a cure by the patient encourages 
medical practitioners to continue to utilize biology, genome research, molecular 
biology, and all other technoscientific discourses to search for a cure. Hysteria, 
considered a woman's disease during the nineteenth century, is a disease steeped 
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in this patriarchal mythology. This is due in part to the fact that the majority of 
its sufferers are women. A woman diagnosed with this disorder is doubly 
afflicted by medical discourse. She suffers the pains of the disease and the 
suspicions of her doctor(s). The discourse of biopower identifies the patient as a 
passive object and a receptacle for pathology (Armstrong, 1983). The doctor must 
diagnose this pathology in order to cure the body. The patient is more subject 
than object. Pain, which is the chief complaint of hysteria, has no pathological 
lesion. This lack of an organic lesion leads the doctor to question the physical 
existence of disease and the credibility of the patient becomes a central issue 
(Morris, 1991). The truth game of the patient/practitioner discourse questions the 
credibility of the patient first. The patient is validated first because there is no 
disease without an organic lesion. Presently, sufferers of Irritable Bowel 
Syndrome (IBS), Fibromyalgia, Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy (RSD), and 
chronic pain experience similar perils of this truth game. The application of 
biopower in relation to hysteria, IBS, Fibromyalgia, chronic pain, etc. is applied 
along the discourses of pathological medicine (Greenhalgh, 2001). A codification 
of medical discourse is, "... what the gaze of the clinic cannot see, cannot verifv, 
and cannot transform into an objectified visible image of pain becomes, so to 
speak, invisible" (Morris, D. B., 1998). What the pathological lesion cannot 
explain, cannot verify, becomes psychological. 
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Biopower operates within athletic training as well. Athletic training uses 
the panoptic gaze to observe and modify the body as a machine. Athletic trainers 
practice on the physically active body. The gaze of the athletic trainer is an 
orthopedic one which monitors the body's anatomical systems. This gaze 
patterns itself after the clinico-pathological model of medicine. The panoptic gaze 
of the athletic trainer maintains a constant surveillance on the daily training 
routines of athletic and physically active bodies. Athletic trainers observe 
exercise regimens, competitive events, and active rest periods of these bodies. 
The purpose of this surveillance is twofold, that of maintenance and 
improvement. By maintaining the body at peak condition, the chance for failure 
is reduced. If the body becomes asynchronous it is fixed or modified so it returns 
to its most efficient state as quickly as possible. Improvement is the 
normalization of the body along a continuum. Through an improvement 
discourse, knowledge about bodies is collected and used to develop better 
methodologies for more efficient movement, smoother and quicker adaptation to 
environmental stress, and minimizing time loss to injuries/illnesses. 
Discursively, athletic training surveillance attempts to maintain and improve the 
machine-body. This improved machine-body continually becomes a new norm 
and re-aligns itself along a continuum. This machine-body is seen throughout 
athletic populations. Within every sport, athletes are continually improving and 
establishing new athletic records as a model of the new machine-body. 
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Curriculum theorists that utilize a post-structural analysis of biopower 
believe that its discursive practice promotes constructive and oppressive 
techniques in its application (Britzman, 1999; Deever, 1992,1994; Morris, 1998, 
1999; Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998). Through weaving post-structural curriculum 
theorv into the discourses of medicine and athletic training its threads work to 
define a different machine-body. "Many of the failures of modern body 
metaphors can be related to the Western conviction that science can solve life's 
mysteries, and that this should be its goal. Postmodern thought responds with a 
more organic, integrated image of the body, embracing a form of body- 
knowledge that may prove more healing than modern body-as-machine 
metaphors" (Marion, 2002, p. 155). Post-structural curriculum theorv asserts that 
the construction of the body as machine makes it difficult to integrate the mind 
and body (Macrine, 2002; Morris, 2002). Integration of mind and body is essential 
to a cyborg healing discourse. The refusal of medicine and athletic training to 
integrate mind and body perpetuates discourses of chronic illness such as 
Fibromyalgia, RSD, and chronic pain. The continuation of these discourses 
damages the constructive contribution of athletic training to the health of the 
physically active. To emphasize my point, the latest addition of Rehabilitation 
Techniques for Sports Medicine and Athletic Training (Prentice, 2004) validates the 
intensity of acute pain with the severity of the injury. This assumption is false. 
However, it is still touted as though it is a scientific theorem (Beecher as cited in 
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Melzack and Wall, 1983; Morris 1991; Wall 2000). As a practicing athletic trainer, 
I observe individuals with extensive injuries and their pain is minimal. 1 also 
observe individuals with minor sprains and strains that writhe in pain as if they 
are gasping for their last breath. A concern is that another generation of athletic 
training students is corrupted by Cartesian discourse and a lack of 
understanding of the complexity of pain. In order to resist the machine-body 
discourse, gazes must be redirected in ways that detach the power of truth from 
hegemonic practices (Fish as cited in Schmelzer, 1993). Unfortunately resistance, 
"... is not always appropriate to the advancement of one's agenda. If resistance 
furthers one's personal cause, it is desirable and is something to be celebrated; if 
not, it may be defined as an attempt, by other, to perpetuate hegemony" (Deever, 
1992, p. 67). The athletic trainer must examine the truth game of machine-bodv at 
its gaps and exploit its operative performances. "Rather than focusing on the 
outcomes of the exercise of power, the examination now rests upon its 
applications" (Deever, 1992, p. 66). The athletic trainer must ask how the 
machine-body discourse functions within his/her particular situation and 
practice. What or whom is being served by the discourse? Ethical and moral 
questions arise as to the role the athletic trainer is playing in perpetuating this 
discourse. 
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Technoscience 
Donna Haraway is also important to the methodology of this text. I 
integrate two of Haraway's most influential literary critiques about the practices 
of science into this discussion. These critiques are technoscience (1997) and the 
cyborg (2000a). I use them, as does Haraway (1997), to construct a complex 
discursive practice which includes biopower. This collection of discourses is 
what I believe Foucault is speaking about when he refers to the web of power 
and its far reaching effects into our social relations. Technoscience for Haraway 
(1997), as discussed in chapter two, is practiced through one of two methods, 
modest witnessing or witnessing. The discourse of the modest witness: 
... is the culture within which contingent facts - the real case about the 
world - can be established with all the authority, but none of the 
considerable problems, of transcendental truth. This self-invisibilitv is the 
specifically modern, European, masculine, scientific form of the virtue of 
modesty, (p. 23) 
This technoscientific discourse of medicine uses truth games and power to 
construct knowledges of exclusion. Only those individuals with the appropriate 
academic training are included in these discursive practices. These truth games 
are open only to a select few and through their operative function perpetuate the 
binaries which utilize the norm as an oppressive device. Witnessing, on the other 
hand, is the perspective post-structural curriculum theorists (Gough, 2001; 
Morris, 2001; Weaver, 2001) and cultural studies of science practitioners 
(Haraway, 1997, 2000a, 2000b; Hayles, 1993, 2002; Lewis, 2003) implement and 
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would like to have integrated into scientific practices. Witnessing is about a 
science that is inclusive and engages the public in critical decisions regarding 
technoscience and our collective biological existence. This science is accountable 
and fallible for all of its technoscientific products (Weaver, 2001). It does not 
court corporate partnerships and is wary of grant money. It engages in ethical 
and moral discussions about technoscience prior to its release upon the public. 
As Haraway (1997) alludes to in her discussion of the modest witness, we are: 
In a time of florid fundamentalist hereditarian and genetic discourse ... 
we need to learn how to engage in knowledge-making practices in 
genetics, as well as in other cultural domains, that produce critical and 
cross-cutting multidisciplinary, multispecies, and multicultural savvy, (p. 
160) 
Like Foucault, Haraway understands both the creative and oppressive sides of 
the discursive practices of technoscience. As a scientist, she understands the 
utility of technoscience but also understands the fatal outcomes of 
technoscientific practices gone badly. She understands the importance of 
weaving in creating knowledges which implode binaries and are inclusive to all 
knowledges. 
In the Modest_Witness (1997), Haraway examines the application of 
biopower as biological techniques which create the body in the processes of 
production and reproduction. Biopower and technoscience form a discursive 
partnership and at certain points of application within the medical discourse 
work in unison to construct, control, and improve the machine-body. Haraway 
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promotes this discourse as technobiopower (1997). The operative function of 
technobiopower is a discourse which must be under constant surveillance of the 
witness. The enormous expansion of this discourse into our social bodies, natural 
resources, capital, medicine, politics, etc. pales the discussion of world wide 
nuclear proliferation. Technobiopower has subtlety crept into our everyday lives. 
It is there because medicine, like science, is privileged in western society. Its 
privilege is granted by the politico-juridical agencies of society (Foucault, 1980). 
Physicians, as part of the medical discourse, "... become the great advisor and 
expert, ... in that of observing, correcting and improving the social 'body' ..." 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 177). With its privileged positions in society, medicine has a 
relatively free hand to go about its business unobstructed. One of the results of 
this free reign is that during post-World War II America and continuing through 
the beginning of the 21st century there is little long-term investment on the part 
of medical research in areas of critical need such as preventative screening for 
children, emphasis on primary care physician training, and prenatal care for low 
income unwed mothers. Expenditure and research is instead increased and 
focused on areas of experimental technoscience. With the increased expenditure 
on technoscience, medicine's value-system and its power over life and death also 
become compromised. Again I refer to Bradley Lewis (2003) in his discussion 
about the pharmaceutical proliferation of Prozac and its effects on 
technobiopower: 
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Certainly, with regard to specific biotechnologies like Prozac, medical 
science (working within the rules, norms and expectations of its own 
scientific discursive frame) can tell us something about the drug's 
pharmacology, therapeutic effects, and common toxicities. And certainly, 
with regard to prescribing Prozac, medical ethics (working within its 
usual frame) can help us sort out questions of autonomy, informed 
consent, and beneficence in the dyadic relation between physician and 
patient. But neither medical science nor medical ethics even scratch the 
surface of articulating the social, cultural, and political dimensions of a 
medical technoscience like Prozac. (Lewis, 2003, p. 52) 
Pharmacological intervention in illness, with its enormous infiltration of 
corporate money, has overpowered medicine's ability to tender an ethical and 
moral discourse about the inequities within our present health care svstem. 
Prescription drugs, such as antibiotics and antihistamines, greatly enhance the 
quality of life for millions of people. However, in the case of Prozac and other 
serotonin inhibiting drugs, medicine cannot cope and does not understand the 
far reaching effects these drugs have on individuals and society. Often these and 
other drugs are prescribed in situations where Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) approval is lacking. Technoscience affects us all, and in our everydav 
lives, but we're not all privileged to participate in its discussion. Participation is 
authorized by a select few such as, corporations, governments, academic 
research labs, etc. which are familiar with its language (Kull, 2002). 
An example of a pharmaceutical discourse which athletic trainers are 
closely tied to is inflammation and the discovery of prostaglandins. This is 
another case where classes of prescription and over the counter (OTC) drugs are 
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used outside specific FDA approval. Inflammation is a regenerative process of 
the body. It is a process whereby the body rids itself of dead cells, bacteria, and 
foreign substances to maintain homeostatic function. Inflammation that is 
associated with injury, infection, and/or disease is regulated by differing 
amounts of neurochemicals, neuropeptides, and neurohormones as opposed to 
the regenerative process (Marion, 2002). In simple terms, the difference between 
injury and regeneration is the causal effect, type, and quantity of chemicals, 
peptides, and hormones present. It is the injury/ disease process which is 
significant in this discussion. 
One of the most amazing outcomes of clinico-pathological medicine and 
biochemistry is the discovery of prostaglandins (Wall, 1999). Prostaglandins are a 
group of lipidlike compounds produced by every cell in the human body. 
Prostaglandins regulate cell function in normal and pathological conditions. 
They are instrumental in the mediation of inflammation, kidney function, 
mucosal lining, fever, and dysmenorrhea. In an injury/illness situation, 
prostaglandins are released through the breakdown of Cyclooxygenase (COX) 
(Ciccone, 2002; Wright, 2002a; Wright et al., 2002). The body is aware of which 
inflammatory process is ongoing by the type of COX broken down. The process 
begins when a cell wall is broken down and arachadonic acid is released. This 
acid is then metabolized to produce one of two enzymes, Lipoxygenase or 
Cyclooxygenase. COX is the enzyme that is significant at the moment. In an 
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injury/disease process COX2is selectively produced as opposed to COXi. COXi 
is responsible for the normal cellular functions while COX2 is responsible for 
inflammation resulting from injury or disease. Prostaglandins are indirectly 
involved in acute pain by decreasing the sensitivity of the nociceptors (pain 
receptors). The desensitization of nociceptors allow other transmitters to actually 
create a noxious stimulus. These irritants normally would not cause a noxious 
sensation without the regulatory effect of prostaglandins. Prostaglandins allow 
neurochemicals such as bradykinin, serotonin, histamine, etc. to bind, activate, or 
depolarize the nerve ending (Wright, 2002a). it is not an understatement that, 
"The discovery of prostaglandins opened the door to the full power of modem 
molecular biology. It now becomes apparent that a huge orchestrated cascade of 
changes form up under the single umbrella word inflammation" (Wall, 1999, p. 
11). The molecular biological understanding of the inflammatory process aids in 
the technoscientific revolution of anti-inflammatory pharmacology*. The 
pharmacotherapeutic effect of non steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) 
leads to their widespread use in the resolution of the inflammatory process and 
acute pain. 
The oldest and most common NSAID is aspirin. Aspirin is a 
technoscientific marvel that is first used by Hippocrates, Galen, and Plinv (Wall, 
2000). For over two thousand years, aspirin is used by healers and doctors to 
treat a multitude of ailments without ever knowing what its mechanism of action 
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is. It is not until 1970 that its pharmacological actions are finally understood by 
science and medicine (Ciccone, 2002; Wall, 2000). Aspirin in its natural organic 
state is an extract from willow bark. It is synthesized initially by the Bayer 
Company during the nineteenth century and following the conclusion of World 
War I becomes mass produced by other corporations (Wall, 2000). Aspirin and 
other NSAIDs act by blocking the production of prostaglandins. This process 
then makes it difficult for the other neurochemicals to sensitize the nerve endings 
and create the noxious stimuli. Aspirin is no longer the first choice as an anti- 
inflammatory drug because of its blood thinning side effects. However, because 
of its ability to thin the blood and regulate the synthesis of prostaglandins it is 
used to prevent coronary events, prevent colo-rectal cancer, treat fevers, thin the 
blood, and pain relief (Morris, 1991; Wall, 2000). Aspirin is still a popular drug as 
Americans spend approximately four billion dollars a year on this and other 
OTC pain relievers (Morris, 1991). 
The ethical dilemma with using NSAIDs for acute inflammation is that 
they are not FDA approved for this pathology. They are approved for 
osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis which are chronic inflammatorv diseases. 
However, NSAIDs are used in this situation because they are as effective in 
resolving acute inflammation as they are in resolving chronic inflammation. This 
technoscientific discourse heals the body by manipulating FDA boundaries. This 
practice is using the judgment of health care practitioners to produce healthy 
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bodies. Technobiopower walks a razor thin line between an ethical discourse of 
avoiding NSAIDs for acute inflammation or using a drug outside its prescribed 
boundaries. It is at this point of application that the cultural studies of science 
movement is opening up its discourse for public debate. These are the kinds of 
discussions that should be taking place between medicine, athletic training, 
patients, and the public. When NSAIDs are compared to Prozac, the enormity of 
the moral and ethical dilemma surrounding Prozac becomes urgent. Prozac, a 
drug which alters one's perception of reality, but does not change reality, 
becomes significant as to what kind of future medicine and the other disciplines 
have in store for the abnormal. 
Cyborg 
In concluding this section, I turn to the cyborg to close out this discussion 
of methodology. It is here that I look towards post-structural curriculum theorv 
to help create pedagogical spaces to weave this critical discourse about the taken 
for granted practices of medical technobiopower. Through this cyborg pedagogy, 
with the help of curriculum theory, I construct a discourse of difference 
regarding pain. Post-structural curriculum theory infiltrates the technobiopower 
discourse with the aid of the cyborg and identity discourses. 
As a mixture of human and technoscience the cyborg is not and cannot be 
normal as defined by the disciplines. Cyborgs are humans with artificial 
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limbs/joints/organs, animal organs, transplants, cadaver parts, etc. Cyborgs are 
the, "... stem cells in the marrow of the technoscientific body; they differentiate 
into the subjects and objects at stake in the contested zones of technoscientific 
culture" (Haraway, 1997, p. 14). Pain patients are the subjects and objects of 
medical technobiopower. Cyborgs force practitioners to re-consider the 
implications of their positivist binaries. Chronic pain patients still live in misery 
as, "Even excellent doctors tend to regard pain as a byproduct of illness or injury; 
..." (Jerome & Breu, 2003, p. 154). These patients are cyborgs because they resist 
the discourse of cause/effect by bringing into question organic lesions as the 
exclusive explanation for pain. Pain resists these oppressive social relationships 
(Kleinman, Brodwin, Good, & DelVecchio Good, 1992) created by discourses of 
pathological/ psychological, mind/body, normal/abnormal. The cyborg patient, 
after multiple procedures such as cordotomies, joint replacements, drug therapy, 
etc. and no end in sight for pain, merge the soma with its blurred boundaries of 
psyche. These cyborg patients implode the mind/body dualism by challenging 
medicine to find any pathological source for their pain. 
The body, which is a source of contention within posthuman discussions, 
is proffered to be along for the ride in the cyborg era (Livingston, 2002). Another 
posthuman discussion believes that through cyborg disembodiment it is possible 
to escape pain (Gromala, 2000). The thought that through technoscience we will 
one day be able to dislodge or cyberjettison our body reinforces the mind/body 
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dualism and continues the misery for millions of chronic pain patients. Our 
Western Cartesian processional unfortunately continues on into the 21st century 
(borrowed from Patrick Wall, 2000). As I discuss in chapter two, the 
cyberjettisoning of the body plays into dualistic thinking because it maintains the 
separation of mind and body as two distinct biological units. Katherine Hayles 
recognizes this fact and retracts some of her earlier comments from. How \Ne 
Became Posthuman, in her article Flesh and Metal (Hayles, 2002). The body actually 
functions in integration with the mind. Tactile and sensorimotor functions of the 
skin serve to relay information about the exteriority of the individual. When this 
information is no longer incoming, as in the case of the phantom limb, the central 
nervous system reacts and continues to try to retrieve this information. This 
retrieval is actually phantom limb pain. This short discussion of phantom limb 
demonstrates how tricky it is going to be to construct a cyborg pedagogy. 
First, I have no desire to abandon the body. The body is essential to any 
cyborg discourse of pain. The goal of this pedagogical discourse is the re- 
integration of body and mind. The successful re-integration means that not only 
is this binary deconstructed but others as well. A domino effect follows as the 
legitimacy of these exclusionary practices comes into question during 
pedagogical discourses. Re-integration of body and mind is a massive 
undertaking as the body is discursively tied to identity within the constructions 
of the normalized disciplines (Britzman, 1998,1999; Morris, 1998,1999). These 
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discursive constructions are ingrained within the populations. They are the 
subtleties of social life that Popkewitz (Chapter 1, p. 2) alludes to in our 
discursive constructions. The presence of exclusionary practice is so subtle and 
concealed that only through a concerted undertaking can they be revealed and 
deconstructed. 
The identity construction of the pain or illness patient must be unlearned. 
What is at stake here is the re-conceptualization of the dynamics of patient- 
doctor relationship, specific knowledges, and the discourses of pain (Britzman, 
1999). Through cyborg pedagogy, the body and identity are constructed in ways 
that are not exclusionary and are unstable. Following Maria Morris' (1998) 
discussion in Unresting the Curriculum, queering the construction of binaries and 
perpetuation of these binaries through pedagogical practices is a starting point. 
Queering binaries means, "... discovering how these categories came to be 
constructed and how certain individuals have been produced bv them" (p. 277). 
Patients with chronic illness and with chronic pain are constructed by the 
discursive practices of medical technobiopower. In order to deconstruct this 
medical technobiopower practice, its truth game must be understood. The 
questions operating within this truth game that I want to answer are several. 
First, how does technobiopower apply and operate the construction of pain? 
Flow did pain come to be understood within this construction? How has the 
complexity of the current healthcare crisis and technobiopower modified the 
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construction of identities? By queering the answers to these questions, the 
operative function of the construction of pain becomes deconstructed and 
unstable. Binaries which rely upon the stability of these discursive practices then 
implode. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS 
Pam & Suffering 
Pain and suffering are often referred to within the textual artifacts of early 
civilizations. Civilizations are bewitched by causations of pain and suffering. 
Historically, as civilizations and their knowledge evolve so does their 
explanation for pain and suffering. Pain that is associated with an injury is 
understood and accepted by the individual. However, pain associated with 
illness is difficult to comprehend and explain (Bonica, 1980,1991; Procacci & 
Maresca, 1984). Pain associated with illness initially becomes, "... linked with 
intrusion of magic fluids, evil spirits, or pain demons into the body" (Bonica, 
1991, p. 192). Ancient civilizations, such as the Babylonians and Assyrians, 
attribute pain associated with illness to the commitment of sin by an individual 
or members of his/her family. Attributing pain to sin is the result of religious 
influences beginning to play significant social parts in the expansion of 
civilizations. Tribal priests begin to take on the role of healers. With the guidance 
of the tribal priest, the sufferer is shown the path of relief is through prayer, 
meditation, sacrifice, chants, etc. These references to prayer, meditation, and 
suffering become the first recordings of the connection between religious beliefs, 
cultural practices, and the occurrence of pain. This connection between religious 
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influences and pain are later strengthened within Christianity (Bonica, 1991; 
Morris, 1991). 
As Christianity broadens its presence worldwide, "... pain was perceived 
and presented as a test and as a punishment inflicted in anger by God" (Duby, 
1994, p. 74). Pain and suffering become constructions of Christianity as it 
attempts to further exploit its position within its population of believers. Sins are 
defined by the human flesh and are transgressions against God. In order for true 
Christians to attain entrance into God's Kingdom, they must experience the pain 
and suffering of Christ. Pain and suffering are easily inculcated to the masses by 
the Church hierarchy with this explanation. Pain and suffering are accepted by 
Christian believers as normal and consistent with the Crucifixion of Christ. 
As the Church's influence grows, a significant epistemological problem 
arises with the consistency of its teachings. The divine soul cannot be taught as 
part of the sinful flesh. The soul is eternally good and cannot be touched bv sin 
(Fendler, 1998). The answer for the Church lies in the construction of body (flesh) 
and a separate soul. Through this construction the Church maintains the piety of 
the soul within a sinful body (Fendler, 1998; Morris, 1991; Sawchuk, Busby & 
Burns, 1999). Saint Catherine of Siena is an example of the essence of Catholic 
suffering. Catherine: 
... sees the material world with its vain pleasures as a place of 'venomous 
thorns' and therefore recommends that the godly — in spurning the 
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thorns of pleasure — should actively seek out suffering through the 
humiliations of the flesh. (Morris, 1991, p. 132) 
Saint Catherine separates pain from suffering in terms of location of experience 
but connects the two in terms of their reliance upon each other in a spiritual 
cohesion of experience. Separating the soul from the body is done to, "... 
maintain a coherent doctrine in which God could be omnipotent and good, and a 
person could be sinful while still being endowed with a divine soul" (Fendler, 
1998, p. 43). The Christian salvation ethic of the pious soul constructs a discursive 
practice which separates the body and soul. However, this discourse is caught 
within its own truth game and constructs a paradox of interrelationship between 
body and soul. The Holy experience of suffering cannot exist without pain and 
pain cannot exist without the body. 
Pain and suffering are utilized as powerful psychological tools bv the 
Church aristocracy to convey guilt onto the individual for acts of transgression. 
Pain and suffering can be diminished through the practice of praver and 
atonement by the individual. Atonement is achieved through confessing. The 
technology of the confession is implemented by the discursive practice of the 
Church in order to produce the truth behind one's pain (Foucault, 1990): 
The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also 
the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power 
relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual 
presence) of a partner .... (1990, p. 61) 
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The confession is a powerful tool in treating and absolving pain in Christianity 
and secular discourses. Confession subjects the individual into divulging all of 
his/her anxieties and emotions that are bearing down on his/her soul and 
causing this painful experience. In medical and secular practices, the confession 
has an even greater effect for producing truth about a body's pain. The 
confession as a surveillance instrument is no longer about absolution and 
portraying oneself as a sinner. The confession is about uncovering the burden of 
one's pain. It is about divulging one's repression. The therapist for example, "... 
has become one of the defining character-types of modernity, embodying a 
concern 'with technique, with effectiveness in transforming neurotic symptoms 
into directed energy, maladjusted individuals into well-adjusted ones' " 
(Maclntyre as cited in Blacker, 1998, p. 354). Confessional therapy displaces the 
psychological causes from the physical pain: 
From the eighteenth century to the present, the techniques of verbalization 
have been reinserted in a different context by the so-called human sciences 
in order to use them without renunciation of the self but to constitute, 
positively, a new self. To use these techniques without renouncing oneself 
constitutes a decisive break. (Foucault, 1988a, p. 49) 
The confession in medical and secular discourses is the surveillance of the self. 
Confessional therapy gives breathing exercises, meditation, relaxation 
techniques, and imaging techniques as opposed to prayer and self-sacrifice in the 
treatment of one's repression. It is the self-monitoring of one's behavior and 
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daily practices. Through the act of self-surveillance an individual may achieve 
relief from the afflictions of pain and suffering. 
In Christian religious practices, suffering is portrayed as a virtue (Wall, 
2000), a gift from God, that should be welcomed by His humble servant. In fact, 
pain and suffering are so virtuous within Catholicism that not until 1947, does 
the Church allow the use of pain-relieving methods by Catholics (McFadden as 
cited in Unruh & Henriksson, 2002). Even then, there is dissenting voices within 
the Catholic church that maintain pain and suffering bring about a greater 
spirituality for the individual (Unruh & Henriksson, 2002). Christian dualism as 
it proceeds discursively towards Cartesian dualism (Fendler, 1998; Wall, 2000) 
constructs suffering as an experience of the soul. Suffering at this particular point 
in the discursive practices of the Church becomes a distinct construction isolated 
from pain. Their isolation continues through today throughout the disciplines. 
Their isolation operates to maintain distinct boundaries of the body and soul. 
The distinction between body and soul separates the knowledges used to 
produce pain and suffering. The knowledge of pain becomes distinct from the 
knowledge of suffering. This distinct knowledge production of pain allows the 
application of biopower onto what will become the social body. 
Descartes' contribution to the construction of pain and suffering is 
Dualism (Lanceley, 1995). Patrick Wall (2000) theorizes that Dualism is born in 
part because it is heretical to treat mind and body as aspects of a single entity 
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during the early seventeenth century. During this time, the Roman Catholic 
Church has very clear authority over which territory of the human it has 
dominion. Descartes, not wanting to be labeled a heretic, articulately formulates 
an explanation for the separation of mind and body. This allows him the 
opportunity to continue his studies unimpeded by the Church. The separation of 
mind and body also preclude further research into the mind as part of the 
scientific process. As a result, scientific and medical study into the mind is 
limited for centuries. Medicine adopts Dualism (Kahn & Steeves, 1986; Kleinman 
et al., 1992) as its epistemology around the time of the French Revolution 
(Foucault, 1994). Medical reverence for Dualism provides the impetus for strictly 
studying the body and leaving the soul (mind) to the humanities and the Church. 
Pain and suffering, which are used collectively and interchangeably throughout 
early Christian discourses (Morris, 1991), become alienated constructions with 
the growing influence of the disciplines of science and medicine (Kahn & 
Steeves, 1986). As medical discourse moves through the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, suffering becomes less prominent, almost non-existent, in 
medical literature and pedagogy. Suffering as a discourse begins operating 
within behavioral, emotional, and psychological realms of human reality. 
Suffering is relegated to the portion of the self influenced by culture, 
environment, and ethnicity (Kahn & Steeves, 1986; Zborowski, 1952). Within the 
discursive practice of clinical medicine, suffering as a construction is relegated to 
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the subjective history of the patient (Kahn & Steeves, 1986), and is essentially 
beyond the concern of the practitioner. For those authors within medicine that do 
address suffering, it is constructed as an emotional state in response to a painful 
event (Kahn & Steeves, 1986; Morris, 1991). Kleinman et al. (1992) in their 
landmark anthropological study of pain and suffering, determine that the current 
mode of suffering within the United States is: 
... the relative weakening in the modern era of moral and religious 
vocabularies, both in collective representations and the language of the 
experts. In their place we see the proliferation of rational-technical 
professional argots that express and constitute suffering in physiological, 
public health, clinical, psychological, and policy terms, (p. 13) 
Kleinman et al. see suffering as a competing discourse between medicine and 
science and the other disciplines such as religion, psychiatry, and psychology. 
While medicine and science tend to dominate the understanding of pain (Morris, 
1991), the discursive practices of these disciplines are actually cooperating with 
other discursive practices as part of the bio-political pole of biopower (Foucault, 
1990). All of these discursive practices are at work collectively constructing the 
social body in pain. All are attempting to explain pain and suffering within their 
specific discursive practices. In essence, all are stating the same thing but with 
different disciplinary techniques. They are operating in the same manner because 
they all subscribe to dualistic thinking and maintain the separation of mind and 
body. The disciplines define pain and suffering as distinct constructions. These 
constructions describe and define the same human event. Each discipline uses 
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their respective discursive practice in isolation of the other to explain the 
experience. Very little weaving (Morris, 2001) takes place within the construction 
of a patient in pain. The disciplines of western society continue the maintenance 
of distinctive exclusionary boundaries around the social body. 
Pain, which is aligned with the body, is separated from the emotional and 
psychological aspects of the experience through the discourse of clinical 
medicine. This separation of emotion and behavior from pain, "... indicates how 
ancient the desire to assign pain wholly to the flesh" (Morris, 1991, p. 163), is in 
clinical medicine. The isolation of pain serves to maintain its position and 
identity as a symptom and tool for the use in clinical medicine as part of its 
discursive practice. Pain and suffering are not binaries and I am not attempting 
to construct them as such. Pain and suffering are linguistic signifiers of the same 
human event. Through the separation of body and mind, suffering is placed in a 
parallel but alienating discursive practice from pain. The discursive practice of 
clinical medicine constructs a boundary around pain so as to isolate it as a 
sensory effect of a specific pathology. It is constructed to exclude influences from 
other social bodily constructions. Through Deborah Britzman's (1998) use of 
inclusion/ exclusion in. Is There a Queer Pedagogy ? pain can be observed in the 
latter part of the twentieth century attempting to include suffering as part of its 
discursive practice. This attempt at inclusion demonstrates a half-hearted gesture 
and creates tension between the patient and practitioner. "Part of the tension is 
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that in discourses of inclusion, there tends to be only two pedagogical strategies: 
techniques for attitudinal change and provisions for information" (p. 219). This 
tension is the epistemological struggle of clinical medicine and the other 
disciplines refusing to let go of their pathological discourses and refusing to 
integrate the mind and body. The inclusion of suffering on behalf of clinical 
medicine is at a point where technoscientific techniques on the part of clinical 
medicine fail in relieving pain. In every day life, the majority of bodies in pain 
are only temporary experiences. Childbirth for instance is a temporary painful 
event that clinical medicine excludes the concept of suffering from its discourse. 
Pain within this discursive practice is easily explained through pathological 
tissue damage. Even if pain persists it is explained by hormonal and tissue 
changes within the body. It is only at the point of a chronic pain that clinical 
medicine allows other discursive practices to intervene. The tension between 
patient and practitioner is that when chronic pain cannot be cured it always 
comes back on the patient: 
It is thus understandable that when patients encounter comments from 
clinicians about pain-proneness (prior mental or emotional factors causing 
or influencing a pain problem); ... or possible concurrent psychosocial 
causes; they are not usually received readily or graciously ... Although 
both the patient and physician would like to find a physical, objective 
cause, patient hostility results when one medical procedure after the other 
is ineffective and the physician finds it increasingly difficult to fit the 
patient into the custom diagnostic categories. (Jackson, 1992, p. 142) 
141 
This type of patient-practitioner interaction is unfortunately a common 
occurrence within clinical medicine and the other disciplines. When the social 
body is defined as abnormal, and the biomedical paradigm is helpless in finding 
a cure, the patient is isolated and helpless. As Britzman identifies this tension 
begins with pedagogical strategies, or in this instance a lack of (1998). Delese 
Wear (2000), associate director of Women in Medicine program at Northeastern 
Ohio Universities College of Medicine, emphasizes pedagogy and the curriculum 
for the change that is needed in medicine to address issues like suffering: 
Medical students have little opportunity to engage any body of 
knowledge not gained through bioscientific/empirical methods. Yet other 
bodies of knowledge — philosophy, sociology, literature, spirituality, and 
aesthetics — are often the ones where compassion, communication, and 
social responsibility are addressed, illuminated, practiced, and learned. To 
educate broadly educated physicians who develop professionalism 
throughout their careers requires a full-spectrum curriculum and the 
process to support it. (p. 602) 
If clinical medicine wishes to truly integrate pain and suffering it must begin 
with its approach to the social body. As it stands now, the predominant 
understanding of pain within the discursive practices of clinical medicine, is 
incapable of addressing pain as long as the mind and body are treated as 
separate entities. Pain stands in exclusion of the experience of the social body. It 
stands as an isolated event and places the mind in the role of a passive organ. 
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The Pain Center 
Prior to the advent of clinical medicine, pain is thought to be conceived 
from a central location within the individual. This "pain center" is located 
throughout history in either the heart or the brain. The ancient Egyptians are 
believed to be the first civilization conceptualizing the heart as the center of 
sensation (Bonica, 1980,1991; Procacci & Maresca, 1984). Aristotle continues this 
belief as he constructs his theory of pain (Bonica, 1980,1991; DeSousa & Wallace, 
1977; Procacci & Maresca, 1984): 
For Aristotle the brain had no direct function in sensory processes; the 
sensorium commune, or center of sensory perception, was located in the 
heart, which he considered the most important organ of the body, that is, 
the center of all fundamental life functions and the location of the soul. 
(Bonica, 1991, p. 193) 
Aristotle's conceptualization of pain and the pain center as heart and soul are 
important throughout the progression of pain theories in modern medical 
history. His conceptions remain foundational fixtures for medical and scientific 
pedagogy during the Renaissance and into the 20th century (Procacci & Maresca, 
1984). Aristotle believes pain to be an emotion rather than a sensation (Morris, 
1991). Aristotle uses emotion to describe pain as a feeling or behavior and an 
imbalance of the soul as opposed to our current understanding of emotion. Thus 
as an emotion, pain affects the inner workings of the body, throwing it out of 
kilter. Sight, touch, smell, taste, and hearing, are the five senses which Aristotle 
identifies as being crucial to providing feedback to the heart about the external 
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world (Procacci & Maresca, 1984). Aristotle believes that pain is an imbalance in 
the information coming from the five senses and the transmission of this 
information along blood vessels to the heart causes a violent change in emotion. 
This imbalance gives rise to the feelings of pain and changes in the emotional 
state of the individual in pain (DeSousa & Wallace, 1977; Procacci & Maresca 
1984). Aristotle's theoretical description of the senses and the center of pain 
persist throughout much of western history despite physiological evidence to the 
contrary from other ancient scholars. The persistence of western scholars to 
continue to pedagogically reinforce and reify the beliefs of Aristotle illuminate 
the cult like following of Greek history by western academia. Despite evidence to 
the contrary, Aristotle's theories are accepted as Truth. 
Alemaeon, a student of Pythagoras, carries out extensive anatomical 
studies of the senses in which he concludes that the center of sensation resides 
within the brain (Bonica, 1980,1991). Alemaeon is the first ancient thinker to hold 
this belief. Alemaeon's beliefs are silenced however, by the widespread 
acceptance of Aristotle and the heart as the center of emotion. With the death of 
Aristotle, the brain is fixed as the center of pain. Galen (130-201 A.D.), court 
physician to Marcus Aurelius, carries out extensive physiological studies on the 
human body. He establishes the importance of the central and peripheral 
nervous systems in human sensation. Galen identifies the cranial and spinal 
nerves, as well as the sympathetic nervous system trunks (Bonica, 1980,1991; 
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Procacci & Maresca, 1984). Galen establishes a connection between the peripheral 
nerves of the body to the pain center within the brain. He also identifies a type of 
nerve that he believes causes pain sensation. Galen's work is lost after the fall of 
the Roman Empire until its revival by Descartes (Bonica, 1980). 
During the seventeenth century, Descartes formulates his own theoretical 
understanding of pain. Descartes' explanation of pain begins with the assertion 
that the pain center resides within the brain. He describes the sensation of pain as 
commencing on the periphery of the subject. It is then transmitted via delicate 
threads to the brain. While Descartes believes that the brain is the center of 
sensation, it is considered a passive entity. The brain simply receives afferent 
information and responds accordingly to the information it receives. Descartes' 
theory does not allow for an active response on the part of the brain, in other 
words there is no feed forward or descending control on the part of the brain. In 
essence, Descartes describes the sensation of pain as a hard-wired direct linked 
system between the brain and the periphery (Bonica, 1980,1991; Melzack, 1993, 
1999b; Morris, 1991; Procacci & Maresca, 1984; Wall, 1999, 2000). By simply 
describing the brain as an endpoint it suffices to explain his pain theorv and save 
himself from the Church's grasp. Descartes' beliefs are so widely accepted that 
they endure four hundred years of technological and epistemological evolution 
in the western disciplines. Initially, Descartes' theory competes in medical texts 
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with Aristotle's. Descartes, however, endures in the medical and scientific 
literature. 
The exact reasons for the enormous impact of Descartes on science and 
medicine are vague. One suggestion (Melzack, 1993) is that Descartes is the first 
philosopher to be influenced by the scientific method. His thoughts on pain are 
developed utilizing the tools of enlightenment. Although his thoughts on pain 
precede the birth of clinical medicine by approximately one hundred years, its 
impact on its practices and pedagogies is immense. His pain theory is a straight 
through pain pathway and is the precursor for Vie Specificity Theory (Bonica, 
1980). The Specificity Theory is the dominate pain theory for much of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The effect of both Descartes and The 
Specificity Theory on the explanation of pain is that they separate the sensation of 
pain from the psychological experience of pain and discard it as irrelevant. 
The pain center, with the aid of technoscience, is still under investigation 
by science and medicine. The brain is still central to the understanding of the 
pain phenomenon. Through the use of positron emission tomography (PET) 
scanners, researchers are attempting to isolate areas of the brain which become 
active when patients are in pain (Wall, 2000). PET scanners work by injecting 
radioactive oxygen into the bloodstream and then scanning the brain. As the 
oxygen decays, the active area of the brain changes color on the scanning image 
(Wall, 2000). Current imaging techniques show "substantial" evidence for a large 
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area of the brain involved in some way with noxious stimuli (Wright, 2002a, p. 
57). The difficulty in correlating a pain center with pain activity as a result of PET 
scanning is that multiple neurological activities are ongoing when an individual 
is in pain. Ascending and descending pathways are firing simultaneously. 
Depending on the emotional state of the individual, as well as other life events, 
discerning pain activity from other neurological activity with imaging is a fine 
art. Different areas of the brain are responsible for attention, sensory- 
discriminative, and autonomic and motor function and all respond to the pain 
experience. The biggest hurdle is that the working knowledge of the brain is very 
limited and, "The complexities of mind are far too vast for our understanding" 
(Morris, 2002, p. 573). 
I believe the search for a pain center allows for further discursive division 
between mind and body. The discursive practices that operate within a pain 
center are enormous and reach across all of the disciplines of Western societv. A 
pain center maintains that an area or areas of the brain are responsible for the 
production of pain that an individual is experiencing. Once this area is identified, 
the next step in the process will be the elimination of pain through 
technoscientific intervention. I am slightly technophobic at this point in the 
discourse. My concern is to what degree will pain be modulated? Also, at what 
site will the modulation occur? I already have a partial answer to my questions, 
as medicine and science are already doing both. Ice is the simplest example of a 
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technoscientific intervention in treating pain. Ice placed at the site of the pain 
(usually the site of the injury as well) cools the nociceptors and reduces the 
amount of afferent signals sent to the Dorsal Horn of the Spinal Cord. This in 
turn controls the pain for as long as the tissue is numb. Ice is an example of a 
temporary and transient modulation of pain. It is reversible and there are very 
few adverse reactions as a result of icing. My concern is when the technoscientific 
interventions become complex and questionable morally and ethically. 
The discursive practice of the pain center can be carried over into other 
areas of brain study as well. For example, the area within the brain that controls 
consciousness could be the next target of science and medicine. Consciousness is 
already isolated within the, "... 'lower layers' of the cerebral neocortex" (Morris, 
2002, p. 573). The difficulty in identifying these constructions within the brain is 
that science and medicine do not have a clear definition of what the entities of 
pain and consciousness are. Pain and consciousness are vague social 
constructions and they are individualized by learned behaviors and emotions. To 
isolate a particular area of the brain such as the Thalamus and call it the pain 
center plays a dangerous game with the social body. This is a game that 
technobiopower is already manipulating. Previously in the text, I discussed at 
length the use of Prozac as a technoscientific intervention in medical discourse 
(Lewis, 2003). Another technoscientific intervention that is common in 
adolescents is the use of Ritalin. Ritalin is from the amphetamine class of drugs 
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and is considered a stimulant. It works as a pseudo-neurotransmitter in the 
central nervous system (Miller & Leger, 2003). Ritalin is primarily used to treat 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The debate is not about the 
legitimacy of ADHD as an actual pathology but rather the ethical and moral 
issues of psychopharmaceutical intervention. In the case of both Prozac and 
Ritalin, pharmacological intervention is used as the primary strategy to 
normalize behavior. The question is never raised by the disciplines as to what 
social and cultural issues surrounding the social body are creating this 
abnormality. The technoscientific consensus is that it is easier to take a pill and 
cyberjack the mind, than it is to address issues of racism, sexism, poverty, and 
socioeconomic status. 
My fear of a pain center is that this discursive practice will continue to 
reinforce a universal understanding and response to pain within humans. It will 
eliminate behavioral and emotional responses, as well as delegitimates memory 
from previous pain experiences. The discursive practice of a pain center operates 
a normality of pain. Pain like clinical depression is organized around 
neurophysiology. By organizing pain around neurophysiology, the social and 
cultural aspects of it are not discussed or considered (Lewis, 2003). 
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The Construction of Pain 
Pain and suffering, as defined by the disciplines of science and medicine, 
are the result of the construction of the social body. The social body is 
constructed by the two poles of biopower, anatomo-politics of the human body 
and the bio-politics of population (Foucault, 1990). Foucault (1990) marks the 
beginnings of biopower around the seventeenth century with the onset of 
capitalism. The social body is essential to the expansion of capitalism during this 
time as it provides both bodies and populations to its mechanisms of production 
(1990). 
The Church is the dominant institution prior to the onset of biopower. The 
Church's separation of body and soul begins a discursive practice for what later 
evolves into Cartesian dualism, the separation of mind and body (Fendler, 1998; 
Wall, 2000). At the height of the Church's power, it contributes to the 
manifestation of biopower. The Church by mandating that the body and soul are 
separate entities allows the body to be subject to the discursive practices of 
biopower. The soul is the possession of the Church. Any reference to it in 
literature or study must be cleared through the Church. The Church, in essence, 
isolates the body from the self. This isolation objectifies the body, as in the object 
of sin and transgression. The Church is the first social institution to construct a 
body of pain. The body for Christianity is perishable and an object to be 
humiliated for the greater gift of eternal life (Morris, 1991). The Church offers the 
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body for study as its needs for the body is in opposition to that of biopower. 
Biopower requires the social body to maintain and increase its capacity over life. 
Population as a concept is essential to the operative functions of biopower 
and is under the control of the bio-political pole (Foucault, 1990,1997; Popkewitz 
& Brennan, 1998). Population incorporates social issues of,//... health, sanitation, 
birthrate, longevity, ..." (Foucault, 1997, p. 71) in management of the individual 
social body. Medicine as a discipline begins to play a significant role in the 
construction and maintenance of populations during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The doctor becomes the advisor and expert and is charged 
with maintaining the social body (Rabinow, 1984). "... it is the doctor's function 
as hygienist, rather than his prestige as a therapist, that assures him this 
politically privileged position in the eighteenth century, prior to his 
accumulation of economic and social privileges in the nineteenth centurv" 
(Rabinow, 1984, p. 284). Medicine attains its credibility and prestige through its 
efficient control over the population. Through the maintenance of a healthy 
population, biopower functions as a fine-tuned machine. The doctor, in his 
privileged position, develops techniques to regulate the social body as health and 
illness are important concerns in the growth of capitalism. Medicine and the 
doctor incorporate the surveillance of the population in their discursive roles for 
biopower: 
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The new late twentieth century medical model — that might be described 
as Surveillance Medicine — was marked by an extension of the medical 
eye from scrutiny of the strict anatomy of the body to a great sweep across 
multi-dimensional space. This widening of medical vision, together with 
the deployment of new exploratory techniques, was accompanied by a 
parallel shift in the conceptual organization of illness as the relationship 
between symptom, sign and illness were reconfigured. From a linkage 
based on surface and depth, all became components in a more general 
arrangement of predictive factors. (Armstrong, 2002, p. 110) 
Surveillance medicine provides an even greater control over the population than 
clinical medicine. Rather than waiting for pathology to strike, surveillance 
medicine searches out for risks that are factors in the evolution of future disease. 
In order to regulate the social body, surveillance techniques of clinical 
medicine categorize and develop specialized knowledges about the body 
(Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998). Clinical medicine in regulating the social bodv 
relies upon its epistemology of anatomo-pathology to develop the knowledge of 
lesions. Within this medical discourse, the social body becomes a greater object of 
discovery. At this point in clinical medical discourse, pain and suffering diverge 
along their separate discursive paths. Pain, now of the social body, becomes the 
technology of the clinical gaze. Suffering now associated with the mind, does 
very little for the maintenance of the population so it is no longer considered as 
vital to the care of patients. The medical literature is devoid of anv serious 
discussion of suffering up until the latter part of the twentieth century. Whatever 
discussion is available is limited as a secondary effect of pain (Kahn & Steeves, 
1986). Pain, as a technology of the gaze, is explained as a result of tissue damage 
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to the social body. This damage is the result of either injury or illness and is a 
response to the inflammatory process. 
Clinical medicine applies a stable meaning to pain because of its clinico- 
pathological origin. The normal social body is universal and therefore accepts a 
stable identity of pain patient within the clinico-pathological discourse. Pain, as 
part of the social body, is constructed as a sensory physiological event and is the 
object of the gaze. It is the technology which the gaze uses to diagnose the lesion. 
Pain is the defining point of space and location (Foucault, 1994). In the normal 
body, pain identifies the area of injury or illness. This construction of pain is a 
sterile neurophysiological process of bodily function. It presents a meaning of 
pain that is universal and all normal bodies respond in this manner. 
The separation of mind and body constructs a discursive formation that 
explains the body using machine metaphors. The machine body, "... can be 
retooled, reconditioned and returned to the workplace — quickly" (Marion, 2002, 
p. 150). Describing pain within the metaphor of a machine body separates the 
meaning of pain from the event itself. It isolates the sensorv event and reifies the 
clinical explanations of pain tied to tissue injury or illness. The sensorv event of 
pain isolates the central nervous system into various structures as opposed to an 
integrated system that communicates throughout the individual. "Recent 
research shows, however, that bodily organs communicate directly with the 
brain, and vice versa, ..." (Marion, 2002, p. 158). This operative function of pain 
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in machine body serves to define pain as a pathology that can be fixed. If 
medicine cannot fix it, it is the result of a faulty machine instead of a faulty 
discourse. Pain is a source of information that leads to the uncovering of 
whatever ailment the machine body is experiencing. The experience and 
psychological aspects of the pain event are irrelevant within the machine body 
discourse. 
As biopower emerges from the seventeenth century, the constructs of pain 
and suffering are modified in a similar manner as sexuality (Foucault, 1990). Pain 
and suffering become: 
... a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the 
intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of 
special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are 
linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of 
knowledge and power. (Foucault, 1990, pp. 105-106) 
Pain and suffering are subjugated to the normalizing processes of the disciplines. 
Pain, however, becomes the object of the discursive practices of science, 
medicine, and the social body. While suffering is the subject of the soul, mind, 
education, philosophy, and religion. Pain is the object of scientific and medical 
study and suffering is the subject of meditation, prayer, and personal meaning. 
Pain and suffering, as they are currently constructed in the era of 
technobiopower, are a complex construction of discursive practices of the 
Church, Descartes, and the modern western disciplines. I mentioned previously 
the integration of Deborah Britzman's (1999) work on sex and sexuality as a basis 
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for the construction of meanings and identities of pain and suffering. The 
normalized construction of pain and suffering, like that of sex, provide stable 
meanings within the respective discursive practices of the disciplines. In the 
discourses of the humanities, religion, philosophy, psychology, the meaning of 
suffering is stable because it is defined as a behavioral and emotional response to 
pain (Morris, 1991). Clinical medicine considers suffering an optional response to 
pain, rather than a parallel response. Suffering is irrational in medical meanings 
but it still translates stability. Suffering is considered a part of the consciousness 
of the individual. Defined in terms of consciousness, suffering becomes an 
experience that, "... is so intensely personal that it becomes difficult for one 
person to translate this experience in a language that makes sense to another 
person" (Morris, 2002, p. 574). Suffering has individual meaning but that 
meaning cannot be internalized by another individual. In The Culture of Pain, 
David Morris (1991) writes about the experiences of Viktor Frankl a survivor of 
Auschwitz and Dachau. Morris recounts some of Frankl's thoughts on suffering 
while interned in the camps. Frankl believes he survived because at a critical 
point of the experience he found a personal meaning which allowed him to 
survive. The personal meaning for Frankl is his will to live and to one day 
continue his academic career speaking about the psychology of suffering in 
concentration camps. For Frankl, meanings differ from person to person and 
change with each situation and time that the individual finds him/her a part of. 
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Suffering, for Frankl, is an essential part of pain because the meaning of the 
particular event is as important as the event itself. Pain and suffering are one in 
the same for the individual in pain. 
The meaning of pain is stable as it is applied to the normal social body 
because it is explained by the discursive practices of clinical medicine. The 
neurophysiological processes of the body are well understood when pain is the 
result of injury or illness. This clinico-pathological diagnosis always assumes an 
underlying pathology. By approaching pain from the discursive practice of 
clinical medicine, a course of action is taken in two stages. "First, the normal 
sensory nervous system is seen as reliable, accurate witness to currently 
observable peripheral pathology. Second, any deviation from this first rule is 
deemed a mental aberration (Wall, 1999, p. 15). Portraying the meaning of pain 
onto the social body through this discursive practice demonstrates a reliability of 
organic pathology as the cause of pain. It demonstrates a normalized universal 
response to pain within the social body. 
Examining the discourses of pain and suffering as "historicity and 
relation" (Britzman, 1999; Foucault, 1990) demonstrates discursive practices of 
mind/body binary and the universal normal social body. Resistance to these 
universal discursive practices can be demonstrated through the patient in 
chronic pain. I use the term patient in chronic pain as opposed to that of chronic 
pain patient as a means to differentiate identities placed upon the social body. In 
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situations of chronic pain, the discursive practice of clinical medicine breaks 
down. Chronic pain is not always signified by an identifiable organic cause: 
There are many pains whose cause is not known. If a diligent search has 
been made in the periphery and no cause is found, we have seen that 
clinicians act as though there was only one alternative. They blame faulty 
thinking, which, for many classical-thinking doctors, is the same as saying 
that there is no cause and even no disease. (Wall, 2000, p. 105) 
Without the presence of an organic lesion, treatment protocol becomes a matter 
of treating symptoms and hoping for the best. The individual in pain moves from 
one discursive practice to the next. The social body shifts its identities (Britzman, 
1999) as the chronic pain forces the patient to employ multiple technologies such 
as meditation, pharmacology, biofeedback, psychological counseling, etc. Each 
discursive practice places its own meaning upon the social body and 
subsequently a different identity. As identity changes so does its application 
upon the patient. Pain and suffering become unstable meanings and identities for 
the patient in chronic pain. The separation of mind and body maintain distinct 
suppositions that there is physical pain and psychological pain. The absence of 
organic causes feeds into the frenzy of psychological pain. Patients are left to 
blame for the state they are in. If we think instead about how pain and suffering 
become subjected to pedagogical discourses of medicine and science we might 
better understand the discourse constructed by the doctor-patient relationship 
and the identity that it represents (Britzman, 1999). The discursive practices 
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manipulating pain and suffering are keys to understanding how we have come 
to understand pain in our present time. 
Theories of Pain 
Modern theories of pain begin with Descartes. Descartes' theory serves as 
the primary model for the explanation of pain until the latter part of the 
twentieth century. Descartes theoretical design is simple. It is a direct link from 
the periphery of the body to the brain. In this model, a filament from the 
periphery of the body is directly linked to an area within the brain. When a 
stimulus or sensation occurs from the periphery a signal is sent to the brain via 
this filament. The brain responds back by returning a signal down this filament 
for a corresponding action by the body (Morris, 1991). The representation of this 
is similar to the rope and cans that children use to pretend they are talking on the 
phone. The two cans are connected by the rope. The sound of the children travels 
along the rope to the cans. In Descartes theory, the rope is the filament and the 
brain is one of the cans. 
Three problems arise with Descartes' theory. First, Descartes posits that 
the brain is a passive organ that acts merely as a relay station. The brain 
passively receives and sends signals. It is incapable of modulating or changing 
the information in any way. Second, it promotes that an actual hard wired pain 
system exists within the central nervous system. This theory promotes an idea of 
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dedicated tissues for the sensation of pain. Finally, it does not promote any 
meaning of the pain event itself. It divests itself from any behavioral or emotional 
response to pain. Pain, within this theoretical discourse, is simply a sensory 
event responding to tissue stimulus. In spite of these problems with Descartes' 
theory, it sets into motion centuries of scientific and medical discursive practices 
that try and verify a Cartesian model of pain. 
In 1840, Johannes Miiller proposes the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies 
(Bonica, 1980,1991; Procacci & Maresca, 1984). The doctrine states that the brain 
receives information about external objects and body structures only through 
sensory nerves. The sensory nerves are specific to each of the five senses and 
each responds to its own specific form of energy. The five senses are based upon 
Aristotle's work and are vision, hearing, taste, smell, and touch (Bonica, 1980, 
1991). Vision for example, would send a specific form of energy that the brain 
would recognize as coming from the visual sense. Miiller's work expands upon 
Descartes' theory of a hard wired pain system and incorporates a system which 
is specific to each sense. It promotes the idea of a pain theory which perceives 
pain as sensational, direct, and specific to the quality and type of input. The 
Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies becomes the precursor to The Specificity Theory 
(Bonica, 1980). The discursive promotion of a pain theory that is specific to the 
quality and type of input equates the intensity of the pain response equal to the 
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amount of tissue damage. In other words, the more tissue involved in the injury 
the more painful the situation. 
The Specificity Theory continues adherence to the Cartesian theory of pain. 
It uses the Doctrine of Specific Nenv Energies to formulate a new model of pain 
(Bonica, 1991). The Specificity Theory evolves from the extensive research by a 
conglomeration of scientists such as, Schiff, Goldscheider, Blix, et al., during the 
mid-nineteenth century (Bonica, 1980). A decade later. Max von Frey an Austrian 
born physiologist, compiles their works and his own work in formulating an 
explanation for pain perception that becomes the Specificity Theory (Bonica, 1980, 
1991; Melzack & Wall, 1983; Procacci & Maresca, 1984). von Frey begins his work 
by building upon Miiller's sensation of touch. He expands touch to incorporate 
four areas, touch, warmth, cold, and pain (Bonica, 1980; Melzack & Wall, 1983). 
During histologic examination of the skin, von Frey designates the free nerve 
endings as pain receptors due to their location and large quantities throughout 
the body (Melzack & Wall, 1983). von Frey's deduction prompts others to believe 
that these pain receptors project via pain fibers to the pain center within the brain 
(Melzack & Wall, 1970,1983; Procacci & Maresca, 1984). 
The basic assumption of von Frey's theory is flawed in that it implies a 
direct connection from the free nerve ending (pain receptor) to the brain 
(Melzack & Wall, 1983). It also postulates that the free nerve ending is completely 
subservient to noxious stimuli. "It further implies that the abstraction or selection 
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of information concerning the stimulus occurs entirely at the receptor level and 
that this information is transmitted faithfully to the brain" (Melzack & Wall, 
1983, p. 203). As scientific and medical research progresses, free nerve endings 
are found to respond to intense, noxious stimuli but this is not always a pain 
response (Melzack & Wall, 1970). Free nerve endings are also found to be 
complex receptors that are subservient to more than a noxious stimulus (Galea, 
2002). The Specificity Theory denies a psychological component to pain. Pain 
within this theoretical discourse is simply a sensory response to tissue excitation. 
Meaning is extracted and it portrays pain as a, "... universal, internal mechanism 
that sends a signal from the injury to the brain" (Morris, 1991, p. 271). The 
significance of the Specificity Theory to medicine and medical pedagogy is that it 
reinforces a discursive practice of a straight through dedicated pain system. This 
discourse has yet to be dislodged from current medical practitioners (Lanceley, 
1995). Other significant theories of pain are postulated in science and medicine 
but none are as gravitating as the Specificity Theory. 
It is not until 1965, that another theory of pain stirs as much scientific and 
medical emotion as does the Specificity Theory. The Gate Control Theory integrates 
the works of previous researchers into one functional theory. The Gate Control 
Theory proposed by Ronald Melzack and Patrick Wall suggests that a neural 
mechanism within the dorsal horn of the spinal cord, similar to a gate in a fence, 
opens and closes to allow pain signals to pass on to the brain (Melzack & Wall, 
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1970,1983). At the gate, within the dorsal horn, signals from afferent nerve fibers 
are either blocked or permitted to travel to the higher levels of the central 
nervous system (CNS) (Aronson, 2002; Bonica, 1991; Christensen, 1980; Melzack 
& Wall, 1970,1983; Starkey, 1993; Lanceley, 1995; Lundy - Ekman, 1998; Wall, 
2000). This gate within the dorsal horn is the substantia gelatinosa (SG). The SG 
modulates neural impulses responsible for pain experiences (Melzack & Wall, 
1983). The Gate allows for subsequent up-regulation and down-regulation of 
noxious stimuli (Wright, 2002a). 
The Gate Control Theory changes the role of the brain in the pain process. 
The Gate Control Theory integrates the function of the brain into its theoretical 
understanding and is the first pain theory to focus on the brain as an active 
participant within nociception (Melzack, 1999a, 1999b; Wright, 2002a). Melzack 
and Wall (1983) postulate that the: 
... stimulation of the brain activates descending efferent fibres which can 
influence afferent conduction .... Thus it is possible for brain activities 
subserving attention, emotion and memories of prior experience to exert 
control over sensory input, (pp. 230 - 231) 
The brain is finally understood to be a dynamic and active organ in the 
experience of pain. The information about higher order CNS actions, specifically 
the brain, is not a part of the original theory. This information is later added by 
Melzack and Casey (Melzack and Wall, 1970). Melzack and Casey (1968) in 
reviewing new evidence from physiological and behavioral studies postulate 
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that the higher order CNS involve sensory-discriminative, motivational-affective, 
and evaluative dimensions. Activation of these systems occurs within the 
neospinothalamic tract, paleospinothalamic tract, and neocortical areas of the 
CNS respectively (Bonica, 1991; Melzack, 1999b; Melzack and Wall, 1970). These 
three areas coordinate, "... with one another to provide perceptual information 
regarding the location, magnitude, and spatiotemporal properties of the noxious 
stimulus..." (Melzack and Wall, 1970, p. 20). They also coordinate the 
motivational and cognitive tendencies in formulating a specific personal 
response by the individual (Melzack and Wall, 1970). They believe there are 
psychological factors that also influence the pain experience. Melzack and Wall 
are the first researchers to integrate the psychological and physiological 
experiences of pain into one theory (Bonica, 1991). The influence of higher order 
CNS input explains the variability in how each individual reacts to noxious 
stimuli in similar circumstances. These CNS reactions are influenced bv culture, 
socioeconomic status, gender, education, previous experiences, etc. (Starkey, 
1993; Wall, 2000; Zborowski, 1952). Finally, the Gate Control Theory "was the first 
scientific explanation of how pressure and other external stimuli inhibit pain 
transmission" (Lundy-Ekman, 1998, p. 118). It has also been able to withstand the 
incessant barrage of scientific and medical criticism (Melzack and Wall, 1983). 
An example of the use of the Gate Control Theory in common practice is the 
reaction by an individual that injures himself/ herself by kicking the foot of a 
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bed. Rubbing, massaging, running cold water, etc. over the injured area of the 
foot provides temporary pain relief (Aronson, 2002; Unruh & Harman, 2002; 
Wall, 2000). The rubbing of the injured foot causes an afferent input that 
overrides that of the afferent input of pain. With the widespread acceptance of 
The Gate Control Theory in science and medicine, a new era of technoscientific 
intervention is ushered in. The Gate Control Theory, for the first time in modern 
history, validates technoscientific therapeutic intervention. Health care providers 
have utilized these interventions for centuries and now they have scientific proof 
that these interventions actually work. With this validation, health care providers 
can now receive reimbursement from health insurance companies for the 
services they provide to patients in pain. 
Technoscience is beneficial to patients in pain through the implementation 
of modalities such as massage, electrical stimulation, acupuncture, ice, moist 
heat, etc. In the practice of athletic training, technoscience assists in returning the 
physically active to their activities sooner. An item for practicing athletic trainers 
to consider is the type of technoscientific intervention he/she chooses to utilize 
on patients. Typically, athletic trainers are taught about the physical properties of 
pain but rarely taught about the psychological and emotional properties. Athletic 
trainers understand the physiology of pain but rarely understand the 
socioeconomic impact, emotional impact, and psychosocial impact of a life in 
pain. Athletic trainers, like clinical medicine, are aware of suffering as the other 
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side of the pain binary but it is beyond the realm of responsibility. Athletic 
trainers are instructed in the psychological strategies of injuries but this is a skill 
based approach to a serious health concern. This approach does little in the 
comprehension of the issues surrounding the experience of pain and suffering. 
The point is, as athletic trainers already do, considering a technoscientific 
intervention which utilizes the power of human touch like massage, 
Proprioceptive Neuromuscular Facilitation (PNF), muscle energy, manual 
traction, etc. rather than the utilization of sound waves or electricity. I realize 
there are other issues involved in the selection of modalities like time, number of 
patients, injury, healing process, etc. which affect the decision making process. 
However, sometimes as the routines of daily practice get the best of us, we forget 
how powerful human touch and interaction are in healing the mind and body. 
We forget that often the patient responds not to technoscience but to the human 
relation that is formed between patient and practitioner. While, human touch is 
not verifiable as part of evidence based medicine, historically there is credence to 
the healing power of touch. 
Acute and Beneficent Pain 
In current medical discourse, pain is approached from one of two 
perspectives, acute or chronic. Acute pain is considered a direct response from a 
specific pathological lesion and is closely related to the healing process (Starkey, 
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2004). Acute Pain is the result of injury or illness to the tissues of the body. 
Simply put, acute pain is considered a symptom of a lesion. Acute pain is taught 
in medical discourse as resulting from the initiation of the inflammatory process 
and a cascade of events which take place as a result of the initiation of this 
response. The inflammatory response, "... extends far beyond the immediate 
region of damage even when the region shows no signs of infection" (Wall, 1984, 
p. 14). Pain following an ankle sprain is the result of the circulation of chemical 
mediators such as bradykinin, serotonin, and prostaglandins. These mediators 
play different roles in the sensitization of nerve endings which create noxious 
sensation. The quality and intensity of the acute pain is believed to be in direct 
proportion to the quality and intensity of the insult to the body. Unfortunately, 
"Afferent nerve fibers evoke both excitations and inhibitions in the central 
nervous system. The proper functioning of an integrated nervous system 
depends on its ability to weave these conflicting influences into meaningful 
patterns" (Wall, 1984, p. 15). These meaningful patterns extract more than a 
sensory event from the acute pain experience. The nervous system is dynamic 
and responds to events in ways which medicine still does not understand. "Our 
sensory systems have evolved to extract a meaning from events and to express 
that meaning in terms of relevant response" (Wall, 1984, p. 19). The 
somatosensory system, a sub classification of the CNS which includes pain, 
tactile, temperature, and Proprioceptive senses, is grouped to extract not only 
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meanings from experiences but store memories as well. The somatosensory 
system stores information about particular movements, patterns, sensations, etc. 
(Riemann & Lephart, 2002). The entire CNS is a dynamic system which is adept 
to change and modifies its responses to the environment at hand. 
Acute pain is also believed to be beneficial. It is thought of as a feedback 
mechanism from the somatosensory system to the brain. Specifically, information 
from the nociceptor afferents triggers reflex motor patterns to avoid injurious 
positions, postures, or movements. Beneficent pain communicates through 
noxious signals that something is wrong and the current activity must cease in 
order to avoid injury. An example is standing or sitting in one place for too long. 
The body begins to sway, muscles begin to get sore or ache, joints begin to get 
stiff. This sequence of events is believed to be the CNS way of preventing injury 
to tissues within the body. Beneficent pain is employed by the body, "... at verv 
mild levels, to adjust our posture or shift position, and without such continual 
minor adjustments we would suffer from inflammations and infections 
developed when our bones grind down their protective connecting tissue" 
(Morris, 1991, p. 14). 
Rene Leriche, a surgeon studying pain early in the 20th century, does not 
subscribe to the notion of a beneficent pain. He puts the false notion of beneficent 
pain into perspective. His response to beneficent pain is the result of his clinical 
observation of patients in chronic pain from disease. He states succinctly, "... 
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reaction of defence? Against whom? Against what? Against the cancer which not 
infrequently gives little trouble until quite late? Against heart afflictions, which 
always develop quietly? ■ ■ • One must reject, then, this false conception of 
beneficent pain" (Cited in Melzack and Wall, 1983, p. 13). Beneficent pain is an 
interesting discursive practice of medicine as it does not always occur in the 
individual. As Leriche suggests, often debilitating diseases wreak havoc within 
the body and the individual is unaware of the events. I concur with his 
observations; this belief of a beneficent pain needs to be reconsidered. 
Beneficent pain is an abnormality in the explanation and understanding of 
pain. Beneficent pain is clinical medicine's answer to noxious sensations that 
occur as part of our routines of daily life. Athletic trainers are taught to embrace 
this pain as a guide for determining limitations in treatment, rehabilitation, and 
activity. It is also a pain which athletic trainers are taught that by masking with 
medication, such as NSAIDs, and allowing athletes to return to play encourages 
further trauma to the body. However, beneficent pain is utilized on a daily basis 
by coaches, parents, and athletes during their competitive training as a limitation 
to overcome. Overcoming this pain maximizes the physiological performance. In 
athletic endeavors, pain is constantly perceived as a limit to go beyond. It is a test 
of an individual's mental strength. To push beyond the physical limitations of 
one's mind and body. American football is the "poster child" of physical sacrifice 
within American sports culture. A former National Football League (NFL) team 
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physician puts beneficent pain in perspective for athletes when he states, "a 
patient who falls and hurts his hip probably would be out of work for three 
months with a hip pointer. In the NFL, that player would be back on the field the 
next week" (Scranton as cited in Farrey, 2002, p. 2). Pain in athletics is not a 
stopping point but rather a marker to measure one's mettle and courage. Often, 
athletes push beyond the physical pains for the rewards of competition and 
personal achievement. The physical pain is blocked out by the psychological. 
Outside of athletics, there are numerous medical and scientific reports of 
individuals with injuries that report little or no pain despite mortal injuries. The 
historic study by Henry Beecher on combat soldiers during World War II is an 
example. At the time of the study, Beecher is an army doctor serving in Italy 
during World War II. He is attending to wounded soldiers at the Anzio 
beachhead and finds that they complain of very little pain despite their serious 
wounds. (Cited in Morris, 1991). Where is the pain under these circumstances? 
The events surrounding the pain play a significant role in how the individual 
perceives and reacts to it. The event is in a backdrop filled with personal 
meanings (Melzack, 1999b; Melzack and Wall 1970,1983; Morris, 1991; Wall, 
2000). The discourse of a beneficent pain constructs an interesting conundrum for 
medicine, science, and athletic training. How does a beneficent pain become 
unreliable? How does beneficent pain operate as an early warning to cease 
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activity go ignored by a group of individuals admired for their physical and 
mental perseverance in stressful situations? 
Cyborg Pain 
I've entitled this section cyborg pain because I believe that two paradigms 
of pain fit within Haraway's (1997) construction of the cyborg. Cyborgs, as 1 
discuss, are discursive figures that inhabit the realm of technobiopower (1997). 
Technobiopower is the collection of discursive practices in which technoscience 
and biopower merge to create normalized bodies and identities within a 
postmodern era of biology, hyperreality, and global corporatization. In science, 
medicine and athletic training, "... we increasingly live and make ourselves in 
techno-biocultural environments structured indelibly by novel forms of science 
and technology" (Escobar, 2000, p. 57). Biology, as a construction of 
technobiopower, is not the study of the body but a discourse about the body 
(Haraway, 1997): 
"My biology," a common expression in daily life for members of the U.S. 
white middle class, is not the juicy mortal flesh itself, but a linguistic sign 
for a complex structure of belief and practice through which I and many 
of my fellow citizens organize a great deal of life. (p. 217) 
Biology defines the anatomical and physiological functions of the normal body 
for technobiopower. Acute pain, the pain center, and theories of pain are all a 
part of this discursive biological practice. Acute pain, as is currently organized 
within the biological construct, is a diagnostic technology and a feedback 
170 
mechanism that informs science and medicine that everything is functioning 
properly within the body. 
Cyborg pain is a discursive construction of pain paradigms that implode 
the biological boundaries of mind/body and normal/abnormal. Cyborg pain 
implodes the technical, medical, social, and biopolitical body (1997). As I have 
discussed at length, binaries are constructed and maintained by the disciplines 
for the distinct purposes of normalization. Technobiopower is the discursive 
practice which cyborg pain resists. Cyborg pain operates by refusing the identity 
attached to it through the normalizing process. Cyborg pain, by no means, is 
glorifying pain but rather presenting a discourse which disrupts the taken for 
granted clinico-pathological practice of technobiopower. Cyborg pain attempts to 
open the space for creating a biological discursive paradigm of pain which is 
inclusive of the differences surrounding this life experience. 
The paradigms I wish to discuss as cyborg pain are chronic pain and 
phantom limb pain. Chronic pain and phantom limb pain are phenomenons that 
are quite common within the population. They are distinct entities of pain that 
share a common bond of abnormality within the normalization process. Their 
operative function is the implosion of the binary of mind/body. Both paradigms 
implode the biological boundaries by incorporating the mind/body binary into 
their abnormal neurophysiological processes. Chronic pain and phantom limb 
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pain are entire biological bodily experiences. Patients within the paradigms of 
cyborg pain: 
... are cyborgs also because, ... humans and other organisms become a 
particular kind of text that can be reduced to code fragments banked in 
transnational data storage systems and redistributed in various ways that 
fundamentally affect reproduction and labor and life opportunities. (Kull, 
2002, pp. 284-285) 
Patients in chronic pain or phantom limb pain pose a problematic for 
technobiopower. These patients find it difficult to function within normal 
activities of daily living. The debilitating pain makes life difficult to tolerate. In a 
society managed by technobiopower, a body that is unable to contribute to the 
productive functions of that society is an abnormal pathological body. 
Unfortunately, neither pain paradigm can be sufficiently explained by clinical 
medicine and its discursive practices. There is no distinct pathological cause for 
either chronic pain or phantom limb pain. They are a complete mystery to the 
disciplines of Western society. 
Health care spending hit $1.6 trillion dollars during 2002 (Sherman, 2004), 
which is roughly $5,000 per person in the United States. "Public funds paid 
$713.4 billion, led by the Medicare and Medicaid programs" (2004, p. A6). The 
largest recipients of Medicaid and Medicare funding are the elderly and the 
disabled (2004). Examining these figures, it is not difficult to fathom the 
enormous financial impact that disabled patients place on the operative functions 
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of technobiopower. Patients diagnosed with chronic pain are well over 90 million 
people a year (Morris, 1991). 
Chronic pain, like consciousness, is not clearly defined or understood. It is 
interesting to note that chronic pain is determined as having no benefit while 
acute pain is beneficial (Morris, 1991). Depending on the source, chronic pain 
may or may not be considered a manifestation of acute pain gone badly. All 
sources agree however, that it is an extremely complex social disease (Morris, 
1991; Starkey, 2004; Strong, 2002; Wall, 1999, 2000). Chronic pain is considered a 
social disease because an individual afflicted with chronic pain affects everyone 
around them. Chronic pain is so poorly understood by medicine that to explain it 
creates even greater confusion: 
Its problematic nature may also be understood, in part, by considering the 
complexity of the nociceptive system and the enormous plasticity inherent 
in that system .... The influence of higher brain centres on all aspects of 
pain processing, and the numerous cellular mechanisms that can alter 
processing of nociceptive information, all have the potential to function 
abnormally and maintain an upregulated state of the nociceptive system. 
(Strong, p. 398) 
The explanation that clinical medicine does offer returns to its epistemological 
foundation of pathological cause. Chronic pain, through the discursive practice 
of clinical medicine, is further divided into nociceptive chronic pain and 
neuropathic chronic pain (Starkey, 2004). The division of chronic pain into 
separate discourses allows for a much easier time to internalize the inability of 
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the practitioner to comprehend and explain this pain to his/her patient with any 
reasonable coherence. 
Nociceptive chronic pain (Starkey, 2004), is caused by an acute disease 
process that turns chronic. The process begins acutely with the activation of 
nociceptors and because of the persistence of the disease, acute inflammation 
turns into chronic inflammation. Arthritic conditions are examples of this type of 
nociceptive chronic pain. Other diseases of this type include cancers, "... 
cancerous tumors may initially grow painlessly, when they begin to compress 
nerve fibers considerable pain is produced. Other chronic diseases produce pain 
because tissue is destroyed as the disease progresses" (Starkey, 2004, p. 35). In 
nociceptive chronic pain, "What is apparent is that the signs and symptoms of 
the patient show a sequence of changes after tissue damage. Pain, tenderness, 
hyperpathia, guarding, abnormal reflexes, and changed motor patterns spread 
far beyond the region of the original injury" (Wall, 1984, p. 24). The familiar tune 
of a pathological cause of tissue damage as the causation for pain continues to be 
pushed as far as the discursive practices of the social body will allow. 
Neuropathic chronic pain (Starkey, 2004), is pain in the absence of an 
identifiable disease or other pathology. Although there is no identifiable cause, 
science and medicine postulate the reasons for neuropathic chronic pain are 
multifaceted and include neurohormones and neurotransmitters. Currently, 
medical discourse believes"... the problem is likely to be an abnormality in the 
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neurons of the pain system" (p. 36). The abnormality is traced to stress and the 
disruption of homeostasis (Melzack, 1999a). Stress, "... is a biological system that 
is activated by physical injury, infection or any threat to biological homeostasis 
as well as by psychological threat and insult..." (1999a, p. S124). With the onset 
of stress the body attempts to rapidly return to homeostasis. As a result, neural, 
hormonal, and behavioral activity are called into action (Melzack, 1999a). 
Chronic neuropathic pain results from these neural and hormonal responses 
overreacting. Cortisol, a hormone in the adrenal cortex, is identified as 
contributing to chronic pain. Cortisol is released in stressful situations, like the 
fight or flight phenomenon. Cortisol works in conjunction with other mediators 
to release endogenous opioids and mobilizes glucose for energy during 
emergency situations. Endogenous opioids are CNS neurotransmitters which 
block noxious stimuli during these fight or flight situations. Unfortunately, 
Cortisol also suppresses the immune system and is highly destructive to neurons 
(Lundy-Ekman, 1998; Melzack, 1999a). Long term presence of Cortisol is 
detrimental to the CNS because of its effects on neuronal breakdown. While 
Cortisol is not solely to blame for chronic pain, it is the prime target of clinical 
medicine. 
Phantom limb pain gets its name from the American surgeon S. Weir 
Mitchell (Wall, 2000; Wright, 2002b). Mitchell is a neurosurgeon on the 
battlefields of the Civil War. He coins the term Phantom limb after attending to 
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countless war amputees complaining of pain within and around the stump. 
(Wall, 2000; Wright 2002b). The vast majority of his amputee patients complain 
of stump pain within six weeks of removal of the appendage. Sixty-five percent 
of his patients complain within the first twenty-four hours of the removal (Wall, 
2000). Phantom limb pain involves intense pain at the location of the former 
appendage. The pain may last for years after the tissue heals and is described by 
patients as resembling the shape of the former appendage. The patient also 
reports the phantom limb moving through space the same as the former 
appendage (Melzack, 1971; 1990). The patient feels the same arm swing, leg 
swing, stretching of muscle tissue, etc. The limb feels so natural and normal that 
initially it used the same as prior to its removal (Melzack, 1971). 
Several phenomena are related to phantom limb pain in patients. First, 
pain may endure for years after tissue healing. Second, pain may spread to other 
areas. Also, pain from other pathological causes may trigger the recurrence of 
phantom limb pain (Melzack, 1971). "Thus, amputees who develop anginal pain 
as long as 25 years after amputation may suffer severe pain in the phantom limb 
during each bout of anginal pain, ..." (1971, p. 189). Finally, increased or 
decreased somatic sensory input may temporarily or permanently abolish 
phantom limb (Melzack, 1971). Somatic sensory input entails the injection of a 
localized anesthetic into the stump to block the noxious input or injection of 
hypertonic saline which exacerbates the noxious stimuli (Melzack, 1971). The 
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interesting part is that both injections last for only minutes, while the relief they 
provide may last for months or permanently. 
During the 20th century, pain sees tremendous, "... growth of a 'market' 
for pain products, pain professionals, and pain institutes" (Kleinman et al., 1992, 
p. 7). The full attention of technobiopower and the discourse of pain are only 
slightly closer to being answered (DeSousa & Wallace, 1977). The cyborg 
presents itself as the product of the long endeavors of technobiopower to cure 
pain. Cyborg pain exists as a discursive resistance to the efforts of 
technobiopower. Chronic pain and phantom limb pain defy categorization and 
normalization. Chronic pain, specifically neuropathic chronic pain, exists 
without cause, successful treatment, or cure. It defies technobiopower by 
deflating production and increasing expenditures. By exponentiallv increasing 
the expense on the health care system a breaking point will be reached soon: 
Patients with chronic pain on the Social Security Administration's (SSA) 
Disability Insurance Program are more likely to be relatively unskilled 
workers with limited education form poor inner-city ethnic groups than 
middle-class professionals. ... Social forces influence not onlv who 
develops chronic pain and who is disabled by it but also who responds to 
treatment and rehabilitation and who becomes permanentlv disabled. 
(Kleinman et al., 1992, p. 3) 
Hegemonic, racial, sexual, and patriarchal discursive practices of 
Technobiopower are adapting to the changing face of health care and pain. 
Technobiopower continues to exclude more and more bodies from its population 
by decreasing their access to health insurance and medical care. Through this 
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methodology fewer bodies will be available for production and consumption. At 
a particular point a rupture in the discursive practice must occur. 
Phantom limb pain resists technobiopower because it resists the binary of 
mind/body. Within phantom limb pain, "... the body is perceived as a unity and 
is identified as the 'self/ distinct from other people and the surrounding world" 
(Melzack, 1999b, p. 881). Phantom limb pain unifies the mind and body and 
supports current scientific and medical research that suggest a neurochemical, 
neuropeptide, and neurohormonal communication system within the individual 
that regulates complex emotional and behavioral experiences (Marion, 2002). 
Phantom limb pain resists the notion of technobiopower that pain and suffering 
are separate experiences of human life. 
Our current discourse of pain is similar to von Prey's Specificity Theory in 
how widely and religiously its acceptance is within the disciplines. As William 
Noordenbos, a world famous neurosurgeon and lifelong advocate for the study 
of pain suggests, "... his (von Frey) voice at that time carried more authoritv. Or 
because he was able to state his views more clearly or was it because thev were 
simpler to state, more easily taught, or did they fit in better with the current 
trend and what people wanted to hear" (Noordenbos, 1987, p. 141). His point is 
about how a lot of science and medicine gets done. The path of least resistance 
does not always apply to electrical current. As science and medicine progresses 
into the 21st century it is imperative that a new paradigm of thinking be unveiled 
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that opposes Cartesian thinking. "Life ultimately means taking the responsibility 
to find the right answer to its problems and fulfilling the tasks which it sets for 
each individual" (Morris, 1991, p. 171). 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The social body in pain is normalized through the discursive practices of 
technobiopower. Normalization of the social body takes place through 
surveillance discourses. Pain, as a technology of technobiopower, categorizes the 
ill or injured social body through pathological causes. Acute pain defines 
pathological cause within the spaces of the social body and allows for the 
treatment of the pathology and a return to health. This normalization process 
forces the body to conform to the discursive paradigm of a pathological pain. The 
social body, within this paradigm, has a stable identity as a patient in pain. This 
identity is named by the source of its pathological pain. The difficulty7, within 
this paradigm, is with the social body which refuses conformity to pathological 
pain. This body in pain is categorized as abnormal, within the discourses of 
science and medicine, and is unstable in its identity construction. This unstable 
identity is a body diagnosed with phantom limb pain or chronic neuropathic 
pain. This social body is constructed as other as a result of reliance upon binaries 
by science and medicine to categorize through naming. The discursive 
construction of other positions the social body with phantom limb pain or 
chronic neuropathic pain as a cyborg in the discourse of pathological pain. 
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The social body in cyborg pain does not conform to a pathological pain 
discourse because no singular causation for pain exists. Cyborg pains resist the 
pathological pain paradigm by refusing to be limited to a discussion of 
mind/body and pathological/ psychological. Cyborg pains occur through 
multiple causations, not all of which are pathological in nature, as discussed in 
Chapter IV. Cyborg pains insist that binaries are categories based upon unstable 
social conditions and create unstable identities. Phantom limb pain and chronic 
neuropathic pain operate as cyborgs because they implode these binaries. The 
inorganic interventions of technobiopower serve cyborg pains by temporarily 
resolving these organic pains. The inorganic intervention of technobiopower in 
the cyborg pains discourse is different from pathological pain discourse. With 
pathological pain, a distinct cause is identified and treated (cured) by 
practitioners through a specific medical protocol. With cyborg pain discourse, 
relief from pain may only be temporary, intervention targets symptoms as 
opposed to causes, and treatment is often sporadic and multivariate in medical 
protocol. Chronic neuropathic pain and phantom limb pain responses differ from 
individual to individual and require different technoscientific interventions. 
Treatment responses and protocols also vary in the degree of success amongst 
individuals. Pathological pain often resolves on its own and often without 
medical intervention. 
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Cyborg pains and technobiopower intertwine in the discursive practices 
of the organic and inorganic. Technobiopower, with its inorganic 
pharmacological and sensory interventions, operates to treat cyborg pain 
symptoms as opposed to its causations and by doing so fuses the mind and 
body. Pharmacologic intervention triggers a systemic CNS reaction and by 
treating the body treats the mind. Pharmacological intervention in cyborg pains 
brings into question the binary of mind and body and its continued use within 
the pedagogies of the western disciplines. It asks what implication does this 
pharmacological cyberjacking of the social body have on the identity 
construction of the patient in chronic pain or phantom limb pain within the 
mind/body binary (Goodeve, 1999; Lewis, 2003)? What happens to the 
pedagogical approaches of the disciplines when cyborg pains implode this 
binary? Once again I return to Popkewitz's quote (Chapter I, p. 2) in order to 
examine the subtle activities of daily pain intervention on the part of health care 
professionals. As a practicing athletic trainer and teacher, my involvement 
within this discursive practice of the normalization of pain must be examined. 
Rarely, do I stop to think about the discursive practices I implicate myself in 
ethically, morally, and philosophically regarding the construction of pain and 
treatment intervention to the social body in pain through the use of 
technobiopower. What must be done to resist these discursive practices of 
pathological pain is the implementation of discourses akin to those of chronic 
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neuropathic pain and phantom limb pain. Again using Maria Morris' (1998) 
example of looking at oppressive categories and examining the beneficiaries and 
who or what is produced by them, is where cyborg pedagogy begins. 
Resistance to pathological pain discursive practices must be at local levels 
and within the pedagogical practices of individual disciplines. Technobiopower 
demands a healthy, normalized population outfitted with the skills to deal with 
the problems of society for the remainder of this century. Governmental leaders, 
influenced by special interest groups, leave health care reform to the market 
economy and health care professionals (Pew Health Professions Commission, 
1995). The logic behind this thinking is that the capitalist system is the truest 
form of Darwinian reform, the strong will survive. The emerging health care 
picture is one of rising medical costs, rising insurance and liability premiums, 
and more Americans foregoing health insurance as an economic priority. The 
unfortunate outcome of this scenario is that a large portion of the population that 
lacks insurance and proper medical care are children and young adults over the 
age of eighteen. How do the athletic trainer and cyborg pains intertwine within 
this health care picture? How can athletic training students (ATS) be 
pedagogically prepared to handle the problems of health care in this century? A 
cyborg pedagogy is my response to these concerns. 
Cyborg pedagogy is pedagogy where together the student and teacher 
create spaces in which patients in pain regain human agency in the struggle to 
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create a stable and unique identity. Cyborg pedagogy is essential in order for 
athletic training students to be capable of meeting the needs of the physically 
active individual within the present and future health care reality. One of many 
unique qualities that athletic trainers traditionally share is the focus on the well 
being of the physically active individual. The continuation of this quality begins 
with the education of future athletic trainers. The job market for athletic trainers 
has shifted away from a traditional university/college athletics setting to a 
clinical outreach and corporate/industrial setting. Athletic training pedagogy 
must adapt to meet these changing work settings and patient demographics. 
Athletic training pedagogy must continue to evolve so as to critically assist in the 
growth and maturation of competent, caring, and knowledgeable health care 
providers. As a profession, athletic training (collectively) must begin to 
implement and live pedagogical practices which are unique to athletic training. 
In the current health care environment, the athletic training student must 
recognize what it means for individuals to not have health insurance. The 
student needs to understand that these reasons are socially constructed and 
exclusionary. They are setup by an economic and political system which does not 
always meet the needs of each individual citizen. Cyborg pedagogy must 
address these issues and incorporate them into the everyday practices of athletic 
training students. As mentioned in Chapter IV, if the cause of chronic 
neuropathic pain is something as simple as excessive Cortisol release from the 
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CNS, is science and medicine willing to relieve the environmental and social 
stressors surrounding its chronic release? Or, as in the case of Prozac (Lewis, 
2003), will pharmacological cyberjacking be sufficient to address chronic 
neuropathic pain? If the chronic pain problem is complex and related to multiple 
causations, are medicine, science, and society willing to do what is necessary to 
relieve this chronic pain problem? Is the athletic trainer willing to address these 
social concerns? 
Cyborg pedagogy is pedagogy from a critical perspective and it is 
intended to envelope the student and the teacher in a process of critical 
awareness: 
Moreover, critical pedagogy should promote the creation of 
interdisciplinary, border crossing students, teachers, and administrators 
who are able to negotiate within the terrains of popular culture and to 
constantly remake their own identities in response to ever changing 
postmodern worlds in which images construct reality and access to 
information implies political and economic power. (Weaver & Daspit, 
1999, p. xv) 
Cyborg pedagogy is undertaken through a discursive relationship and must be 
genuine for a critical transformation to take place. Cyborg pedagogy through the 
implementation of Haraway's (1997) discursive cyborg implodes the binary of 
mind/body and resists its oppressive and exclusionary discourses. Currently, 
medicine and athletic training are taught using the truth games (Foucault, 1997) 
of pathological pain. These particular truth games produce situated knowledges 
about the experience of pathological pain in the social body. These situated 
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knowledges are part of the same truth game which separates the reality of 
cyborg pains from the cultural, social, and economic conditions in which they 
exist. They perpetuate the separation of the pathological from the psychological 
and the social body from the reality in which it exists. "At the heart of all 
professions are specialized knowledge and assumptions about that knowledge. 
In medicine, inductees are taught that the content and methods of science are 
essential to 'knowing' in medicine ..." (Wear & Castellani, 2000, p. 604). These 
specialized knowledges disregard the everyday knowledges of patients in pain 
and create an environment which is not conducive to healing and caring. 
In constructing this cyborg pedagogy, Paulo Freire's work is my 
theoretical framework. Freire (1999) focuses on the conscientization of the teacher 
and the student during their pedagogical relationship. He pushes towards a 
reality where knowledge is situated on the student rather than the teacher. 
Conscientization is oppositional to "banking" education and its methodologies of 
standardization. Banking education (1999): 
... becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories 
and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher 
issues communiques and makes deposits which the students patiently 
receive, memorize, and repeat, (p. 53) 
For Freire, banking education is a problematic because (1999): 
The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less 
they develop the critical consciousness which would result from their 
intervention in the world as transformers of that world. The more 
completely they accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they 
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tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of 
reality deposited in them. (p. 54) 
As students are instructed to focus on standardized materials, which are 
sterilized from their cultural and social base, they lose vision of the larger social 
picture, especially the health care picture. Their critical gaze shifts from questions 
of patient care to questions of specialized knowledges. A standardized 
curriculum does not allow for opportunities to critically evaluate the ethics or 
historicity of a particular set of knowledges. Standardized curriculums want the 
individual to regurgitate standardized information. As a result, there is no 
critical comprehension for the student; it becomes an education of answers. "It is 
obvious that the mistake inherent in an education that forms only in giving 
answers does not reside in the answer itself but in the rupture between the 
answer and the question" (Freire, 1998b, p. 31). Conscientization is the critical 
awakening of the individual, in terms of recognizing their discursive realitv and 
working towards creating a resistance to that reality (Freire, 1999). To achieve 
this conscientization, cyborg pedagogy begins by reading texts from the lives of 
the students rather than from someone else's life and reality. "The cyborg teacher 
is positioned in a web of self-knowledge, or self-care, and is itself in relation to 
such technologies imbricated in extended webs of possibility, power, signs, and 
production" (Appelbaum, 1999, p. 111). Cyborg pedagogy' places the instructor 
and student in an environment in which both create collective interests. Their 
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relationship is mutually rewarding and is an interaction based upon a discursive 
practice of differences and abnormalities. This is in opposition to a "banking" 
classroom where the truth game is the memorization of standardized and 
normalized knowledge. Within a cyborg pedagogy/'... people develop their 
power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which 
they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a 
reality in process, in transformation" (Freire, 1999, p. 64). In this pedagogy, 
students interpret pathological and cyborg pains as something more than 
sensory and the social body as something more than normal. This pedagogy 
practices to transform discursive reality. Students examine the reasons for a lack 
of health insurance in the United States. They participate in moral, ethical, and 
professional discussions. These transformations come about through a critical 
analysis of discursive realities. 
Cyborg pedagogy does not disregard evaluation. On the contrary, 
evaluation and feedback are critical to the operation of education. Testing should 
be done as necessary to demonstrate learning, maturation, and progress. It is not 
done hyperactively for standardized achievement and accountability. Evaluation 
is undertaken within the context of the situation that the student and instructor 
are in. In other words, to evaluate a knee effectively, the student evaluates a 
patient with a real problem, real emotions, and real feedback. The clinical 
evaluation provides the student the necessary feedback as to how all of their 
188 
situated knowledges work collectively to make them an ATC and the patient a 
real person. The evaluation which breaks knowledge into pieces and then 
"checks off" correct procedures provides little feedback and critical growth for 
the student. Athletic training is unique in its mission; therefore we must begin to 
delineate the type of pedagogy which will be most beneficial to our students in 
their current and future employment settings. I would like to leave cyborg 
pedagogy and the reader with a pertinent quote from Paulo Freire, "Only an 
education of question can trigger, motivate, and reinforce curiositv" (1998). 
Concluding, cyborg pains should continue the discursive practice of 
weaving. Weaving is essential to the mutual growth of curriculum theorv and 
the health care professions. Weaving helps bridge the pedagogical gap created 
by specialized knowledges. One of the ways weaving achieves this is by criticallv 
examining issues of popular culture in the health care classroom. For example, 
by examining mass media pharmaceutical ads, students and teachers can 
critically examine the ethical, social, and medical issues surrounding these 
discursive practices on television. Teachers and students can recognize 
influences on health care decision making from sources outside of science and 
medicine. Weaving can foster the academic interdisciplinarity that is desperately 
needed in athletic training. 
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